CRS Report for Congress The Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends,State

出处：按学科分类—政治、法律 BERKSHIREPUBLISHINGGROUP《PatternsofGlobalTerrorism1985-2005：U.S.DepartmentofStateReportswithSupplementaryDocumentsandStatistics》第602页（21589字）

Raphael Perl

Specialist in International Affairs Foreign Affairs,

Defense, and Trade Division

Summary

This report highlights trends and data found in the State Department’s annual Patterns of Global Terrorism report,(Patterns 2003) and addresses selected issues relating to its content.This report will not be updated.

On April 29, 2004, the Department of State released its annual Patterns of Global Terrorism report. Data at releaseshowed minimal change in the number of terrorist attacks worldwide in 2003 over 2002 levels—a decrease from 198 attacks to 190. In 2003, the overall number of reported anti-U.S. attacks remained more or less constant as well, 82 anti-U.S. attacks in 2003 as opposed to 77 attacksin the previous year. In 2003, the number of personskilled in international terrorist attacks was 307,down from 725 in 2002. In 2003, persons wounded numbered 1,593, down from 2013 the previous year. In 2003, as in 2002, both the highest number of attacks(70) and highest number of casualties (159 dead and 951 wounded) continued to occur in Asia. Notably, the report defines terrorist acts as incidents directed against noncombatants.Thus, attacks in Iraq on military targets are not included.

Patterns, a work widely perceived as a standard, authoritativereference tool on terrorist activity, trends, and groups, has been subject to periodic criticism that it is undulyinfluenced by domestic, other foreign policy, political and economic considerations.

This year for the first time, data contained in Patterns—which some critics in Congress view as incomplete if not flawed—was provided by the newly operational Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).TTIC is providing an erratasheet, which will include, among other information,data on terrorist attacks after November 11, 2003.

It has been some fifteen years since Congress mandatedthe first Patterns report. At the time when the report was originally conceived as a reference document, the primarythreat from terrorism was state sponsored. Since then, the threat has evolved with Al Qaeda affiliated groups and non-state sponsors increasingly posing a major threat. Given the increased complexity and danger posed by the terrorist threat, one option available to Congress and the executive branch is to take a fresh look at Patterns,its structure and content.

Overview of 2003 Terrorist Trends

On April 29, 2004, the Department of State released its Patternsof Global Terrorism report (hereafter referred to as Patterns2003).⁽¹⁾ Data, as originally published, show minimal change in the number of terrorist attacks worldwide in 2003 over 2002 levels—a decrease from 199 attacks to 190. In 2003, the overall number of reported anti-U.S. attacks remainedmore or less constant as well, 82 anti-US attacks in 2003 as opposed to 77 attacks in the previous year. The reportindicates that worldwide deaths from international terroristactivity were down roughly 58% in 2003 (from 725 to 307) and the number of wounded was down roughly 21% from 2,013 to 1,593. In 2003, as in 2002, both the highest number of attacks (70) and highest number of casualties (159 dead and 951 wounded) continued to occur in Asia where the number of attacks declined roughly by one-third, and the number of casualties declined roughly 13%. The report emphasizesthat most of the attacks in Iraq that occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom do not meet the U.S. definition of international terrorism employed by Patterns because they were directed at combatants, that is, “American and coalition forces on duty.”⁽²⁾

In additional to statistical charts, Patterns, includes in its Appendixes a summary chronology of significant terrorist incidentsand background information on U.S designated foreignterrorist organizations and other terrorist groups.⁽³⁾

State Sponsors of Terrorism

In addition to data on terrorist trends, groups, and activities worldwide, the report provides a description as to why countriesare on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism that are subject to U.S. sanctions. Thus, included in Patterns are detaileddata on the seven countries currently on the “terrorism list”: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria.U.S. Administration officials maintain that the practice of designatingand reporting on the activities of the state sponsors of terrorism list and concomitant sanctions policy has contributedsignificantly to a reduction in the overt—and apparentlyoverall—activity level of states supporting terrorism in the past decade. Libya and Sudan are frequently cited as examplesof such success.

Countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism are subject to severe U.S. export controls—particularly of dual use technology.The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export AmendmentsAct of 1989 (P.L. 101-222) prohibits export of dual use items, as well sales of military items and foreign economic assistance to countries on the terrorism list. Also, the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits providing foreign aid to these designatedcountries. Section 6(j) of the 1979 Export AdministrationAct stipulates that Congress must be notified at least 30 days in advance before any licenses are issued for exporting equipment or services that could be used for terrorist or militarypurposes. Other sanctions include denying foreign tax credits on income earned in those countries.

The degree of support for, or involvement in, terrorist activitiestypically varies dramatically from nation to nation. In 2003, of the seven on the U.S. terrorism list, Iran continued to be characterized on one extreme as an active supporter of terrorism: a nation that uses terrorism as an instrument of policyor warfare beyond its borders. Closer to the middle of the spectrum is Syria. Although not formally detected in an active role since 1986, Patterns reports that the Assad regime reportedlyuses groups in Syria and Lebanon to export terror into Israel and allows groups to train in territory under its control.On the less active end of the spectrum, one might place countriessuch as Cuba or North Korea, which at the height of the ColdWar were more active, but in recent years have seemed to settle for a more passive role of granting ongoing safe haven to previously admitted terrorists. Also at the less active end of the spectrum, and arguably falling off it, are Libya and notably Sudan, which reportedly has stepped up counterterrorismcooperation with U.S. law enforcement and intelligenceagencies after the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Country Highlights

Terrorism List Nations

Iran. Patterns 2003 again designates Iran as the “most active”state sponsor of international terrorism.The report, which incorporates data from U.S. and allied intelligence services,notes that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard and Ministry of Intelligence and Security were “involved in the planning of and support for terrorist acts and continued to exhort a varietyof groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals.”⁽⁴⁾ Actionscited include (1) providing safe haven to members of Al-Qaeda; (2) providing money, weapons and training to HAMAS, Hizballah, and Arab Palestinian rejectionist groups;and (3) helping members of the Ansar al Islam group in Iraq transit and find safe haven in Iran.The report notes that Iranianofficials have acknowledged detaining Al Qaeda operativesduring 2003, but have resisted calls to transfer them to their countries of origin. On December 19, 2003, Iran announcedit will sign an agreement allowing international inspectionsof nuclear sites. Iran is not considered to be a likely candidate for removal from the Department of State’s TerrorismSponsors List in the coming year.

North Korea. North Korea, designated a member of the“axis of evil” by President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address, is not known to have sponsored any terroristacts since 1987 according to the report. However, it continuedto give sanctuary to hijackers affiliated with the Japanese Red Army. Patterns 2003 stresses that North Korea announced it planned to sign several antiterrorism conventions,but did not take any substantive steps to cooperate in efforts to combat terrorism. Although Patterns notes that North Korea’s support for international terrorism appears limited at present, its efforts to restart its nuclear program and its role in proliferation of ballistic missiles and missile technologysuggest that its removal from the terrorism list will not occur anytime soon.

Iraq. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, had been cited in the 2002 Patterns report for a longstanding policy of providing safe haven and bases for terrorist groups and as having laid the groundwork for possible attacks against civilian and militarytargets in the United States and otherWestern nations throughout 2002. However, in the event of a substantive regime change, a nation may be removed from the terrorism list. Under U.S. law, (Paragraph 6 (j) (4) of the Export AdministrationAct, the President must first report to Congress that the government of the country concerned: (1) does not supportterrorism and (2) has provided assurances that it will not support terrorism in the future. On May 7, 2003, President Bush suspended all sanctions against Iraq applicable to state sponsors of terrorism,which had the practical effect of putting Iraq on a par with non terrorist states. Iraq is expected to be removed from the terrorism list as soon as it has its own governmentin place that pledges not to support terrorist acts in the future, a requirement expected to be met shortly after June 30, 2004.The report notes that the line between insurgency and terrorism has become “increasingly blurred” in Iraq, as attackson civilian targets have become more common. By the end of 2003, coalition forces had detained more than 300 suspected foreign fighters in Iraq.⁽⁵⁾

Libya. In 2003 Libya reiterated assurances to the U.N. SecurityCouncil that it had renounced terrorism, had shared intelligencewithWestern intelligence agencies, had taken steps to resolve matters related to its past support of terrorism, and on December 19, 2003 announced it would rid itself of weapons of mass destruction and allow inspections of its nuclearfacilities.⁽⁶⁾ The report states that in 2003, Libya held to its pattern in recent years of curtailing support for internationalterrorists, although Tripoli continued in 2003 to maintaincontact with “some past terrorist clients.” President Bush lifted sanctions against Libya on April 23, 2004, after successfulintelligence cooperation on WMD issues and efforts by Libya to resolve compensation for Pam Am flight 103 survivors.

