Collated Reports on State Sponsors of Terrorism

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From Patterns of Global Terrorism

Afghanistan

1987

The Afghanistan-sponsored terrorist campaign in 1987 spread beyond the North-West Frontier Province to major cities in Pakistan. The campaign is being waged by the Afghan Ministry of State Security, WAD. In addition to assassinations and bombing of civilians, the campaign included attacks against public utilities in major cities, particularly in the North-West Frontier Province. Pakistan’s President Zia asserted in November that the bombings were staged “at the behest of the Soviet Union,” but Moscow has vehemently denied any complicity.

In view of the close relationship WAD has with the KGB, however, we consider it likely that the Soviet Union has been cognizant of Afghan intelligence’s overall operations in Pakistan.

Most of the explosive devices recovered in Pakistan during the terrorist campaign have been of Soviet manufacture. Some of the materiel can be purchased on the international black market, but the time-delay devices used in many of the bombings can be obtained only through Soviet sources.

A Pakistani Government report states that approximately 1,500 Soviet advisors work with the WAD. We expect most Soviet advisers to leave Afghanistan as their troops withdraw.

Afghan agents have also carried out terrorist operations in Iran, although details of these activities are not well known. WAD agents are widely credited with assassinating a major Mujahedin leader in Iran last year.

In their insurgency against the Kabul regime, Mujahedin guerillas generally eschew acts of violence that put civilians in jeopardy. Some bombs were detonated in Kabul, however, in areas where the likelihood of causing civilian casualties was high. The Mujahedin claimed responsibility for a car bomb blast in Jalalabad in 1987 in which there were significant civilian casualties.

The United States has registered strong concerns to the Afghan Government as well as with the Soviet Union over the WAD campaign and will continue to monitor the situation closely.

1988

Afghanistan has sponsored a bombing campaign against Pakistan since the mid-1980s in an effort to turn Pakistanis against the Afghan refugees and undermine Islamabad’s support for the Afghan resistance. The bombings decreased from 128 in 1987 to 118 in 1988 but continue well above the level in 1986, when there were 22. The nature of the campaign changed in 1988:

The primary venue of bombings shifted back to the North-West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, after a number of bloody bombings in 1987 in major cities in Sind and Punjab Provinces. Bombings were refinewed during the last quarter in major cities outside the border areas; probably to signal Kabul’s displeasure with Islamabad’s continuing support for Mujahedin operations against withdrawing Soviet troops.

The fatality rate declined by half in 1988, not only because of the shift of venue away from the main cities, but also because the terrorists have not used car bombs since December 1987.

The number of bombings also began to trail off in the second half of 1988. We attribute this to a number of factors: WAD may have had trouble infiltrating terrorists into Pakistan, as the Mujahedin controlled more Afghan territory adjacent to Pakistan; Pakistani security may have improved; and Kabul may have decided to decrease the bombings—at least against crowded Pakistani civilian areas—after the Geneva accords were signed in May.

There are also indications that WAD shifted its resources to attack Afghan rebel supply sites in Pakistan:

On 10 April a major explosion at an arms depot outside Rawalpindi killed over 100 persons and wounded approximately 1,100 others. Although the cause of the explosion was never determined, sabotage is suspected.

On 14 April an explosion in Chaman killed six persons and wounded up to 50 others. It was almost certainly caused by sabotage.

The Afghan WAD received training in 1988 by the Soviet KGB, but there is no evidence linking Soviet personnel to difirect participation in terrorist operations. We consider it likely, however, that the Soviet Union has been cognizant of Afghan intelligence’s overall operations in Pakistan. Pakistani sources report that physical evidence found at the sites of terrorist attacks indicates that much of the explosives and related materials are Soviet manufactured, such as specialized Soviet-made timing devices that have little utility in a military inventory.

1997

Usama Bin Ladin

Usama bin Muhammad bin Awad Bin Ladin is one of the most significant sponsors of Sunni Islamic terrorist groups. The youngest son of Saudi construction magnate Muhammad Bin Ladin, Usama joined the Afghan resistance almost immediately after the Soviet invasion in December 1979.

He played a significant role in financing, recruiting, transporting, and training Arab nationals who volunteered to fight in Afghanistan. During the war, Bin Ladin founded alQaida—the Base—to serve as an operational hub, predominantly for like-minded Sunni Islamic extremists. The Saudi Government revoked his citizenship in 1994 and his family officially disowned him. He had moved to Sudan in 1991, but international pressure on that government forced him to move to Afghanistan in 1996.

In August 1996, Bin Ladin issued a statement outlining his organization’s goals: drive US forces from the Arabian Peninsula, overthrow the Government of Saudi Arabia, “liberate” Muslim holy sites in “Palestine,” and support Islamic revolutionary groups around the world. To these ends, his organization has sent trainers throughout Afghanistan as well as to Tajikistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen and has trained fighters from numerous other countries including the Philippines, Egypt, Libya, and Eritrea. Bin Ladin also has close associations with the leaders of several Islamic terrorist groups and probably has aided in creating new groups since the mid-1980s. He has trained their troops, provided safehaven and financial support, and probably helps them with other organizational matters.

Since August 1996, Bin Ladin has been very vocal in expressing his approval of and intent to use terrorism. He claimed responsibility for trying to bomb US soldiers in Yemen in late 1992 and for attacks on them in Somalia in 1993, and reports suggest his organization aided the Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya in its assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995. In November 1996 he called the 1995 and 1996 bombings against US military personnel in Saudi Arabia “praiseworthy acts of terrorism” but denied having any personal participation in those bombings. At the same time, he called for further attacks against US military personnel, saying: “If someone can kill an American soldier, it is better than wasting time on other matters.”

Usama Bin Ladin

The bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 7 August 1998 underscored the global reach of Usama Bin Ladin—a long-time sponsor and financier of Sunni Islamic extremist causes—and his network. A series of public threats to drive the United States and its allies out of Muslim countries foreshadowed the attacks. The foremost threat was presented as a Muslim religious decree and published on 23 February 1998 by Bin Ladin and allied groups under the name “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders.” The statement asserted that it was a religious duty for all Muslims to wage war on US citizens, military and civilian, anywhere in the world.

The 17th son of Saudi construction magnate Muhammad Bin Ladin, Usama joined the Afghan resistance almost immediately after the Soviet invasion in December 1979. He played a significant role in financing, recruiting, transporting, and training Arab nationals who volunteered to fight in Afghanistan. During the war, Bin Ladin founded alQaida—the “Base”—to serve as an operational hub for likeminded Sunni Islamic extremists. In 1994 the Saudi Government revoked his citizenship and his family officially disowned him. He moved to Sudan in 1991 but international pressure on Khartoum forced him to move to Afghanistan in 1996.

Bin Ladin leads a broadbased, versatile organization. Suspects named in the wake of the Embassy bombings—four Egyptians, one Comoran, one Jordanian, three Saudis, one US citizen, one or possibly two Kenyan citizens, and one Tanzanian—reflect the range of al-Qaida operatives. The difiverse groups under his umbrella afford Bin Ladin resources beyond those of the people directly loyal to him. With his own inherited wealth, business interests, contributions from sympathizers in various countries, and support from close allies like the Egyptian and South Asian groups that signed his so-called fatwa, he funds, trains, and offers logistic help to extremists not directly affiliated with his organization.

Bin Ladin seeks to aid those who support his primary goal—driving US forces from the Arabian Peninsula, removing the Saudi ruling family from power, and “liberating Palestine”—or his secondary goals of removing Western military forces and overthrowing what he calls corrupt, Westernoriented governments in predominantly Muslim countries. To these ends, his organization has sent trainers throughout Afghanistan as well as to Tajikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, and has trained fighters from numerous other countries, including the Philippines, Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, and Eritrea.

Using the ties al-Qaida has developed, Bin Ladin believes he can call upon individuals and groups virtually worldwide to conduct terrorist attacks. His Egyptian and South Asian allies, for example, publicly threatened US interests in the latter half of 1998. Bin Ladin’s own public remarks underscore his expanding interests, including a desire to obtain a capability to deploy weapons of mass destruction.

On 4 November indictments were returned in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York in connection with the two US Embassy bombings in Africa. Charged in the indictment were: Usama Bin Ladin, his military commander Muhammad Atef, and Wadih El Hage, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Mohammed Sadeek Odeh, and Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali, all members of al-Qaida. Two of these suspects, Odeh and al-Owhali, were turned over to US authorities in Kenya and brought to the United States to stand trial. Another suspect, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, was arrested in Germany and extradited to the United States in December. On 16 December five others were indicted for their role in the Dar es Salaam Embassy bombing: Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Fahid Mohommed Ally Msalam, and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan.

Cuba

Designation date March 1, 1982

1985

The Castro regime has maintained a large and complex apparatus for subversion that supports many leftist revolutionaries and terrorists. This has ranged from arms and funding to safehaven and training—assistance that is indispensable for guerilla movements and terrorists in Latin America. Castro has given logistic assistance and financial support to thousands of guerillas and has provided them with military training.

Cuba has provided support to Salvadoran leftists and other insurgents. Many of the guerillas infkltrated into Honduras in recent years were trained in Cuba, and Havana has used Honduran territory as a transit area for material passed to Salvadoran insurgents. In addition, Colombia’s M-19 has a long and well-established relationship with the Cuban government.

1986

Cuba maintains a large and complex apparatus for subversion that has substantially assisted guerilla movements and terrorists in Latin America. Cuba gives logistic assistance and financial support to thousands of regional subversives—mostly from Central America—and provides them with military training. Havana has close and long-standing relationships with terrorist groups in Chile and Colombia.

Havana is particularly close to the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) and the 19th of April Movement (M-19)—and has long encouraged efforts by Colombian insurgents to unite. Cuba has had a special interest in Chile since the Allende years. In August 1986, Chilean authorities discovered large arms caches north of Santiago. Available information strongly suggested the weapons had been supplied by Cuba.

1987

We were unable to trace direct sponsorship of an international terrorist attack to Cuba in 1987. Since 1959, however, Cuba has trained and supported guerillas throughout the world, including Palestinians. Such training has become increasingly specialized. Cuba has provided safehaven, weapons, and political and financial support to a wide range of leftist and insurgent organizations that use terrorism in Latin America, including groups from El Salvador, Guatemala, Ecuador, Chile, and Colombia. This support persisted in 1987. We are also aware of longstanding contacts between Cuba and Puerto Rican terrorist groups.

1988

For nearly 30 years now, Cuban President Fidel Castro has trained and supported guerillas from many parts of the world, including Palestinians, who have relied in part on terrorist operations against noncombatants to advance their political aims. Cuba has maintained a large and complex apparatus for subversion that has substantially assisted guerilla movements throughout Latin America, and many of Latin America’s radical leftist organizations look to Castro for guidance and advice. Havana has particularly longstanding ties to guerilla groups in Colombia and Chile, including the FPMR, which is believed responsible for nine international terrorist incidents in Chile in 1988. In Colombia, Cuba has supported the ELN which is responsible for numerous international terrorist attacks targeting Western economic interests in 1988. In El Salvador, the FMLN, which has received support from Cuba as well as other radical countries, has publicly threatened Americans assisting the Salvadoran Government as “legitimate targets of assassination.”

Because of such continuing involvement, the US Government in 1982 put Cuba on its official list of state supporters of terrorism. Although we are unable to trace direct sponsorship of an international terrorist attack in 1988 to Cuba, it continues to provide safehaven, weapons, and political and financial support to a wide range of leftist and insurgent organizations that use terrorism.

Cuba harbors terrorists wanted in the United States for their crimes. William Morales, a Puerto Rican terrorist, was granted refuge in Cuba in June 1988 after his deportation from Mexico. Morales escaped from US detention in 1987 while serving an 89-year sentence for acts of terrorism. Cuba is also believed to be harboring at least one other Puerto Rican terrorist implicated in a Wells Fargo robbery in Connecticut in 1983. Joanne Chesimard, leader of the Black Liberation Army who escaped from a US federal prison after being convicted of the murder of a New Jersey state policeman, is living in Cuba.

1989

Cuba has trained and supported radical groups from around the world, including Palestinian groups that have often used terrorism to advance their political causes. It has maintained a large and complex apparatus to support guerilla movements and extremist groups throughout Latin America. Many of Latin America’s radical leftist organizations look to President Fidel Castro for guidance and advice. Havana has particularly longstanding ties to guerillas in Chile and Colombia, including the National Liberation Army—a group that has carried out more international terrorism than any other in Latin America in recent years. In El Salvador, the Farabundo Marti Liberation Movement, which receives support from Cuba as well as other radical countries, has publicly threatened Americans assisting the Salvadoran Government as “legitimate targets of assassination.” Because of its continuing involvement in support to radical groups conducting terrorist actions, the US Government placed Cuba on its official list of state supporters of terrorism in 1982.

1990

Cuba continues to serve as a haven for regional revolutionaries and to provide military training, weapons, funds, and guidance to radical subversive groups that use terrorism. The island today remains a major training center and transit point for Latin subversives and some international groups.

EL Salvador’s Farbundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) has been the primary beneficiary of Cuba’s clandestine support network over the last several years. Havana has been the point of origin for most of the weapons used by the FMLN for insurgent and terrorist operations in El Salvador. Other Central American groups, notably in Honduras and Guatemala, have also received Cuban aid. In South America, Chilean radical leftist groups have been the favored recipients of Cuban support, but their aid may have declined since Chile’s peaceful transition to civilian rule in March 1990.

Several rebel organizations have offices and members stationed in Havana. Wounded rebels are often treated in Cuban hospitals. With the demise of the pro-Cuban governments in Panama and Nicaragua, Cuba’s support has become even more important to radical groups.

1991

In light of its overwhelming domestic economic problems, Cuba has greatly reduced or suspended its training, arms shipments, and financial support to armed Latin American subversive groups over the past year. Havana also has downplayed political ties to many of these groups—notably in Honduras and Chile—in hopes of upgrading diplomatic and trade relations in the region. Shortly before a settlement was reached, Havana publicly backed a political settlement between the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), a longtime beneficiary of Cuban military aid and training.

Cuba, nevertheless, reportedly continues to serve as a safehaven for some regional and international terrorist organizations. In addition, Cuba continues to provide limited political training to some leftist organizations. We have no information to confirm that Cuba has closed down its training camps for armed insurgents.

1992

Cuba’s increasingly critical economic situation and continued political isolation have precluded any significant material or financial assistance to the few remaining Marxist insurgencies in Latin America. As a result, Fidel Castro has impressed upon some of the insurgent leaders the need to make peace. In the past year Castro has welcomed the peace accord in El Salvador and has publicly advised Guatemalan and Colombian insurgents to negotiate seriously to end the armed struggle.

Castro continues to allow insurgent offices such as those of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) to operate in Havana. Although Cuba has adhered to UN-mandated sanctions against Libya, it has not moved to limit Libyan diplomatic representatives, as required by international law. Reports indicate that Cuba continues to host Third World leftist militants for study and political training, but military training seems to have been halted.

1993

In the past, Cuba provided significant military training, weapons, funds, and guidance to radical subversives from different parts of the world. Largely because of its steady and dramatic economic decline, Cuba has been unable to maintain support to subversive groups. Moreover, the Castro regime has minimized its ties to such groups in an attempt to upgrade diplomatic and trade relations. Although there is no evidence that Cuba directly sponsored an international terrorist attack in 1993, the island continued to serve as a safehaven for members of some regional and international terrorist organizations. Cuba has adhered to UN-mandated sanctions against Libya but has not limited Libyan diplomatic representation as required. In September, Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Pedro Miret Prieto traveled to Libya to expand bilateral cooperation.

1994

The Castro regime, which is preoccupied with its existence, is no longer able to support armed struggle actively in Latin America and other parts of the world. In years past, Havana provided significant levels of military training, weapons, funds, and guidance to leftist subversives. Currently, the regime’s focus is largely on economic survival, and the government is attempting to upgrade diplomatic and trade relations within Latin America. Cuba’s economy continued to deteriorate, and a large antiregime demonstration broke out for the first time in 1994.

Although there is no evidence that Cuban officials have been directly involved in sponsoring a specific act of terrorism during the past year, Havana did provide safehaven in 1994 to several terrorists in Cuba. A number of ETA Basque terrorists who sought sanctuary in Cuba several years ago continue to live on the island. Some of the more than 40 Chilean terrorists from the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) who escaped from a Chilean prison in 1990 also probably still reside in Cuba. Colombia’s two main guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), reportedly maintain representatives in Havana.

1995

Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world. In earlier years, the Castro regime provided significant levels of military training, weapons, funding, and guidance to leftist extremists worldwide. Havana’s focus now is to forestall an economic collapse; the government actively continued to seek the upgrading of diplomatic and trade relations with other nations.

Cuba is not known to have sponsored any international terrorist incidents in 1995. Havana, however, provided safehaven to several terrorists in Cuba during the year. A number of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorists, who sought sanctuary in Cuba several years ago, still live on the island. Members of a few Latin American terrorist organizations and US fugitives also reside in Cuba.

1996

Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world. In earlier years the Castro regime provided significant levels of military training, weapons, funding, and guidance to numerous leftist extremists. Havana’s focus now is to forestall an economic collapse; the government actively continued to seek the upgrading of diplomatic and trade relations with other nations.

Although there is no current evidence that Cuban officials were directly involved in sponsoring specific acts of terrorism last year, Cuba is still a safehaven for several international terrorists, maintains close relations with other state sponsors of terrorism, and remains in contact with numerous leftist insurgent groups in Latin America.

A number of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorists who sought sanctuary in Cuba several years ago continue to live on the island. Some of the more than 40 Chilean terrorists from the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) who escaped from a Chilean prison in 1990 also probably still reside in Cuba. Colombia’s two main guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), reportedly maintain repfiresentatives in Havana.

Cuba also provides safehaven to several nonterrorist US fugitives.

1997

Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world. In the past, the Castro regime provided significant levels of funding, military training, arms, and guidance to various revolutionary groups across the globe. However, with the collapse of its prime sponsor—the Soviet Union—in 1989, Cuba suffered a severe economic decline. Without ready cash, Havana was forced to scale back severely its already waning support to international terrorists. To make up for this economic shortfall, the Castro government’s focus in recent years has been on generating revenue through tourism. Cuba’s attempts to encourage foreign investment in the hospitality industry has forced the nation to seek upgraded diplomatic and trade relations with other nations.

Although Cuba is not known to have sponsored any international terrorist incidents in 1997, it continued to give safehaven to several terrorists during the year. A number of ETA terrorists who gained sanctuary in Cuba some years ago continue to live on the island. In addition, members of a few Latin American-based international terrorist organizations and US fugitives also reside in Cuba.

Cuba also maintains close ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and remains in contact with leftist insurgent groups in Latin America. For instance, Colombia’s two main terrorist groups, the FARC and the ELN, reportedly maintain repfiresentatives in Havana.

Cuba suffered from a string of small bombings targeting the island’s tourism industry in 1997. At least six bombs detonated at Havana hotels and restaurants in April, July, August, and September. An Italian tourist was killed in one blast in early September, the only fatality of the bombing campaign. On 10 September, Cuban security forces announced they had arrested a Salvadoran citizen who confessed to planting the bombs. Havana charged that US-based groups were responsible for directing the bombing campaign from the United States, but it has repeatedly ignored US requests for evidence to support these charges.

1998

Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America or elsewhere. Previously, the Castro regime provided significant levels of funding, military training, arms, and guidance to various revolutionary groups across the globe. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Havana has been forced to reduce dramatically its support to leftist revolutionaries.

Cuba, nonetheless, continues to maintain close ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and leftist insurgent groups in Latin America. For instance, Colombia’s two main terrorist groups, the FARC and the ELN, maintain representatives in Cuba. Moreover, Havana continues to provide safehaven to a number of international terrorists and US terrorist fugitives.

1999

Cuba continued to provide safehaven to several terrorists and U.S. fugitives in 1999. A number of Basque ETA terrorists who gained sanctuary in Cuba some years ago continued to live on the island, as did several U.S. terrorist fugitives.

Havana also maintained ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and Latin American insurgents. Colombia’s two largest terrorist organizations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (ELN), both maintained a permanent presence on the island. In late 1999, Cuba hosted a series of meetings between Colombian Government officials and ELN leaders.

2000

Cuba continued to provide safehaven to several terrorists and US fugitives in 2000. A number of Basque ETA terrorists who gained sanctuary in Cuba some years ago continued to live on the island, as did several US terrorist fugitives.

Havana also maintained ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and Latin American insurgents. Colombia’s two largest terrorist organizations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army, both maintained a permanent presence on the island.

2001

Since September 11, Fidel Castro has vacillated over the war on terrorism. In October, he labeled the USfiled war on terrorism “worse than the original attacks, militaristic, and fascist.”

When this tactic earned ostracism rather than praise, he undertook an effort to demonstrate Cuban support for the international campaign against terrorism and signed all 12 UN counterterrorism conventions as well as the Ibero-American declaration on terrorism at the 2001 summit. Although Cuba decided not to protest the detention of suspected terrorists at the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, it continued to denounce the global effort against terrorism—even by asserting that the United States was intentionally targeting Afghan children and Red Cross hospitals.

Cuba’s signature of UN counterterrorism conventions notwithstanding, Castro continued to view terror as a legitimate revolutionary tactic. The Cuban Government continued to allow at least 20 Basque ETA members to reside in Cuba as privileged guests and provided some degree of safehaven and support to members of the Colombian FARC and ELN groups. In August, a Cuban spokesman revealed that Sinn Fein’s official representative for Cuba and Latin America, Niall Connolly, who was one of three Irish Republican Army members arrested in Colombia on suspicion of providing explosives training to the FARC, had been based in Cuba for five years. In addition, the recent arrest in Brazil of the leader of a Chilean terrorist group, the Frente Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez (FPMR), has raised the strong possibility that in the mid-1990s, the Cuban Government harbored FPMR terrorists wanted for murder in Chile. The arrested terrorist told Brazilian authorities he had traveled through Cuba on his way to Brazil. Chilean investigators had traced calls from FPMR relatives in Chile to Cuba following an FPMR prison break in 1996, but the Cuban Government twice denied extradition requests, claiming that the wanted persons were not in Cuba and the phone numbers were incorrect.

Numerous US fugitives continued to live on the island, including Joanne Chesimard, wanted in the United States for the murder in 1973 of a New Jersey police officer and living as a guest of the Castro regime since 1979.

2002

Although Cuba signed and ratified all 12 international counterterrorism conventions in 2001, it has remained opposed to the USfiled Coalition prosecuting the war on global terrorism and has been actively critical of many associated US policies and actions. On repeated occasions, for example, Cuba sent agents to US missions around the world who provided false leads designed to subvert the post-September 11 investigation. Cuba did not protest the use of the Guantanamo Bay base to house enemy combatants from the conflict in Afghanistan.

In 2002, Cuba continued to host several terrorists and US fugitives. Havana permitted up to 20 Basque Fatherland and Liberty members to reside in Cuba and provided some degree of safehaven and support to members of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) groups. Bogota was aware of the arrangement and apparently acquiesced; it has publicly indicated that it seeks Cuba’s continued mediation with ELN agents in Cuba.

An accused Irish Republican Army (IRA) weapons expert and longtime resident of Havana went on trial in Colombia in 2002. He had been caught a year earlier in Colombia with two other IRA members and detained for allegedly training the FARC in advanced use of explosives. Some US fugitives continued to live on the island.

2003

Cuba remained opposed to the USfiled Coalition prosecuting the global war on terrorism and actively condemned many associated US policies and actions throughout 2003. Government-controlled press reporting about USfiled military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were consistently critical of the United States and frequently and baselessly alleged US involvement in violations of human rights. Government propaganda claimed that those fighting for self-determination or against foreign occupation are exercising internationally recognized rights and cannot be accused of terrorism. Cuba’s delegate to the UN said terrorism cannot be defined as including acts by legitimate national liberation movements—even though many such groups clearly employ tactics that intentionally target innocent civilians to advance their political, religious, or social agendas. In referring to US policy toward Cuba, the delegate asserted, “acts by states to destabilize other states is a form of terrorism.”

The Cuban Government did not extradite nor request the extradition of suspected terrorists in 2003. Cuba continued to provide support to designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, as well as to host several terrorists and dozens of fugitives from US justice. The Government refuses to return suspected terrorists to countries when it alleges that a receiving government could not provide a fair trial because the charges against the accused are “political.” Cuba has publicly used this argument with respect to a number of fugitives from US justice, including Joanne Chesimard, wanted for the murder of a New Jersey State Trooper in 1973. Havana permitted up to 20 ETA members to reside in Cuba and provided some degree of safehaven and support to members of FARC and the ELN. Bogota was aware of the arrangement and apparently acquiesced; it has publicly indicated that it seeks Cuba’s continued mediation with ELN agents in Cuba. A declaration issued by the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 2003 maintained that the presence of ETA members in Cuba arose from a request for assistance by Spain and Panama and that the issue is a bilateral matter between Cuba and Spain. The declaration similarly defended its assistance to the FARC and the ELN as contributing to a negotiated solution in Colombia.

Dozens of fugitives from US justice have taken refuge on the island. In a few cases, the Cuban Government has rendered fugitives from US justice to US authorities. The salient feature of Cuba’s behavior in this arena, however, is its refusal to render to US justice any fugitive whose crime is judged by Cuba to be “political.”

With respect to domestic terrorism, the Government in April 2003 executed three Cubans who attempted to hijack a ferry to the United States. The three were executed under Cuba’s 2001 “Law Against Acts of Terrorism.”

Cuba became a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism in 2001.

2004

Throughout 2004, Cuba continued to actively oppose the USfiled coalition prosecuting the global war on terrorism. Cuba continues to maintain at the UN and other fora that acts by legitimate national liberation movements cannot be defined as terrorism, and has sought to characterize as “legitimate national liberation movements” a number of groups that intentionally target innocent civilians to advance their political, religious, or social agendas. The Cuban Government claims, despite the absence of evidence, that it is a principal victim of terrorism sponsored by Cuban-Americans in the United States. The Cuban Government’s actions and public statements run contrary to the spirit of the UN conventions on terrorism that it has signed.

In 2004, Cuba continued to provide limited support to designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, as well as safehaven for terrorists. The Cuban Government refuses to turn over suspected terrorists to countries that have charged them with terrorist acts, alleging that the receiving government would not provide a fair trial on charges that are “political.” Havana permitted various ETA members to reside in Cuba, despite a November 2003 public request from the Spanish Government to deny them sanctuary, and provided safehaven and some degree of support to members of the Colombian FARC and ELN guerilla groups.

Many of the over seventy fugitives from US justice that have taken refuge on the island are accused of committing violent acts in the Unites States that targeted innocents in order to advance political causes. They include Joanne Chesimard, who is wanted for the murder of a New Jersey State Trooper in 1973. On a few rare occasions the Cuban government has transferred fugitives to the United States, although it maintains that fugitives would not receive a fair trial in the United States.

Havana, Managua, and Hanoi: The Chilean Arms Cache (1986)

On 6 August 1986 security forces near Carrizal Bajo in northern Chile discovered the first of eight terrorist arms caches—which together contained the most ordnance ever found at one time in the possession of Latin American terrorists or insurgents. Their discovery presented a rare public picture of three states cooperating to abet terrorism in a fourth country.