Syria. Syria, according to Patterns 2003, continued to providepolitical and material support to Palestinian rejectionist groups and continued to permit Iran to use Damascus as a transhipment point for resupplying Hizballah in Lebanon.On a positive note, the report notes that Damascus has cooperatedwith other governments “against al Qaeda, the Taliban,and other terrorist organizations and individuals,” has discouraged signs of public support for Al Qaeda, including in the media and mosques, and has made efforts to tighten its borders with Iraq to limit the movement of anti-Coalition foreign fighters. On May 11, 2004, President Bush imposed economic and trade sanctions against Syria under the Syrian Accountability Act,⁽⁷⁾ but also waived some of the provisions,notably provisions applying to the export of select items.⁽⁸⁾

Cuba. Cuba, a terrorism list carryover from the cold war has,according to Patterns 2003, “remained opposed to the U.S.-led Coalition prosecuting the global war on terrorism”⁽⁹⁾ and continued to provide support to designated terrorist organizations.It is considered unlikely that Cuba will be removed from the terrorism list, absent a regime change.⁽¹⁰⁾

Sudan. Sudan is generally considered by observers to be a strong candidate for removal from the terrorism list. Patterns 2003 claims that the nation has “deepened its cooperation with the U.S. Government,” producing significant progress in combating terrorist activity, but “areas of concern” remain,notably the active presence in Sudan of Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ). In 2004, Sudan was removed from the list of countries designated by the Secretary of State as not fully cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism.

Report Issues

Politicization of Report

Some critics of Patterns and its designation of state sponsors of terrorism charge that the Patterns 2003 report generally,and specifically its reporting of activities of nations, is unduly influenced by a complex web of overlapping and sometimes competing political and economic agendas and concerns. As cases in point, they refer to activity cited in Patterns reports used to justify retaining Cuba and North Korea on the state sponsors list.⁽¹¹⁾ Others suggest that Patterns’ heavy focus on state sponsors of terror make such reports less useful in a world where terrorist activity is increasingly neither state supportednor state countenanced. Still others ask whether, and to what degree, Patterns supports a sanctions policy that is unrealistically achievable and too unilateral when imposing sanctions on nations in which U.S. and allied economic and strategic geopolitical interests run high.

However, Patterns in its current form is not intended to set policy. Thus, one potential shortcoming of the criticisms cited above is that they are either policy oriented or revolve around disagreement with policy issues instead of centering on disagreement with the data and analysis presented in Patternsreports. Moreover, such criticisms, they maintain, arguablyplace too much emphasis on the state sponsors section of Patterns, with little or no emphasis on the plethora of useful data provided in the report on trends in terrorist activityand background on terrorist organizations.

Over-or Under-Emphasizing

Levels of Cooperation

Particularly strong have been suggestions by some that Patternsplays down undesirable levels of counter-terrorism cooperationand progress in the case of nations seen as vital to the global campaign against terror. Patterns 2003, in contrast to pre “9/11” report versions, is silent about Pakistan’s alleged ongoing support for Kashmiri militants and their attacks against the population of India. Some critics argue that Patterns2003 also falls far short of criticizing Saudi Arabia, perceivedby many analysts as a slow, unwilling, or halfhearted ally in curbing or cracking down on activities which support or spawn terrorism activities outside its borders. In contrast,Patterns 2003 cites Saudi Arabia as “an excellent example of a nation increasingly focusing its political will to fight terrorism.”Some suggest, however, that often at play here is simply a desire to put the best face on terrorist related relationships in the hopes of obtaining better cooperation in the future.