The first cache—342 assault rifles—was found 600 meters from a small cove. Four members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) arrested at the same time claimed that several illicit arms deliveries had come ashore at the cove since the beginning of the year. The terrorists led Chilean security officers to an abandoned mine 12 kilometers away in which over 200,000 rounds of rifle ammunition and 315 Soviet Bloc rocket-propelled antitank grenades were discovered.

Over the next two weeks, several other caches were found, mostly near Carrizal Bajo. They were extremely well constructed and, like the mine site, were clearly intended for the long-term storage of large quantities of arms and ammunition. Another 1,320 assault rifles, nearly 1 million rounds of ammunition, and almost 900 antitank rockets were discovered in a concretefireinforced underground vault in an old hotel FPMR members had purchased near Vallenar. An underground training school with a firing range was found under a house in Huasco. An identical underground school was found farther south near Santiago.

The caches consisted of heretofore unheard-of quantities of some extremely lethal weapons ideal for terrorist use. Many of the recovered weapons were manufactured in the United States during the Vietnam war, including more than 3,000 M-16 rifles that had been sent to equip US forces in Vietnam. Other captured ordnance of similar origin included 167 disposable antitank rocket launchers and nearly 2 million rounds of rifle ammunition, all of which most likely was made available by Hanoi from captured stocks.

In contrast to these older US weapons, the Bloc ordnance was of recent manufacture. This included 114 RPG-7 rocket launchers and nearly 2,000 rocket rounds for them, 2,000 Soviet-style handgrenades and ignitor assemblies, 5,000 Soviet nonelectric blasting caps, and some rifle ammunition. Much of this materiel and other Bloc equipment was packed in its original shipping containers.

The size and composition of the caches and prefabricated components of the storage sites indicate state sponsorship. The cost of the weapons involved and the logistic problems associated with their delivery put an effort of this scale beyond the resources of a subnational group. Havana, which has access to both new Bloc equipment and, through its allies, to US Vietnam-vintage weapons, is the leading candidate. Havana and Managua undoubtedly hoped to gain an element of deniability by providing large quantities of US-made ordfinance, but similar materiel—in smaller quantities—brokered by Cuba from Vietnam and passed through Nicaragua as an intermediary has been recovered form Cuban-backed subversives in other Latin American countries during the past few years.

The sheer volume of the materiel found in Chile—an estimated 70 tons—suggests delivery by sea, as do damp equipment and some of the seawater-corroded ammunition. That so large a quantity could be secretly delivered to terrorists in Chile indicates that other Latin American nations with long stretches of deserted coastline may also be vulnerable to Cuban subversive efforts. The discovery of similar equipment in other countries raises concerns that such operations may already be underway elsewhere in the region.

Iran

Designation date January 19, 1984

1985

The level of terrorism by Iranian?supported groups in 1985 remained high but declined from the record level of 1984. Groups with established ties to Iran carried out some 30 attacks last year, although Iran cannot be linked directly to most of these attacks. Although Iraq, France, and the United States have remained the primary targets, Persian Gulf states have faced a continuing terrorist threat that could escalate sharply should Iran choose to exercise its terrorist option.

Export of the revolution has been a central tenet of the clerical regime in Iran, with terrorism a primary instrument in advancing this objective. Iran has used its network of diplomatic and cultural missions to support terrorist operations, and many elements of the Iranian Government, including several senior officials, have been directly involved in terrorist activity. Economic constraints and the war with Iraq, however, apparently have compelled Iran increasingly to reduce its difirect involvement in terrorism and pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy, putting less emphasis on the ideological use of terrorism to support the export of its Islamic revolution. Some groups that owe their inspiration and their origin to Iran, such as the Lebanese Hizballah, have become increasingly independent of Tehran’s direction, although their activities still serve Iran’s foreign policy goals.

Iraq has been a primary target of Iranian-sponsored groups. Iran has trained and financed several Iraqi dissident groups, such as the Dawa Party, that are dedicated to overthrowing Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and establishing an Islamic republic in Iraq.

Lebanon has been the scene of most of the terrorism perpetrated by groups that have received Iranian support. ProIranian Shi’a Muslims in Lebanon were responsible for nearly 20 international incidents last year, including eight attacks against French targets and five against US targets. Tehran apparently did not play a direct role in the majority of attacks on foreigners in Lebanon. The nature of Iran’s ties to the radical Shi’as that have kidnapped foreigners and the extent to which Iran can control or direct them has remained unclear.

Tehran has maintained the capability to resume quickly terrorist activities throughout the Persian Gulf. Shi’a dissidents from several Gulf states have traveled to Iran to receive training. Iranian-backed terrorists were suspected of having planned the assassination attempt on the Amir of Kuwait in May 1985. Iran may intend to maintain its terrorist option in the region in case diplomatic initiatives fail or the war with Iraq demands more drastic measures against other Arab states.

1986

Iran in 1986 continued to view terrorism as an important instrument in its campaign to drive US and Western influence out of the Middle East, to eliminate opponents of the Khomeini regime overseas, and to intimidate the Persian Gulf states to end their support for Iraq. Although fewer international terrorist incidents were traceable to Iranian support in 1986, this does not reflect any decreased willingness to use terrorism.

In the Persian Gulf, Iran has used terrorism to promote its foreign policy goals, in particular to deter moderate Gulf states from aiding Iraq in its war effort, at times to induce these states to support OPEC oil policies favored by Iran, to further the war against Iraq, and to radicalize Shia populations in the Gulf states. Iran recruits Shias from the Gulf states, gives them religious indoctrination, paramilitary and terrorist training, and returns them to these states. Most of the Iranian-backed terrorist acts in the Gulf are conducted by such Iranian-trained and-sponsored Shia radicals. The groups promoted by Iran in 1986 included the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, the Islamic Dawa Party (which has local branches in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Lebanon), and the Organization for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula.

Iranian-backed Shia terrorists were responsible for the bombings of several oil installations in Kuwait in June 1986. Five bombs exploded near Kuwait’s crude oil tank farms and at an oil well near Kuwait City.

Iran is believed to have been responsible for the attempted bombings of Saudi and Kuwaiti airlines offices in Vienna and Karachi in the past year. The attacks coincided with Tehran’s warnings to Riyadh and the other Arab oilproducing states to cut production and boost oil prices.

Lebanon has been the scene of most of the terrorism perpetrated by groups that Iran supports. Tehran continues to provide significant support to the radical Shia Hizballah movement that has kidnapped foreigners and is conducting terrorist operations against Western—and particularly US and French—interests. Although Hizballah is not under Iran’s complete control, Tehran has substantial influence over the group’s activities and provides financial assistance as well as weapons and training.

The Revolutionary Justice Organization, believed to be a cover name used by Hizballah, abducted a four-person French television crew in March 1986. Three of the French journalists were subsequently released after France and Iran had settled bilateral issues.

The Revolutionary Justice Organization also claimed the abduction of Frank Reed, Joseph Cicippio, and Edward Tracy in September and October.

A faction of Hizballah continues to hold US hostages Terry Anderson and Thomas Sutherland, kidnapped in 1985.

Iranian-backed factions in Lebanon were probably responsible for the murder of a French military attache in Beirut in September and for the attacks against the French contingent of the UNIFIL in south Lebanon.

Tehran continues to recruit Shia dissidents from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq and give them military training in Iran. Iran is also trying to expand its networks in Europe, Africa, and Asia, using local Islamic communities, religious and cultural institutions, as well as its diplomatic services to bolster its capability to conduct or support terrorist activities beyond the Middle East.

1987

Of the 44 terrorist incidents in which Iran was identified as the sponsor, we recorded 25 in the Middle East, 10 in Western Europe, and nine in Asia. The preferred means were bombings (27) and armed attacks (13). Tehran uses terrorism skillfully and selectively to support its long-term objectives of ridding the Middle East of all Western influence, intimidating Iranian dissidents overseas, forcing Arab countries to end their support for Iraq, and exporting Khomeini’s vision of a radical Islamic revolution to all parts of the Muslim world. We believe that most Iranian leaders agree that terrorism is an acceptable policy option, although some may disagree on specific operations.

Beginning in early January 1987, Iran stepped up its support for international terrorism when its state agents or surrogate groups:

■ Attempted to put pressure on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other moderate Arab states both in the Persian Gulf area and in Europe by terrorist acts.

■ Allegedly ordered the kidnapping in Lebanon of US jourfinalist Charles Glass.

■ Assassinated Iranian defectors and dissidents in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, West Germany, Turkey, and Pakistan.

■ Began a worldwide search to identify potential US targets for terrorist attacks.

Iran continued its policy of recruiting coreligionists from Persian Gulf states for training in Iran, where it provided them with training in subversion and terrorism. Although some of the terrorist acts in the Persian Gulf states during the year may have been conducted without Iran’s explicit authorization or knowledge, Tehran most likely approved such acts in principle. Besides the Lebanese-based Hizballah, Iranianbacked factions that may have been used to conduct or support terrorism include the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Republic of Iraq; the Organization of the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula; the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain; and the Islamic Call Party (Dawa), which has branches in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Lebanon.

Iran has maintained its campaign against the Persian Gulf states. In June 1986, Kuwaiti Shia terrorists bombed several oil installations in Kuwait. Iran’s actions in Kuwait in 1987 are described in the Kuwait section. Bahrain, too, was the target of an Iranian-inspired terrorist plot. According to press reports, Iran trained a Bahraini oil engineer to sabotage Bahrain’s only oil refinery and to carry out other antiBahraini attacks. Bahrain authorities were able to arrest him in late December, however, shortly before the attacks were to take place.

Following the bloody Iranian-instigated clashes during the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca in July 1987, which resulted in hundreds of Iranians being killed, Iranian leaders publicly urged the overthrow of the Saudi ruling family, revenge for the deaths of the Iranian pilgrims, and an end to Saudi control over Islamic holy places in Saudi Arabia. We suspect that proIranian terrorists were responsible for the bombing of a Saudi bank in Paris in September. The terrorist threat to Saudi Arabia remains high.

Lebanon remains the major focus of Iran’s support for terrorism. As in previous years, in 1987 Iran provided major assistance to Hizballah, the extremist Lebanese Shia group that regularly engages in terrorism, including the kidnapping of foreign hostages (see section on Lebanon) and other attacks on Western targets. Iran does not completely control Hizballah but retains influence over the group’s activities—most notably on hostage questions—through its provision of financial support, weapons, and training. Several Iranian Revolutionary Guard units in Lebanon are colocated with Hizballah detachments. Furthermore, for extremist Shia in Lebanon, Khomeini remains the exemplar of Islamic revolutionary ideals.

Iran has made the elimination of regime opponents at home and abroad a major goal of its terrorist activities. In the past, Iranian agents have hunted down and killed dissidents in Europe, the United States, the Middle East, and Asia. In January 1987, for instance, a defector who had been chief pilot for Rafsanjani, Speaker of the Iranian Assembly, was shot dead in West Germany. All told, seven dissidents were murdered in Europe and two others threatened. Terrorist attacks against anti-Khomeini dissidents in South Asia are mentioned in the section on Pakistan.

Iran undoubtedly views terrorism as a potential major weapon in its confrontation with the United States in the Persian Gulf. Many Iranian leaders have claimed publicly that Shia terrorism against the US Marines in Beirut compelled the United States to withdraw its military forces, thus dealing the United States a humiliating defeat. In 1987, as the United States increased its military involvement in the Gulf, Iranian leaders drew parallels between events in Lebanon in 1983-84 and current developments. Although no Iranianbacked terrorist attacks were staged against specific US targets during the year, we believed that during the summer of 1987 Iran began to formulate contingency plans for anti-US terrorist operations.

1988

Iranian-sponsored terrorist incidents decreased from 45 in 1987 to 32 in 1988, with Tehran’s interest shifting away from targeting Kuwaitis and Iranian dissidents to attacking Saudis. A review of individual operations indicates Tehran relies on local Iranians and Islamic fundamentalists world-wide to carry out its attacks, and the lack of arrests last year suggests they are well trained and disciplined.

After sponsoring a large number of attacks against Kuwait during 1986 and 1987 to pressure Kuwait to end support for Iraq in the Gulf War, pro-Iranian Kuwaiti Shias—possibly acting with Iranian support—probably were behind just five operations in 1988. Some elements in Iran may have provided support for the hijackings by Hizballah of Kuwait Airways Flight 422 on 5 April 1988. At a minimum, Iran provided a friendly environment at Mashhad Airport, the flight’s first stop. Airport authorities apparently were expecting its arrival despite the radio silence maintained by Kuwait Airways Flight 422 throughout the course of the extended flight over wartime Iranian territory. Iranian officials may have allowed more Hizballah members and weapons to board the aircraft at Mashhad.

In 1988 most Iranian-sponsored incidents were directed at Saudi interests, in part, because of Iranian resentment over the deaths of approximately 275 Iranian pilgrims during an Iranian-instigated riot in Mecca in 1987 as well as Saudi restrictions on Iranian attendance during the 1988 pilgrimage. Iranian leaders publicly committed Iran to retaliate for the deaths of its pilgrims, to overthrow the ruling Saud family, and to end Saudi control over the Islamic holy places in Arabia, Iran and its supporters probably were responsible for a number of these anti-Saudi operations, which were primarily difirected at the offices of the Saudi national airline, Saudia. Pro-Iranian terrorists also may have been behind the attempted murders of three Saudi teachers in Lagos, Nigeria, in March; the assassination of a Saudi diplomat in Ankara, Turkey, on 25 October; and an assassination attempt against another Saudi diplomat in Karachi, Pakistan, on 27 December.

Iran toned down its antidissident campaign in 1988, although Tehran continues to regard suppression of exiled regime opponents as a key focus of its terrorist activities. The only known Iranian antidissident attacks last year were an arson attack on a video store in West Germany owned by an Iranian who sold anti-Khomeini videotapes and the attempted kidnapping of a dissident in Turkey in October.

Tehran also supports—and exerts significant influence over—the extremist Shia Hizballah movement’s kidnapping of Westerners in Lebanon. Iran provides Hizballah with money, weapons, and training and has approved—and in some instances may have encouraged—its seizing of some Western hostages. Tehran may have been involved in the kidnapping in Beirut of businessman Ralph Schray, a Lebanese West German dual national, on 27 January. Iranian influence with Hizballah on foreign hostages may have been intended to produce short-term benefits for Tehran, although the continued detention of the hostages in Beirut has obstructed its acceptance as a responsible member of the international community. Tehran helped arrange the release of another German hostage. Rudolf Cordes, in September, in the hope that it might receive diplomatic and economic consideration in the future. Iran may have been involved in the kidnapping of UN officer Lt. Col. William Higgins. Higgins, a US Marine, was taken by Iran’s Lebanese Shia ally, Hizballah.

1989

Iranian-sponsored terrorist incidents decreased from 32 in 1988 to 28 in 1989. Iran’s extensive support for terrorism continued after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June. The events of 1989 indicate Tehran continued to view the selective use of terrorism as a legitimate tool to achieve specific foreign policy goals. Iranian intelligence has been used to facilitate and in some cases conduct terrorist attacks. In addition, Iran is expanding contacts with Lebanese Muslim extremists, radical Palestinian groups, and other Muslim fundamentalist groups to carry out terrorist operations against Israeli, US, Western, and moderate Arab interests. In the past year Iranian support for terrorism has included:

■ Calling for the death of author Salman Rushdie and attacking publishers and distributors of The Satanic Verses.

■ Assassinating at least five Iranian dissidents.

■ Recruiting Shia to carry out attacks in Saudi Arabia during the hajj.

■ Inciting radical Shia elements to attack Saudi interests in retaliation for Riyadh’s execution of 16 Shia responsible for the hajj bombings.

■ Probably involving itself with, if not organizing, Hizballah terrorist activities in Europe, West Africa, and elsewhere.

Ayatollah Khomeini’s denunciation of Salman Rushdie’s novel and calls for the author’s execution had the effect of a decree, which is binding under the Shia interpretation of Islamic law. Violent demonstrations and attacks against publishers and bookstores occurred throughout Europe, Asia, and the United States. Three British Council library buildings were bombed in Pakistan, killing one local guard. At least a dozen people died and more than 120 were injured in violent street riots in Pakistan and India. President Rafsanjani’s reaffirmation of the death threat rekindled anti-Western fervor and prompted renewed anti-Rushdie demonstrations and attacks. In December 1989, UK authorities arrested and expelled Iranians involved in anti-Rushdie attacks; we believe Iran is continuing to coordinate and plan attacks directed against businesses affiliated with The Satanic Verses.

Another indication that terrorism continues to be a feature of the Tehran regime was the public statement in May by then Parliament Speaker (now President) Rafsanjani that exhorted Palestinians to kill Americans and other Westerners in order to avenge those Palestinians killed during the uprising in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. Rafsanjani also publicly encouraged the hijacking of airplanes and the blowing up of factories.

During 1989,Tehran continued its campaign to eliminate antiregime dissidents.We believe the increase in these attacks can be attributed to the regime’s fear that prominent dissident leaders presented a significant threat to Tehran during the leadership transition following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June.The number of attacks against dissidents increased from two in 1988 to three in 1989, resulting in five deaths—three in Austria, one in the United Arab Emirates, and one in Cyprus. These attacks appear to have been well planned and were probably carried out by Iranian intelligence officers.

Iranian-sponsored attacks directed against Saudi interests also increased during 1989. Tehran’s anti-Saudi campaign can be traced to Iranian resentment over Riyadh’s imposition of restrictions on the number of Iranians permitted to make the annual pilgrimage to Mecca as a result of pro-Khomeini riots during the 1987 pilgrimage. During the 1989 hajj, two bombs exploded in Mecca, killing one and wounding over 20 others; several Kuwaiti Shia confessed to the crime. During their interrogations, the Shia confessed that they had been recruited, trained, and supported by Iran. Riyadh executed 16 Kuwaitis for this attack on 21 September. Shortly after the executions, Iranian and Hizballah leaders issued numerous statements denouncing the Saudi regime and calling for refivenge. As a result, attacks against Saudi interests increased:

On 14 October, a Saudi Airlines office in Lahore, Pakistan, was damaged by a bomb explosion.

On 16 October, a Saudi military attache in Ankara, Turkey, was seriously injured when a bomb exploded under the seat of his car.

On 1 November, a Saudi official in Beirut, Lebanon, was assassinated by three gunmen. Islamic Jihad—a cover name used by Hizballah terrorists—claimed responsibility for the attack that was authenticated by a photograph of a US hostage.

On 24 November, the Saudi official responsible for coordinating aid in Pakistan to the Afghan resistance movement was assassinated.

During 1989, Tehran also continued to support—and exert influence over—the radical Shia elements in Lebanon. Iran continues to provide Hizballah with money, weapons, and training and has approved—and in some cases encouraged—the kidnapping of Western citizens. Tehran also continued to develop relations with Palestinian fundamentalist groups, as well as with radical Palestinian groups such as the PFLP-GC, which has been publicly accused of complicity with Iran in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, as well as with Arab fundamentalist groups.

1990

Iran’s extensive support for terrorism continued during 1990, although the number of terrorist acts attributed to Iranian state sponsorship dropped to 10 in 1990 from 28 in 1989.

Iran has used its intelligence services extensively to facilitate and conduct terrorist attacks, particularly against regime dissidents. Intelligence officers in embassies have used the diplomatic pouch for conveyance of weapons and finances for terrorist groups. Iran continued to strengthen its relationship with Muslim extremists throughout the world, often providing them with advice and financial assistance. Over the past year, Iranian support for terrorism has included:

■ Repeating the call for the death of the author of The Satanic Verses, Salman Rushdie.

■ Assassinations of four antiregime dissidents—in Pakistan, Switzerland, Sweden, and France.

■ Supporting radical Shia attacks on Saudi interests, including the assassinations of three Saudi diplomats, in retaliation for the execution of the Hajj bombers.

■ Extensive support for Hizballah, the PFLP-GC, the PIJ, and other groups, including provision of arms, funding, and training.

Iranian-backed Shia groups are believed to be in control of Western hostages in Lebanon, and most observers believe that the key to releasing the hostages rests with Iran. One such group, Hizballah, is believed to hold all the remaining American hostages. Iranian President Ali Akbar HashemiRafsanjani, whose domestic political strength increased during 1990, is thought to favor a pragmatic approach to foreign policy and improved relations with the West, which would require resolution of the hostage problem. For example, The Tehran Times, a newspaper considered to reflect Rafsanjani’s views, editorialized on 22 February that the hostages should be freed without preconditions. Two months later, US hostages Robert Polhill and Frank Reed were released. The hostages releases received some criticism from hardline elements both in Iran and within Hizballah who questioned whether Iran or the hostage holders had received any benefit for their actions in terms of a good will gesture from the West. No more hostages were freed in 1990, and press reports indicated that Iran was seeking rewards before any further movement on the hostages was possible.

Major terrorist figures, including Ahmad Jabril of the PFLP-GC and various prominent members of Hizballah, frequently visit Iran. Iran hosted a World Conference on Palestine in Tehran in December in an effort to gain increasing influence over Islamic affairs, in general, and over the Palestinian movement, in particular. Leaders of several radical Palestinian and Lebanese groups including Saiqa, HAMAS, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad attended.

1991

Iran continues to be a leading state sponsor of terrorism, even though the number of terrorist acts attributed to its direct sponsorship dropped to five in 1991, down from 10 in 1990 and 28 in 1989.

Iranian intelligence services continue to facilitate and conduct terrorist attacks, particularly against regime opponents living abroad. This policy is undertaken with the approval of the highest levels of the regime, although the government routinely denies involvement in assassination of dissidents or in terrorist attacks carried out by pro-Iranian groups. Iranian diplomatic and commercial facilities are reported to be used extensively in such operations.

During the past year Iran has further strengthened its relationship with extremists who engage in acts of terrorism throughout the world, with special emphasis on the Palestinians. Tehran often provides these groups with advice and financial and material assistance, often via Iranian embassies.

Iran has not limited its assistance only to terrorists who are Islamic fundamentalist in orientation. It has also provided sanctuary and some aid to the Marxist-Leninist separatist group Turkish Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), a group that has used terrorist tactics in a seven-year campaign to establish a separate Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey.

The outstanding example of Iranian state terrorism in 1991 was the 6 August assassination of former Iranian Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar and his aide in a Paris suburb. French counterterrorism investigating magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere has thus far arrested three Iranians and issued an international arrest warrant against Hussein Sheikhattar, a senior official in the Iranian Ministry of Telecommunications. On 31 December France requested the extradition of another suspected Iranian conspirator arrested a week earlier outside the Iranian Embassy in Bern, Switzerland. Swiss officials approved his extradition to France on 24 February 1992, subject to appeals from the suspect. A comprehensive investigation into the case continues amid press reports that Judge Bruguiere could issue additional warrants against more Iranian officials. The linking of the murder to the Iranian Government by Judge Bruguiere has had significant political repercussions for French-Iranian relations, including postponement or cancellation of visits to Iran planned by President Mitterand and Foreign Minister Dumas.

Iranian-backed Shia groups in Lebanon were involved in the continued detention of Western hostages in 1991. Iran played a key role in the UN-sponsored process that obtained the release of six American and three British hostages in 1991 and the recovery of the bodies of two Americans who died while in captivity. Iran probably helped arrange freedom for the hostages out of the belief that continuation of the crisis was detrimental to Iranian President Rafsanjani’s attempt to improve relations with the West and obtain foreign assistance in modernizing Iran’s economy. The hostage releases still received criticism from Iranian hardliners and elements of Hizballah. Immediately after the August release of British hostage John McCarthy, Hizballah elements opposed to the hostage releases kidnapped a French citizen. He was freed three days later only after what appeared to be significant pressure from Iran, Syria, and Lebanese figures. Iran has also reportedly offered refuge to about 40 former Hizballah hostage holders and may provide them with new identities to prevent retaliation.

Further demonstration of Iran’s close involvement in hostage taking is shown by the Iranian Ambassador to Germany invoking the fate of two German relief workers in an attempt to obtain the release of the Hammadi brothers, two Hizballah terrorists jailed in Germany. Iran has indicated its willingness to help bring about the release of two German hostages believed to be held by Hizballah elements in Lebanon.

Iranian-supported groups in Turkey were believed to have been responsible for the 26 March car bombing in Ankara that injured an Iraqi diplomat and the two October car bombings that killed an American serviceman and injured an Egyptian diplomat.

Major international terrorists—including Ahmad Jabril of the PFLP-GC and various prominent members of Hizballah and factions of the PIJ—frequently visit Iran, often meeting with the regime’s senior leadership. In October, representatives of these organizations and others attended a conference hosted by Iran on Palestine designed to strengthen opposition to the Middle East peace process. Tehran has in recent years focused on developing its ties to radical Palestinian groups and tried to increase its influence in the Palestinian movement as a whole.

Iran has steadfastly opposed the Middle East peace process and threatened participants. Iran’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, declared on 30 October, “Those who take part in this treason will suffer the wrath of nations.” Earlier in the month, Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili, a senior cleric, called on Muslims to attack American lives and properties as a religious duty.

Iran has continued its death threats against author Salman Rushdie. The bounty on Mr. Rushdie was apparently increased during 1991 to a total of at least $2 million. In addition, two translators of Mr. Rushdie’s works were attacked in 1991. An Italian translator was injured in an attack, and a Japanese translator was killed. Both attacks are believed to be linked to the translators’ work with the writings of Salman Rushdie.

1992

Iran was the most dangerous state sponsor of terrorism in 1992, with over 20 acts in 1992 attributable to it or its surrogates. Iran’s intelligence services continue to support terrorist acts—either directly or through extremist groups—aimed primarily against Iranian opponents of the regime living abroad and Israeli targets. Although Iran did not carry out difirect attacks on US targets in 1992, Iranian agents regularly surveilled US missions and personnel. Tehran’s leaders view terrorism as a valid tool to accomplish the regime’s political objectives, and acts of terrorism are approved at the highest levels of government in Iran. Hizballah, Iran’s most important client, was responsible for the deadliest act of terrorism in 1992, the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in March, which killed 29 people and wounded 242. Indications are that Iran at least had foreknowledge of this act and was probably involved.

Despite Iran’s attempts to distance itself publicly from difirect involvement in terrorist acts during the past year, Tehran has been tied to several bombings and assassinations in the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America.

Iranian intelligence continues to stalk members of the Iranian opposition, especially in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. There are strong indications that Iran was responsible for the assassination of the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and three of his followers in Berlin in September. The killing closely resembled the murder of the previous head of the KDPI in Vienna in 1989. The fatal stabbing of an Iranian dissident poet in Bonn in August 1992 was reminiscent of the stabbing of former Prime Minister Bakhtiar in Paris in 1991.

In March 1992 a French court sentenced two Iranians in absentia to five years imprisonment on illegal weapons charges stemming from 1986. The two had been waiting outside the home of Abdal Rahman Barumand, an ally of former Prime Minister Bakhtiar. Barumand was assassinated in April 1991 and Bakhtiar in August 1991, both in Paris. Two Iranians were arrested in Paris in November 1992 and held for extradition to Switzerland for the murder of Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) leader Kazem Rajavi in 1990.