On the flip side of the coin is an issue, yet to be resolved,of how to inform Congress and give countries credit in Patterns for cooperation in such matters as intelligence or renditionswhen, for domestic political concerns, they do not want this made public. One option might be to produce more frequently a classified annex to the Patterns report which has been done in the past. A downside, however, is that preparationof a classified version is much more time consuming for those tasked with simultaneously preparing the public document.

Review and Restructuring

of Patterns

Some also suggest that Patterns reports could be stronger in their coverage of the ideological and economic impact of terrorismon individual nations and the global economy. One issue here, as raised by some observers, is whether Patterns places too much emphasis on quantifying and measuring terroristsuccess in terms of physical damage to persons and property when terror groups may increasingly be measuring mid-and long-term success by economic and political criteria.

Going beyond the question, raised by some, of any perceivedshortcomings in data, which may or may not be found in Patterns 2003, is the question of the quality of strategic analysis of the data provided.To what degree might such analysis be enhanced? Some observers suggest the issue here is the degree to which Patterns is designed to reflect, or might be construed to reflect, a “body count” reporting mentality.⁽¹²⁾Would there be benefits to Congress and the counterterrorismpolicy community if the focus of Patterns reports was less on presenting statistics and facts, and more on gainingmeaning from the data? And if so, how might Congress effect such a change in policy focus? Admittedly, overall numbersby themselves may not always present a complete picture.For example, each small pipeline bombing in Colombia is cited as one incident in Patterns as would be a major terroristincident as the multiple train bombings in Madrid in March 2004. Another possible shortcoming, some note, is that Patterns sometimes may not include, or adequately note,incidents that are not international in nature but which may have a major political or economic impact on the target nationand well beyond it.

Indeed, Patterns 2003 has been subject to criticism on the issue of data completeness or accuracy, as well as on the issue of data relevance.⁽¹³⁾ In a May 17, 2004 letter to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Henry A.Waxman, Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Government Reform,suggests that data in Patterns 2003 which indicate that nonsignificantterrorist attacks have declined in the last two years is in sharp contrast to independent analysis of the same data which concludes that significant terrorist attacks (acts causing, or reasonably expected to cause: death, serious personalinjury or major property damage) actually reached a 20-year high in 2003.⁽¹⁴⁾ Also questioned is completeness, if not factual accuracy, of the data relied upon in the Patterns 2003 report. The list of significant incidents in Patterns 2003, as originally disseminated, concludes abruptly on November11, 2003, presumably therefore, not counting major multiple terrorists attacks that occurred later in the year.⁽¹⁵⁾

Table 1 Patterns of Global Terrorism Data, 2002-2003

Note: Based on data originally published in Patterns 2003. Traditionally,this data had been provided to the State Department by the Central IntelligenceAgency. More recently this function has been transferred to thenewly operational Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Periodic requestsfrom analysts at the Department of State and from analysts at theCongressional Research Service in April 2004 for quarterly access to anunclassified version of the data base of terrorist incidents have, to date,not resulted in access to the data desired.

a Compared with 487 attacks in 1982.

b In 2003 the highest percent of targets were businesses (67%); the mostcommon method of attack was bombing (71%).

c Casualties include dead and wounded.

d 2002 figures include relatively high casualties in a number of anti-Russian attacks, such as the October 2002 Moscow theater attack.

The statistical data which forms the basis for Patterns have traditionally been provided to the State Department by the CIA. More recently this function has been transferred to the newly operational Terrorist Threat Integration Center(TTIC).⁽¹⁶⁾ TTIC is providing an errata sheet to correct incompletedata.⁽¹⁷⁾

Conclusion

It has been some fifteen years since Congress mandated the first Patterns report. At the time the report was originally conceivedas a reference document, the primary threat from terrorismwas state sponsored. Since then, the threat has evolved, with Al Qaeda affiliated groups and non-state sponsorsincreasingly posing a major threat. Over the years, the reporthas increased in length and expanded in scope. It has been disseminated on the internet, translated into five additionallanguages, and is widely recognized as a primary resourceon terrorist activities and groups. However, in view of the earlier-noted data issues, the report may be subject to increasedcriticism and scrutiny. In light of the high level of internationalattention attached to the report and the increased complexity and danger posed by the terrorist threat, some observershave suggested that a thorough Executive/Congressionalreview of Patterns, its structure and content, may be timely and warranted.

Order Code RL32417, June 1, 2004