The death sentence for Salman Rushdie, British author of The Satanic Verses, was upheld in 1992 by both the Iranian parliament and Iran’s Chief Justice, and the reward for killing him was raised to more than $2 million. The Iranian Government has tried to carry out the death threat. The United Kingdom expelled three Iranian officials who were attempting to organize Rushdie’s murder.

Iran is also the world’s principal sponsor of extremist Islamic and Palestinian groups, providing them with funds, weapons, and training. Turkish Islamic Jihad, believed to be backed by Iran, claimed responsibility for the March carbomb murder of an Israeli synagogue a few days earlier. These attacks came within weeks after the killing of Hizballah chief Musawi in southern Lebanon by the Israelis. Both Iran and Hizballah had vowed revenge against Israel and the United States for his death.

Iran also supports other radical organizations that have resorted to terrorism, including the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC), and HAMAS. In August, Iran’s first vice president met with the chiefs of Hizballah and the PFLP-GC while visiting Damascus. In October, Tehran hosted a series of highprofile meetings with Hizballah and HAMAS with the stated goal of coordinating their efforts against Israel and bringing the Arab-Israeli peace talks to a halt. In the aftermath of these talks, Hizballah increased its operations against Israel, including its repeated use of rockets to attack villages in northern Israel.

Iran has become the main supporter and ally of the fundamentalist regime in Sudan. Members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps provide training for the Sudanese military. The current Iranian Ambassador to Khartoum was involved in the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and served as Iranian Charge in Beirut, where he played a leading role in developing the Hizballah terrorist infrastructure in the 1980s. Khartoum has become a key venue for Iranian contact with Palestinian and North African extremists of the Sunni branch of Islam.

Tehran continues to support and provide sanctuary for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been responsible for hundreds of deaths in Turkey this year.

1993

Iran again was the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 1993 and was implicated in terrorist attacks in Italy, Turkey, and Pakistan. Its intelligence services support terrorist acts—either directly or through extremist groups—aimed primarily against opponents of the regime living abroad. Although neither Iran nor its surrogate Hizballah has launched an attack on US interests since 1991, Iran still surveils US missions and personnel. Tehran’s policymakers view terrorism as a valid tool to accomplish their political objectives, and acts of terrorism are approved at the highest levels of the Iranian Government. During the year, Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks were less frequent in Western Europe and the Middle East, favored venues of the past, but were more frequent in other areas, especially Turkey and Pakistan.

Iranian intelligence continues to stalk members of the Iranian opposition in the United States, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Despite Tehran’s attempts to distance itself from direct involvement in terrorist acts, Iran has been linked to several assassinations of dissidents during the past year. Iran was probably responsible for the assassination of at least four members of one opposition group, the Iraq-based Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK): one in Italy in March, a second in Pakistan in June in which a bystander was also killed, and two in Turkey in August. The body of a MEK member who was abducted in Istanbul at the end of 1992 has still not been found. In January, the body of another Iranian dissident who had been kidnapped in Istanbul several months before was found. All of the murders were carried out by professional assassins; no arrests have been made.

Iranian intelligence agents are under arrest in Germany and France for their links to murders of Iranian dissidents. One Iranian, identified by German prosecutors as an Iranian intelligence agent, is being tried with four Lebanese Hizballah members for their roles in the murder of three Iranian Kurdish dissidents in Berlin in September 1992. France arrested two Iranians in November 1992 for the murder of MEK leader Kazein Rajavi in Geneva in 1990; on 30 December, France expelled them to Iran, despite an extradition request from Switzerland. They had been in Europe as part of a hit team to assassinate one or more unidentified Iranian dissidents. The French Government explained that it was pursuing French national interests. A French magistrate investigating the killings of former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar and an assistant near Paris in 1991 has linked the murder to Iranian intelligence. Three men are being held in French prisons in connection with the murders, including a nephew of President Rafsanjani who was an employee of the Iranian Embassy, and a nephew of the late Ayatollah Khomeini who was an Iranian radio correspondent. French authorities have issued arrest warrants for several other men.

Iranian leaders continue to defend the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1989 fatwa, which condemned British author Salman Rushdie for blasphemy and called for his death. In February, on the fourth anniversary of the decree, Iran’s curfirent spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared that the death sentence must and will be carried out, no matter the consequences. To demonstrate its support, the Iranian Parliament also passed a resolution endorsing the fatwa and calling for Rushdie’s death. An Iranian foundation that has offered a reward of more than $2 million for killing Rushdie has warned that Muslims will also take revenge on anyone who supports Rushdie. In Beirut, Hizballah vowed to carry out the decree. In Oslo, an unknown assailant shot and seriously wounded the Norwegian publisher of The Satanic Verses in October. In Turkey in July, 37 persons died in a fire set by antiRushdie demonstrators during a violent three-month-long campaign to prevent a Turkish magazine from publishing excerpts of Rushdie’s book. At the start of the campaign, the Iranian Ambassador to Turkey proclaimed that the fatwa against Rushdie also applied in Turkey. Fundamentalists, including Turkish Hizballah groups, issued death threats to the journal’s officials, distributors, and vendors and attacked printing facilities, distribution vehicles, and sales kiosks, injuring several workers. Iran is also the world’s preeminent sponsor of extremist Islamic and Palestinian groups, providing funds, weapons, and training. The Lebanese Hizballah, Iran’s most important client, was responsible for some of the most lethal acts of terrorism of the last decade, including the 1992 car bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina. In 1993, Hizballah concentrated on guerrilla operations in southern Lebanon, including rocket attacks on civilians in northern Israel, and simultaneously boosted its political influence in the Lebanese parliament. Hizballah has also continued its efforts to develop a worldwide terrorist infrastructure.

Iran supports many other radical organizations that have resorted to terrorism, including the PIJ, the PFLP-GC, and HAMAS. Iranian leaders have worked to develop a rejectionist front, comprising Hizballah and 10 Palestinian groups based in Damascus, to counter the Middle East peace process.

An Iranian-backed Turkish group, Islamic Action—also referred to as the Islamic Movement Organization—is suspected by Turkish authorities in the car bombing of a prominent Turkish journalist in Istanbul in January and an assassination attempt on a Turkish Jewish businessman a few days later. In February, three members of an Iranian-backed radical Islamic group, possibly Islamic Action, were convicted for the bombing of an Istanbul synagogue almost a year earlier. It is unclear whether the group, some of whose members were arrested by Turkish police, were involved in the antiRushdie campaign in Turkey or linked to any of the several hundred murders of secular Kurdish activists in eastern Turkey that have been blamed on so-called Turkish Hizballah groups.

Tehran continues to support and provide sanctuary for the PKK, which was responsible for hundreds of deaths in Turkey during the year.

Iran has become the main supporter and ally of the fundamentalist regime in Sudan. Members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps provide training for the Sudanese military. The Iranian Ambassador to Khartoum was involved in the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and played a leading role in developing Hizballah in the 1980s. Khartoum has become a key venue for Iranian contact with Palestinian and North African extremists.

The opposition group MEK launched several attacks into Iran from Iraq in 1993, mostly on oil refineries and pipelines in southwestern Iran. Two guards were killed in an attack on a communications facility of the national oil company in Kermanshah in May. In December, the MEK admitted that it killed a Turkish diplomat in Baghdad, claiming he was mistaken for an Iranian official.

1994

Iran is still the most active state sponsor of international terrorism and continues to be directly involved in planning and executing terrorist acts. This year Tehran seems to have maintained its terrorist activities at the level of 1993, when there were four confirmed and two possible Iranian attacks on dissidents living outside Iran. Iranian terrorist operations concentrate on Iranian dissidents, particularly members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). Iran supports extremist Palestinian groups that have used terrorism to try to halt the Middle East peace process. Tehran also gives varying degrees of assistance to an assortment of radical Islamic and secular groups from North Africa to Central Asia.

While President Rafsanjani has tried to moderate Iran’s public image to expand its economic and political ties to Western Europe and Japan, Iran continues to use terrorism as ruthlessly as it did under Khomeini. Tehran supports groups, such as its main client Hizballah, that pose a threat to Americans. Due to the continuing threat from Tehran and Hizballah, American diplomatic missions and personnel remain at risk.

Confirmed attacks on Iranian dissidents in the past year include the following: the 7 January killing of Taha Kirmeneh, a dissident who was a member of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), by gunmen in Coru, Turkey; the 10 January wounding of a member of the KDPI by a letter bomb in Stockholm, Sweden; the killing of a KDPI leader in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, on 10 March; and the killing of two members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) in Qabbiyah, Iraq, while driving to Baghdad on 29 May. While the MEK has been victimized by Iranian terrorism, the group has itself employed terrorist tactics. The 24 June murder of dissident Osman Muhammed Amini at his home in Copenhagen and the 12 November murder of dissident Ali Mohammed Assadi in Bucharest may also have been carried out at the Iranian Government’s behest.

On 6 December, a French court handed down a decision in the trial of three Iranians accused of participating in the 1991 murder of former Iranian Prime Minister Bakhtiar and an assistant. One defendant received life imprisonment. A second, an Iranian radio correspondent who is reputed to be a nephew of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, was sentenced to 10 years in jail. The third, an employee of the Iranian Embassy in Bern, was acquitted.

Iran remains committed to implementation of the death sentence imposed on British author Salman Rushdie. When speaking to Western audiences, Iranian leaders claim that the fatwa (or religious finding) against Rushdie is a religious matter that does not involve the Government of Iran.

However, the Iranian Government continued its propa-ganda campaign against Rushdie. In February, the fifth anniversary of the fatwa, Tehran Radio stated that “The least punishment for (Rushdie)—is—his execution.” Ayatollah Hassan Sanei, the head of a quasi-governmental foundation that has offered a $2 million reward for the murder of Rushdie, said that supporters of Rushdie who campaign for the lifting of the fatwa deserved to be “punished.” A Revolutionary Guards official vowed publicly that the death sentence would be carried out. The influence of this campaign has been felt outside Iran. In September, the head of a Muslim organization in Norway threatened to kill Rushdie if he attended a conference on freedom of expression in Stavanger.

Iran is also the world’s preeminent state sponsor of extremist Islamic and Palestinian groups, providing funds, weapons, and training. Hizballah, Iran’s closest client, could well have been responsible for the 18 July bombing of the Argentine Israel Mutual Association that left nearly 100 persons dead. This operation was virtually identical to the one conducted in March 1992 against the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, for which Hizballah claimed responsibility. Hizballah had stated that it would seek retaliation against Israel for the kidnapping of a well-known Lebanese Shia terrorist and the Israeli airstrike in June on a Hizballah camp in Lebanon that killed more than 20 militants. Iran supports many other radical organizations that have engaged in terrorism. Tehran opposes any compromise with or recognition of Israel and, as the peace process moves ahead, has worked to coordinate a rejectionist front to oppose the Israeli-PLO accords, particularly with the PIJ, the PFLP-GC, and HAMAS, as well as Hizballah.

Tehran continues to provide safehaven to the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Iran. The PKK—seeking to establish a Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey—in 1994 conducted a violent campaign against Turkish tourism, including attacks on tourist spots frequented by foreigners, while continuing unabated the use of terrorism against Turkish citizens, including ethnic Kurds.

1995

Iran remains the premier state sponsor of international terrorism and is deeply involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts both by its own agents and by surrogate groups. This year Tehran escalated its assassination campaign against dissidents living abroad; there were seven confirmed Iranian murders of dissidents in 1995, compared with four in 1994. Iranian antidissident operations concentrated on the regime’s main opposition group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI).

Leaders of Iranian dissident groups are the most frequent victims of Iranian intelligence and terrorist operations. In 1995 most antidissident attacks were conducted in Iraq, in contrast to prior years’ worldwide operations. Attacks on Iranian dissidents in Iraq during the year included the shooting deaths on 17 May of two MEK members in Baghdad, the murder on 5 June of two members of the Iranian Kurdish “Toilers” Party (Komelah) in Sulaymaniyah, and the killing of three MEK members in Baghdad on 10 July. The shooting death in Paris on 17 September of Hashem Abdollahi, son of the chief witness in the trial of 1994 that convicted two Iranians for murdering former Iranian Prime Minister Bakhtiar in 1991, may have been an antidissident attack.

Sendar Hosseini, a suspect in the 1994 murder of dissident Osman Muhammad Amini in Copenhagen, Denmark, was arrested by Italian police in Bibione, Italy.

Iran provides arms, training, and money to Lebanese Hizballah and several Palestinian extremist groups that use terrorism to oppose the Middle East peace process. Tehran, which is against any compromise with or recognition of Israel, continued in 1995 to encourage Hizballah, HAMAS, the PIJ, the PFLP-GC, and other Palestinian rejectionist groups to form a coordinated front to resist Israel and the peace process through violence and terrorism.

Hizballah, Iran’s closest client, remains the leading suspect in the July 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israel Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed at least 96 persons. This operation was virtually identical to the one conducted in March 1992 against the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, for which Hizballah claimed responsibility.

Iran also gives varying degrees of assistance to an assortment of radical Islamic and secular groups from North Africa to Central Asia. For example, Tehran continued to offer the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) safehaven in Iran. Seeking to establish a Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, the PKK in 1995 launched numerous attacks in Europe and continued its violent campaign against Turkish tourism, including attacks on tourist spots frequented by Westerners. Tehran also provided some support to Turkish Islamic groups that have been blamed for attacks against Turkish secular and Jewish figures.

Iranian authorities reaffirmed the validity of the death sentence imposed on British author Salman Rushdie, although some Iranian officials claimed that the Government of Iran would not implement the fatwa. Tehran, however, continued to mount a propaganda campaign against Rushdie. In February—the sixth anniversary of the judgment—Iran’s official news agency IRNA reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmoud Vaezi “underlined the need for the implementation of the fatwa against the author of the blasphemous book The Satanic Verses.” Vaezi in May declared that “the fatwa issued by the late Imam [Khomeini] could neither be revoked nor changed by anybody.”

Despite increasing Iranian support for extremist groups and involvement in terrorist operations, President Rafsanjani continued to project publicly a “moderate” image of Iran to Western European countries and Japan to facilitate the expansion of its relations with them. This quest for respectability probably explains why Iran reduced its attacks in Europe last year; Tehran wants to ensure access to Western capital and markets.

Iran continued to view the United States as its principal foreign adversary, supporting groups such as Hizballah that pose a threat to US citizens. Because of Tehran’s and Hizballah’s deep antipathy toward the United States, US missions and personnel abroad continue to be at risk.

1996

Iran remained the premier state sponsor of terrorism in 1996. It continued to be involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts by its own agents and by surrogates such as Lebanese Hizballah and continued to fund and train known terrorist groups.

Tehran conducted at least eight dissident assassinations outside Iran in 1996. In May 1996 Reza Mazlouman, a government official under the Shah, was murdered in Paris by an Iranian resident of Germany with alleged ties to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The suspect was extradited to France by Germany. Seven other dissidents were assassinated by Iran in 1996 in Turkey and northern Iraq. Iran’s primary targets are members of the regime’s main opposition groups, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), as well as former officials of the late Shah’s government who speak out against the clerical regime.

Iran continued to provide support—including money, weapons, and training—to a variety of terrorist groups, such as Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ). It continued to oppose any recognition of Israel and to encourage violent rejection of the Middle East peace process. For example, Iranian Vice President Habibi met with HAMAS leaders in Damascus and praised their successful efforts immediately following the February bombings in Israel. HAMAS claimed responsibility for two more bombings in Israel the following week.

During a routine customs inspection of an Iranian vessel in Antwerp in March, Belgian authorities discovered a disassembled mortar-like weapon hidden in a shipment of pickles. The shipment was consigned to an Iranian merchant living in Germany. Iranian dissidents claim that the mortar was intended for use in an assassination attempt against Iranian exiles in Europe.

Testimony in the three-year-long trial of an Iranian and four Lebanese for the Iran-sponsored killing of Iranian Kurdish dissidents in Berlin’s Mykonos restaurant in 1992 concluded in late 1996. German authorities issued an arrest warrant in March for Ali Fallahian, Iran’s Intelligence Minister. In the fall, former Iranian President Abolhassan Bani Sadr and two other witnesses testied against Iran. In final statements in late November, German prosecutors charged Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and Iranian President Rafsanjani with approving the operation. (Guilty verdicts for four of the accused were announced in April 1997.)

Iranian leaders have consistently denied being able to revoke the fatwa against Salman Rushdie’s life, in effect for nearly eight years, claiming that revocation is impossible because the author of the fatwa is deceased. There is no indication that Tehran is pressuring the 15 Khordad Foundation to withdraw the $2 million reward it is offering to anyone who will kill Rushdie.

In addition, Iran provides safehaven to elements of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Turkish separatist group that has conducted numerous terrorist attacks in Turkey and throughout Europe. Although Turkey and Iran agreed to a joint operation in mid-October to remove the PKK from the border region, Iran reportedly failed to cooperate in a meaningful way.

Iran’s terrorist network in the Persian Gulf remained active in 1996. The Government of Bahrain announced in June the discovery of a local Hizballah group of Bahraini Shiites who had been trained and sponsored by Iran in an effort to overthrow the ruling al-Khalifa family.

1997

Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 1997. Tehran continued to be involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts by its own agents and by surrogates such as the Lebanese Hizballah and continued to fund and train known terrorist groups throughout 1997. Although the August 1997 accession of President Khatami has resulted in more conciliatory Iranian public statements, such as public condemnations of terrorist attacks by Algerian and Egyptian groups, Iranian support for terrorism remains in place.

Tehran conducted at least 13 assassinations in 1997, the majority of which were carried out in northern Iraq. Iran’s targets normally include, but are not limited to, members of the regime’s main opposition groups, including the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). Elsewhere in Iraq, in January 1997 Iranian agents tried to attack the Baghdad headquarters of the MEK using a “supermortar” of a design similar to that discovered aboard the Iranian ship “Kolahdooz” by Belgian customs authorities in early 1996. The attack was unsuccessful, resulting in the death of one person and some damage to an Iraqi hospital building.

April 1997 witnessed the conclusion of the trial in Germany of an Iranian and four Lebanese for the 1992 killing of Iranian Kurdish dissidents, one of whom was then Secretary General of the KDPI, in Berlin’s Mykonos restaurant. A German judge found the Iranian and three of the Lebanese guilty of the murders. Two defendants, Kazem Darabi and Abbas Rhayel, were sentenced to life in prison. Two others, Yousef Amin and Muhammad Atris, received sentences of 11 years and five years and three months, respectively. The fifth defendant, Aatollah Ayad, was acquitted. The court stated that the Government of Iran had followed a deliberate policy of liquidating the regime’s opponents who lived outside Iran, including the opposition KDPI. The judge further stated that the Mykonos murders had been approved at the most senior levels of the Iranian Government by an extrafilegal committee whose members included the Minister of Intelligence and Security, the Foreign Minister, the President, and the Supreme Leader. As a result of elections in May, however, the positions of Minister of Intelligence and Security, Foreign Minister, and President are now held by individuals other than those who were involved in the “Mykonos” murders. In March 1996 a German court had issued an arrest warrant in this case for Ali Fallahian, the former Iranian Minister of Intelligence and Security.

In September 1997, Iran’s new leadership affirmed the fatwa on Salman Rushdie, which has been in effect since 1989, stating once again that revocation is impossible since the author of the fatwa is deceased. There is no indication that Tehran is pressuring the Fifteen Khordad Foundation to withdraw the $2.5 million reward it is offering for executing the fatwa on Rushdie.

Iran continued to provide support—in the form of training, money, and/or weapons—to a variety of terrorist groups, such as Lebanese Hizballah, HAMAS, and the PIJ. The Iranian Government continues to oppose recognition of Israel and to encourage violent rejection of the Middle East peace process. In the fall of 1997, Tehran hosted numerous representatives of terrorist groups—including HAMAS, Lebanese Hizballah, the PIJ, and the Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiya—at a conference of “Liberation Movements.” Participants reportedly discussed the jihad, establishing greater coordination between certain groups, and an increase in support for some groups. In October, the Algerian Government accused Tehran of training and equipping Algerian terrorists.

Iran still provides safehaven to elements of the PKK, a Turkish separatist group that has conducted numerous terrorist attacks in Turkey and on Turkish targets in Europe. Following a late 1997 Turkish incursion into northern Iran in pursuit of PKK cadres, Tehran protested the violation of its territory but in 1997 made no effort to remove the PKK from Iranian territory.

In November, Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, publicly condemned the terrorist attack by the Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya on tourists at Luxor, Egypt. Similarly, in early January 1998 the Foreign Ministry’s official spokesman, Mahmud Mohammadi, also condemned the vicious attacks on civilians during the Muslim month of Ramadan (late December 1997 to early January 1998) “no matter who was responsible.”

(President Khatemi, in a 7 January 1998 CNN interview, agreed that terrorist attacks against non-combatants, including Israeli women and children, should be condemned.)

1998

Iran in 1998 continued to be involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts. Tehran apparently conducted fewer antidissident assassinations abroad in 1998 than in 1997. Tehran continued, however, to support a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals. Despite Iranian public statements condemning certain terrorist acts or expressing sympathy for Kenyan and Tanzanian victims of the August 1998 bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Iranian support for terrorism remains in place.

Tehran is reported to have conducted several assassinations outside Iran during 1998. In June the “League of the Followers of the Sunna” accused Iranian intelligence agents of murdering an Iranian Sunni cleric, Shaikh Nureddin Ghuraybi, in Tajikistan. In September the leaders of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, a virulently anti-Shia sectarian group, accused Iran of responsibility for the murders of two of the organization’s leaders, Allama Shoaib Nadeem and Maulana Habibur Rehman Siddiqui. In late November the National Council of Resistance claimed that the Iranian regime had kidnapped and killed Reza Pirzadi in Pakistan. Pirzadi was described as a warrant officer who had been released from prison in Iran in 1996.

Members of Iran’s Ministry of Security and Intelligence (MOIS) may have conducted five mysterious murders of leading writers and political activists in Iran. Late in the year, Tehran announced the discovery of an operational cell within the MOIS that it alleged operated without the knowledge of senior government officials. Tehran reportedly arrested the cell’s members.

The Iranian Government stated publicly that it would take no action to enforce the fatwa on Salman Rushdie, a British citizen, which has been in effect since 1989. The Iranian Government’s assurance led the UK Government to upgrade its diplomatic relations with Iran. Tehran stated, however, that revoking the fatwa is impossible since its author is deceased. Moreover, the Iranian Government has not required the Fifteen Khordad Foundation to withdraw its reward for executing the fatwa on Rushdie, and in November the Foundation increased its offer to $2.8 million.

Iran continued to provide support to a variety of terrorist groups, including the Lebanese Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which oppose the Middle East peace process through violence. Iran supports these groups with varying amounts of training, money, and/or weapons.

In March, a US district court ruled that Iran should pay $247 million to the family of Alisa Flatow, a US citizen killed in a PIJ bomb attack in Gaza in April 1995. The court ruled that Iran was responsible for her death because it provided funding to the PIJ, which claimed responsibility for the act. Palestinian sources said Iran supported the PIJ’s claimed attack in Jerusalem in early November 1998, in which two suicide bombers injured some 21 persons.

Iran still provides safehaven to elements of the PKK, a Turkish separatist group that has conducted numerous terrorist attacks in Turkey and on Turkish targets in Europe.

Iran also provides support to North African groups. In an interview in April 1998, former Iranian president Bani Sadr accused Tehran of training Algerian fighters, among others.

Tehran accurately claims it also is a victim of terrorism. In 1998 several high-ranking members of the Iranian Government were attacked and at least two were killed in attacks claimed by the terrorist group Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). The MEK claimed responsibility for the killing on 23 August of Asadollah Lajevardi, the former director of Tehran’s Evin Prison. It also claimed responsibility for the deaths in June of several persons, including Haj Hassan Salehi, allegedly a torturer at the prison, during a bombing attack on the Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office in Tehran.

Mohsen Rafiqdust, head of the Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled, escaped an attack on his life on 13 September. He said counterrevolutionary elements had embarked on efforts to make the country insecure.

At least nine Iranian diplomatic and associated personnel died when unknown persons invaded the Iranian Consulate in Mazare Sharif, Afghanistan, in early August during the Taliban takeover of that city. The Taliban denied responsibility for the deaths.

1999

Although there were signs of political change in Iran in 1999, the actions of certain state institutions in support of terrorist groups made Iran the most active state sponsor of terrorism. These state institutions, notably the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, continued to be involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts and continued to support a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals.

A variety of public reports indicate Iran’s security forces conducted several bombings against Iranian dissidents abroad. Iranian agents, for example, were blamed for a truck bombing in early October of a Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) terrorist base near Basrah, Iraq, that killed several MEK members and non-MEK individuals.

Iran continued encouraging Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups—including HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Ahmad Jibril’s PFLP-GC—to use violence, especially terrorist attacks, in Israel to undermine the peace process. Iran supported these groups with varying amounts of money, training, and weapons. Despite statements by the Khatami administration that Iran was not working against the peace process, Tehran stepped up its encouragement of, and support for, these groups after the election of Israeli Prime Minister Barak and the resumption of Israel-Syria peace talks. In a gesture of public support, President Khatami met with Damascus-based Palestinian rejectionist leaders during his visit to Syria in May. In addition, Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei refiected Iran’s covert actions aimed at scuttling the peace process when he sponsored a major rally in Tehran on 9 November to demonstrate Iran’s opposition to Israel and peace. Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist speakers at the rally reaffirmed their support for violent jihad against Israel. A Palestinian Islamic Jihad representative praised a bombing in Netanya that occurred days before and promised more such attacks.

Tehran still provided safehaven to elements of Turkey’s separatist PKK that conducted numerous terrorist attacks in Turkey and against Turkish targets in Europe. One of the PKK’s most senior atlarge leaders, Osman Ocalan, brother of imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, resided at least parttime in Iran. Iran also provided support to terrorist groups in North Africa and South and Central Asia, including financial assistance and training.

Tehran accurately claimed that it also was a victim of terrorism, as the opposition Mujahedin-e Khalq conducted several terrorist attacks in Iran. On 10 April the group assassinated Brigadier General Ali Sayyad Shirazi, the Iranian Armed Forces Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff.

2000

Despite the victory for moderates in Iran’s Majles elections in February, aggressive countermeasures by hardline conservatives have blocked most reform efforts. Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2000. Its Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) continued to be involved in the planning and the execution of terrorist acts and continued to support a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals.

Iran’s involvement in terroristfirelated activities remained focused on support for groups opposed to Israel and peace between Israel and its neighbors. Statements by Iran’s leaders demonstrated Iran’s unrelenting hostility to Israel. Supreme Leader Khamenei continued to refer to Israel as a “cancerous tumor” that must be removed; President Khatami, labeling Israel an “illegal entity,” called for sanctions against Israel during the intifadah; and Expediency Council Secretary Rezai said, “Iran will continue its campaign against Zionism until Israel is completely eradicated.” Iran has long provided Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups—notably HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and Ahmad Jibril’s PFLP-GC—with varying amounts of funding, safehaven, training, and weapons. This activity continued at its already high levels following the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May and during the intifadah in the fall. Iran continued to encourage Hizballah and the Palestinian groups to coordinate their planning and to escalate their activities against Israel. Iran also provided a lower level of support—including funding, training, and logistics assistance—to extremist groups in the Gulf, Africa, Turkey, and Central Asia.

Although the Iranian Government has taken no direct action to date to implement Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the decree has not been revoked, and the $2.8 million bounty for his assassination has not been withdrawn. Moreover, hardline Iranians continued to stress that the decree is irrevocable. On the anniversary of the fatwa in February, the IRGC released a statement that the decree remains in force, and Ayatollah Yazdi, a member of the Council of Guardians, reiterated that “the decree is irrevocable and, God willing, will be carried out.”

Iran also was a victim of Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK)-sponsored terrorism. The Islamic Republic presented a letter to the UN Secretary General in October citing seven acts of sabotage by the MEK against Iran between January and August 2000. The United States has designated the MEK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

2001

Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2001. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) continued to be involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts and supported a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals. Although some within Iran would like to end this support, hardliners who hold the reins of power continue to thwart any efforts to moderate these policies. Since the outbreak of the intifadah, support has intensified for Palestinian groups that use violence against Israel. During the past year, however, Iran appears to have reduced its involvement in other forms of terrorist activity. There is no evidence of Iranian sponsorship or foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks in the United States. President Khatami condemned the attacks and offered condolences to the American people.

Israel claims the ship KarineA contained 50 tons of mostly Iraniansupplied weapons for use by militants against Israelis. During 2001, Iran sought a highprofile role in encouraging anti-Israeli activity by way of increasing its support for anti-Israeli terrorist groups. Supreme Leader Khamenei continued to refer to Israel as a “cancerous tumor” that must be removed. Matching this rhetoric with action, Iran continued to provide Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups—notably HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP-GC—with varying amounts of funding, safehaven, training, and weapons. It also encouraged Hizballah and the rejectionist Palestinian groups to coordinate their planning and to escalate their activities.

In addition, Iran provided limited support to terrorist groups in the Gulf, Africa, Turkey, and Central Asia. This support is at a considerably lower level than that provided to the groups opposed to Israel and has been decreasing in recent years. The Iranian Government took no direct action in 2001 to implement Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie, but the decree has not been revoked nor has the $2.8 million bounty for his death been withdrawn. Moreover, on the anniversary of the fatwa in February, some hardline Iranians stressed again that the decree is irrevocable and should be carried out.

During Operation Enduring Freedom, Tehran informed the United States that, in the event US warplanes went down inside Iran, Iranian forces would assist downed air crews in accordance with international convention. Iran also worked with the United States and its allies at the Bonn Conference in late 2001 to help in the formation of the Afghan Interim Authority. Tehran pledged to close its borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan to prevent the inltration of Taliban and al-Qaida escapees. There are, however, reports that Arab Afghans, including al-Qaida members, used Iran as a transit route to enter and leave from Afghanistan.

2002

Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2002. Its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence and Security were involved in the planning of and support for terrorist acts and continued to exhort a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals.

Iran’s record against al-Qaida has been mixed. While it has detained and turned over to foreign governments a number of al-Qaida members, other al-Qaida members have found virtual safehaven there and may even be receiving protection from elements of the Iranian Government. Iran’s long, rugged borders are difcult to monitor, and the large number of Afghan refugees in Iran complicates efforts to locate and apprehend extremists. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that al-Qaida elements could escape the attention of Iran’s formidable security services.

During 2002, Iran maintained a highprofile role in encouraging anti-Israeli activity, both rhetorically and operationally. Supreme Leader Khamenei referred to Israel as a “cancerous tumor,” a sentiment echoed by other Iranian leaders in speeches and sermons. Matching this rhetoric with action, Iran provided Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups—notably HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of PalestineGeneral Command—with funding, safehaven, training, and weapons. Tehran also encouraged Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups to coordinate their planning and to escalate their terrorist activities against Israel.

Iran also provided support to extremist groups in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iraq with ties to al-Qaida, though less than that provided to the groups opposed to Israel.

In 2002, Iran became party to the 1988 Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation. It is party to five of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

2003

Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2003. Its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence and Security were involved in the planning of and support for terrorist acts and continued to exhort a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals.

Iran’s record against al-Qaida remains mixed. After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, some al-Qaida members fied to Iran where they have found virtual safehaven. Iranian officials have acknowledged that Tehran detained al-Qaida operatives during 2003, including senior members. Iran’s publicized presentation of a list to the United Nations of deportees, however, was accompanied by a refusal to publicly identify senior members in Iranian custody on the grounds of “security.” Iran has resisted calls to transfer custody of its al-Qaida detainees to their countries of origin or third countries for further interrogation and trial.

During 2003, Iran maintained a highprofile role in encouraging anti-Israeli activity, both rhetorically and opera-tionally. Supreme Leader Khamenei praised Palestinian resistance operations, and President Khatami reiterated Iran’s support for the “wronged people of Palestine” and their struggles. Matching this rhetoric with action, Iran provided Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups—notably HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command—with funding, safehaven, training, and weapons. Iran hosted a conference in August 2003 on the Palestinian intifadah, at which an Iranian official suggested that the continued success of the Palestinian resistance depended on suicide operations.

Iran pursued a variety of policies in Iraq aimed at securing Tehran’s perceived interests there, some of which ran counter to those of the Coalition. Iran has indicated support for the Iraqi Governing Council and promised to help Iraqi reconstruction.

Shortly after the fall of Saddam Hussein, individuals with ties to the Revolutionary Guard may have attempted to infiltrate southern Iraq, and elements of the Iranian Government have helped members of Ansar al-Islam transit and find safehaven in Iran. In a Friday Prayers sermon in Tehran in May, Guardian Council member Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati publicly encouraged Iraqis to follow the Palestinian model and participate in suicide operations against Coalition forces.

Iran is a party to five of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

2004

Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2004. Its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence and Security were involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts and continued to exhort a variety of groups to use terrorism in pursuit of their goals.

Iran continued to be unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qaida members it detained in 2003. Iran has refused to identify publicly these senior members in its custody on “security grounds.” Iran has also resisted numerous calls to transfer custody of its al-Qaida detainees to their countries of origin or third countries for interrogation and/or trial. Iranian judiciary officials claimed to have tried and convicted some Iranian supporters of al-Qaida during 2004, but refused to provide details. Iran also continued to fail to control the activities of some al Qaida members who fied to Iran following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

During 2004, Iran maintained a high-profile role in encouraging anti-Israeli terrorist activity, both rhetorically and operationally. Supreme Leader Khamenei praised Palestinian terrorist operations, and Iran provided Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups—notably HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command—with funding, safe haven, training, and weapons. Iran provided an unmanned aerial vehicle that Lebanese Hizballah sent into Israeli airspace on November 7, 2004.

Iran pursued a variety of policies in Iraq during 2004, some of which appeared to be inconsistent with Iran’s stated objectives regarding stability in Iraq as well as those of the Iraqi Interim Government (ⅡG) and the Coalition. Senior ⅡG officials have publicly expressed concern over Iranian interference in Iraq, and there were reports that Iran provided funding, safe transit, and arms to insurgent elements, including Muqtada al-Sadr’s forces.

Iraq

1986

Baghdad has denied being a state sponsor of terrorism since 1983 when it closed down Abu Nidal’s offices there, but subsequently available evidence indicates that Iraq has continued supporting some terrorist groups, particularly those opposed to Syria. Iraq sees terrorism as a useful tool for promoting its foreign policy interests. In 1986, Baghdad also permitted safehaven to some Palestinian terrorists responsible for attacks against US and Israeli targets.

Iraq justifies its support for Palestinian groups, including those engaged in terrorism, as consistent with its stated policy of assisting the struggle for a Palestinian homeland. Since the bombing of PLO headquarters in Tunis in 1985 and Yasir Arafat’s difficulties in maintaining an armed presence in Lebanon, Baghdad has become a major center of PLO and Fatah political and operational activities. Iraq also views its assistance as a means of enhancing its regional prestige, refurbishing its Pan-Arab credentials, and, most important, preventing Syria from gaining control of the Palestinian movement. The Palestinians, in return, offer Baghdad political support in the war with Tehran and help it against Syria. In 1986, the following Palestinian groups were based in or had offices in Baghdad:

The Arab Liberation Front, set up by Baghdad in 1969 to counter Syrian-backed groups.

The Palestine Liberation Front, headed by Abu Abbas, which was responsible for the Achille Lauro hijacking in October 1985.

The 15 May Organization, a splinter group formed from the remnants of Wadi Haddad’s PFLP Special Operations Group, and headed by Abu Ibrahim. It has claimed responsibility for a long list of operations over many years, including bombings of Israeli Embassies and El Al offices in London, Rome, Istanbul, Vienna, Athens, and Genos; the 1984 attempted assassination of the Iranian Ambassador to Damascus; and the bombings of department stores in London, Paris, and Brussels. Members of 15 May were also responsible for the 1982 bombing of a Pan Am flight over Honolulu and probably for the bombing of TWA Flight 840 over Athens in April 1986.

1987

Iraq, which previously had been on the US Government’s terrorist list⁽¹⁾ until removed in 1982, denies any relationship to terrorist organizations. The Abu Nidal organization was expelled in 1983; since then, Iraq has striven to establish a new international image as a state abhorring terrorism.This effort is no doubt designed to engender international support as the Iran-Iraq war continues.

Certain Palestinian terrorist groups, however, such as the Palestinian Liberation Front and remnants of the May 15 Organization, are known to have received sanctuary and assistance from Iraq since 1983. Some groups may have continued to receive aid in 1987.

1988

Iraq has worked to improve its international image, beginning with the expulsion of the ANO from Iraq in 1983.This effort was, no doubt, aimed at garnering international support during the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq, nonetheless, sponsored three assassinations of exiled dissidents in the United Kingdom, Sudan, and Norway in 1988.We suspect—but cannot confirm—that the Iraqi-backed Mujahedin-e-Khalq was responsible for an attempted bombing at a Tehran bus terminal.

Iraq also continued to provide safehaven to some Palestinian groups, such as the Iraqi-created Arab Liberation Front and Abu Abbas’s Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), responsible for the Achille Lauro hijacking in 1985. Baghdad views its safehaven to Palestinian groups as legitimate assistance to the struggle for a Palestinian homeland.

1990

Iraq was returned to the terrorist list in September 1990 because of its increased contact with, and support for, terrorist groups. After the formation of an international coalition against the invasion of Kuwait, Iraqi officials issued public statements endorsing terrorism as a legitimate tactic.

Following its invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, the Government of Iraq systematically seized the citizens of the United States and many other nations.This occurred in both Kuwait and Iraq and continued for several months. Many of the hostages were moved to strategic sites in Iraq, including armaments factories, weapons research facilities, and major military bases.

This mass act of hostage taking was condemned by nations throughout the world, and the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 664, demanding that Iraq release these hostages.

Saddam Hussein eventually released the hostages, starting with women and children. By December, all the Western

hostages were freed, but many Kuwaitis remained in captivity. Hostage taking on the scale undertaken by Iraq is unprecedented in recent history. Saddam Hussein’s operation represented a cynical and futile attempt to terrorize both foreign nationals and their governments and to weaken international resolve to oppose his occupation and annexation of Kuwait.

During 1990, and particularly after 2 August, the press reported increasing movement of terrorists to Baghdad, signaling the deepening relationship between these groups and Iraq. Even before the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq provided safehaven, training, and other support to Palestinian groups with a history of terrorist actions.The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) and Abu Abbas’s PLF, responsible for the 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking and the terrorist attack on Israeli beaches in May, are among these groups. The ANO is also reported to have reestablished its presence in Iraq in the first half of 1990. Abu Ibrahim, leader of the now-defunct 15 May terrorist organization and famed for his skill as a bombmaker, is also reportedly based in Baghdad.

With the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq reduced its support for anti-Iranian dissident groups including the Mujahidin-e-Khalq (MEK). Speculation continues regarding increased Iraqi support for the terrorist Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey.This is coupled with the worsening of Turkish-Iraqi relations over Turkey’s enforcement of UN mandated trade sanctions after the invasion of Kuwait and disputes over water rights.

Senior Iraqi Government officials, including Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, made public statements justifying terrorism as a legitimate Iraqi response in the event of hostilities between Iraq and the multinational force deployed in the region. There were reports that Iraq planned to put these words into effect and that Iraqi officials, as well as Baghdad’s Palestinian surrogates, conducted surveillance against various coalition targets.

1991

During 1991 Iraq was a leading state sponsor of terrorism. Iraqi agents and members of pro-Iraqi groups conducted attacks on the United States and other coalition members in a variety of locations around the world. Numerous other planned attacks were frustrated by stringent security precautions imposed by both coalition and noncoalition states in response to the threat of Iraqi-sponsored terrorism.

On 11 June Iraq agreed, in accord with United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, not to support acts of international terrorism or allow terrorists to operate in Iraq. However, Iraq reportedly continues to maintain contacts with several groups and individuals that have historically practiced terrorism.These include the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), Abu Abbas’s Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), and former 15 May organization leader Abu Ibrahim. Baghdad continues to make vague threats of retribution for the military defeat it suffered during Operation Desert Storm.

Iraq was linked directly to only a small number of the more than 200 war-related terrorist incidents that occurred worldwide between mid-January and the end of February 1991, a figure three times greater than the comparable period in 1990. Much of the terrorist activity associated with the Gulf war was attributed to indigenous groups such as November 17 in Greece, theTupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Peru, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) in Chile, and Dev Sol inTurkey,which was responsible for the death of two US citizens. In the months before Operation Desert Storm began, Iraq reportedly trained terrorists in intelligence activities and sabotage in special camps and prepared operations against coalition targets. During Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein publicly and repeatedly called upon all of his terrorist allies to attack coalition targets, frequently through announcements on Iraq’s Mother of Battles radio. The massive wave of anticoalition terrorism did not come to fruition, probably because of the cooperation of several governments in arresting or expelling several hundred Iraqi operatives from their host countries, the disruption in Baghdad’s communications, and increased precautions at coalition facilities during the war. The targets hit during the Gulf crisis were typically banks or commercial facilities belonging to members of the coalition; most of the attacks caused only limited property damage.

Iraq was directly involved in the 19 January attempted bombing of the US Cultural Center in Manila by two Iraqi nationals, one of whom was killed when the powerful bomb he was carrying exploded prematurely.The Philippine government expelled an Iraqi diplomat who directed the operation and his accomplices. Iraq was also responsible for an attempted bombing of the US Ambassador’s residence in Indonesia during the same period.

Although Iraq reduced support for anti-Iranian dissident groups, including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, as part of a drive to appease Iran during the war, it probably maintains contact with several of these organizations.

Iraq is also suspected of increasing support and sanctuary provided to the Kurdish Workers’ party (PKK), which has staged recent large-scale raids on Turkish government facilities from Iraqi territory. This policy probably is designed to punish Turkey for supporting the coalition during the war, providing sanctuary to Kurdish refugees, enforcing UN sanctions, and being part of a longstanding dispute over water rights. Iraq has denied such involvement.

1992

Iraq has not yet fully recovered its ability to conduct international terrorist attacks since the mass expulsion of Iraqi agents from many countries during the Gulf war. Nevertheless, Baghdad conducted 39 terrorist attacks against a variety of targets in direct violation of UN Security Council Resolution 687, which required Iraq to cease support for acts of international terrorism. Iraqi intelligence has resumed sending agents abroad to track opponents of Saddam Hussein. In addition, there have been persistent reports and at least one murder that strongly suggest Iraq is training hit squads to attack Hussein’s enemies in other countries. In 1992, Iraqisponsored terrorism has focused on Kurdish targets and on UN and Western relief organization employees stationed in northern Iraq.

The most dramatic case of an assassination committed by the Iraqis during the year occurred in December, when two Iraqis shot and killed an Iraqi nuclear scientist in Amman, Jordan, as he was preparing to defect.

There have been many casualties in the dozens of attacks aimed at driving UN and aid workers out of northern Iraq. In November, magnetic time bombs placed under UN convoy trucks exploded in Irbil; all evidence points to Iraqi Government responsibility for the attacks. In December, Iraqi authorities placed eight time bombs under UN relief convoy trucks. The bombs were set to explode in Irbil but were discovered and defused. One week later, explosions destroyed or damaged 14 relief trucks that had just passed the Iraqi checkpoint at Faydah. The trucks had crossed Iraqi-controlled territory after returning from Suleyamaniya. The houses, offices, and vehicles of UN and relief workers have been repeatedly attacked by bombs, grenades, guns, and fires.

UN Security Council Resolution 687 also requires that Iraq not allow any terrorist organization to operate within its territory. Nevertheless, Baghdad continues to maintain contacts and in some cases provide sanctuary to several groups and individuals that have practiced terrorism. Iraq hosts and supports the main Iranian opposition group, the Mujahedine Khalq (MEK), which carried out several violent attacks in Iran in 1992.

Saddam Hussein also supports extremist Palestinian groups including the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the Arab Liberation Front, Abu Abbas’s Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and Abu Ibrahim, leader and master bomb maker of the now defunct 15 May organization. The 1992 conviction of Mohammed Rashid in a Greek court for bombing a Pan Am aircraft in 1982 provided clear proof of longstanding Iraqi state sponsorship of international terrorism. Baghdad is alleged to provide safehaven and support to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

1993

The attempted assassination of former President Bush in Kuwait in April was the most brazen Iraqi act of terrorism in 1993. Iraqi-sponsored terrorism has become almost commonplace in northern Iraq, where the regime has been responsible for dozens of attacks on UN and relief agency personnel and aid convoys.

Iraq has not fully recovered its ability to conduct terrorist attacks outside its borders since the mass expulsion of Iraqi agents from many countries during the Gulf war. However, Iraqi intelligence has resumed sending agents abroad to track opponents of Saddam Husayn.

Kuwaiti officials discovered the elaborate scheme to kill former President Bush with an enormous car bomb shortly before he arrived for a visit.The group arrested for the assassination attempt was also planning a bombing campaign to destabilize Kuwait. The 14 suspects—11 Iraqis and three Kuwaitis—went on trial in June. Several of the Iraqi defendants worked for Iraqi intelligence, according to testimony in the trial. Forensic evidence also clearly linked Iraq to the abortive attack.

Iraqi-backed surrogates were probably responsible for two attempts to bomb the Kuwait Airways office in Beirut and another attempt to bomb the Kuwaiti Embassy, also in Lebanon. The Iraqi regime continued its war of attrition on UN and humanitarian targets in northern Iraq aimed at driving the foreign presence out of the area and depriving the Kurdish population of relief supplies. UN and relief workers were shot at; bombs or grenades were tossed at residences and vehicles; and bombs were placed on UN trucks loaded with relief supplies. In March, a Belgian official of Handicapped International was shot and killed; a local employee of the same organization was killed and six others were injured when an aid station was bombed in December.We suspect Iraqi involvement.

On 26 September, a UN truck carrying 12 tons of medical supplies was completely destroyed by a bomb attached to the fuel tank probably by Iraqi agents at an Iraqi checkpoint. The truckdriver and 12 civilians were injured by the blast. The incident illustrates Iraqi determination to reduce aid to the Kurds.

Although the Iraqi Government agreed in 1992 to comply with UN Resolution 687, which requires that Iraq not allow any terrorist organization to operate within its territory, Baghdad still maintains contacts with or provides sanctuary to several groups and individuals that have practiced terrorism. For example, the PKK, which has killed hundreds of people in attacks inside Turkey and has mounted two separate terrorist campaigns against Turkish interests in Europe in 1993, has training camps in Iraq, according to press reports. Iraq supports an opposition group, the MEK, which carried out several violent attacks in Iran during the year from bases in Iraq. Baghdad also harbors members of several extremist Palestinian groups including the ANO, the Arab Liberation Front, and Abu Abbas’s Palestine Liberation Front (PLF).

1994

Iraq continued to engage in state-sponsored internal and international terrorism in 1994. It is rebuilding its ability to mount terrorist attacks abroad, despite financial and diplomatic constraints imposed in the wake of the Gulf war. The Government of Iraq provides safehaven and logistic support to several terrorist groups and individuals, including elements of the ANO, based in Lebanon; the Mojahedin-e Khalq, which is opposed to the government in Tehran; Abu Abbas’ Palestine Liberation Front (PLF); and notorious bomb-maker Abu Ibrahim. Both Abbas and Ibrahim enjoy sanctuary in Iraq.

Political killings and terrorist actions are directed against civilians, foreign relief workers, journalists, and opposition leaders. On 12 April, a prominent Iraqi expatriate oppositionist residing in Beirut, Lebanon, was assassinated. The Government of Lebanon stated that it had firm evidence linking the killing to the Government of Iraq and arrested two Iraqi diplomats in connection with the incident. Lebanon subsequently broke diplomatic relations with Iraq.

Since 1991, in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, the Government of Iraq has obstructed the international community’s provision of humanitarian assistance.We believe that Iraq is responsible for more than 100 attacks on relief personnel and aid convoys over the past four years. Moreover, the Government of Iraq has offered monetary “bounties” to anyone who assassinates UN and other international relief workers.

A German journalist and her Kurdish bodyguard were shot to death on 3 April in an ambush near Suleymaniya. Kurdish authorities arrested several suspects who reportedly confessed that the government had paid them to commit the murders. Several other international personnel, including UN guards and journalists,were critically injured in bombing and shooting attacks. At least 16 such attacks were reported. On 2 January, two UN vehicles were fired on while approaching the Aski Kalak bridge between Mosul and Irbil. One vehicle was hit seven times. On 21 January a handmade device using TNT exploded in the garden of a UN residence. Two Swedish journalists were injured on 14 March near Aqrah when a bomb exploded under their car. On 24 May two vehicles carrying representatives from the NGO OXFAM were shot at while returning to Suleymaniyah from a UN-NGO meeting in Salaheddin. On 1 June handgrenades were thrown at a warehouse in Suleymaniyah belonging to the French relief group Equilibre.

In July, three members of a prominent Shi’a family, the al-Khoeis, and their driver died under suspicious circumstances in an automobile crash in southern Iraq, near Al Najaf. Evidence points to involvement by the Government of Iraq.The al-Khoei family had long been targeted for harassment and abuse by the government. On 4 June, a Kuwaiti court returned verdicts in the trial of the 14 individuals accused of participation in the plot to assassinate former President Bush during his April 1993 visit to Kuwait. Six of the 14 were sentenced to death, seven were sentenced to prison for terms ranging from six months to 12 years, and one was acquitted.

1995

During 1995 several acts of political violence in northern Iraq matched Baghdad’s pattern of using terrorism against the local population and regime defectors. Although Iraq’s terrorist infrastructure has not recovered from the blows it suffered during the Gulf war, Baghdad has taken measures to restore its terrorist options.

Iraq remains far from compliance with UN resolutions that require it to cease internal repression and support for terrorism. Iraqi-sponsored terrorism has been commonplace in northern Iraq, where the regime is responsible for more than 100 attacks on UN and relief agency personnel and aid convoys over the past several years. In 1995 there were a number of acts of political violence for which Baghdad is a suspect. For example, a blast on 9 November at the security office in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq of the opposition Iraqi National Congress (INC) killed at least 25 persons.The INC has been targeted before by the regime in Baghdad.

Early in the year, a number of Iraqi oppositionists in northern Iraq were poisoned by thallium. At least one survived and was treated in a British hospital.The British Government confirmed that he was a victim of a regime assassination attempt.

In October, the British Government expelled an officer of the Iraqi Interests Section in London for engaging in “activities incompatible with his diplomatic status.” The Londonbased Iraqi opposition reported that the official concerned was an employee of the Iraqi intelligence services who was responsible for targeting Iraqi exiles for attack.

On 20 January a US District Court in California awarded $1.5 million to Dr. Sargon Dadesho, an Iraqi oppositionist living in the United States who had brought suit against the Iraqi regime.The court concluded that the Iraqi Government was involved in a 1990 plot to assassinate Dadesho. This is the only time such a judgment on Iraq’s terrorist activities has been reached in a US court. In other court action, a Kuwaiti appeals court on 20 March confirmed the death sentences against two Iraqis convicted of involvement in the plot in 1993 to assassinate President George Bush, while converting to prison terms the death sentences meted out to four others by a lower court.

Iraq continues to provide haven and training facilities for several terrorist clients. Abu Abbas’ Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) maintains its headquarters in Baghdad.The Abu Nidal organization (ANO) continues to have an office in Baghdad. The Arab Liberation Front (ALF), headquartered in Baghdad, continues to receive funding from Saddam’s regime. Iraq also continues to host the former head of the now-defunct 15 May organization, Abu Ibrahim, who masterminded several bombings of US aircraft. A terrorist group opposed to the current Iranian regime, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), still is based in Iraq and has carried out several violent attacks in Iran from bases in Iraq.

1996

Iraq has not managed to recover its pre-Gulf war international terrorist capabilities, but it is slowly rebuilding its intelligence network. Acts of political violence continued in northern Iraq, and intra-Kurdish fighting in August led to an increased number of operatives there under Baghdad’s control. At the time of its military attack on Irbil, Iraq reportedly murdered more than 100 Iraqis associated with the dissident Iraqi National Congress (INC). Later, Baghdad renewed its threat to charge foreign relief personnel and other Iraqi staff with “espionage,” a crime punishable by death.

Iraq continues to provide safehaven to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups, including the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), and the former head of the now defunct 15 May Organization, Abu Ibrahim, who masterminded several bombings of US aircraft. The Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), a terrorist group that opposes the current Iranian regime, also is based in Iraq.

In mid-November a Jordanian diplomatic courier was murdered in Iraq on the road from Amman to Baghdad, and his diplomatic pouch stolen.The perpetrators of the act have yet to be identified. The diplomatic bag contained 250 new Jordanian passports, which could be used by terrorist operatives for travel under cover.

The terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) continues to attempt to use northern Iraq as a safehaven and base for attacks on Turkey.

1997

During 1997, Baghdad continued to rebuild its intelligence network, which had been heavily damaged during the Gulf war and which it had previously used to support international terrorism. Press reports citing oppositionist and refugee sources stated that the regime has infiltrated the UN refugee camps and Iraqi communities in Europe and the Middle East. Iraqi oppositionists have claimed publicly that the regime intends to silence them and accused Baghdad of planning to assassinate Iraqi exiles. However, there is no available evidence to indicate that Iraq’s agents participated directly in terrorist attacks during 1997.The last known such attack was against former President Bush in 1993.

In October, several gunmen attacked the World Health Organization headquarters in Baghdad with handgrenades, causing property damage but no casualties.The Iraqi Government blamed the attack on Iranian agents. Iran denied any involvement. A rocket attack 2 January 1998 on the headquarters of the United Nations (UNSCOM) inspectors in Baghdad did not cause damage because the rocket did not explode. No group claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Iraq continues to provide safehaven to a variety of Palestinian terrorist groups, including the ANO, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), and the former head of the now defunct 15 May Organization, Abu Ibrahim, who masterminded several bombings of US aircraft. Iraq also provides bases, weapons, and protection to the MEK, a terrorist group that opposes the current Iranian regime.

1998

In 1998, Baghdad continued efforts to rebuild its intelligence network, which it previously had used to support international terrorism. Press reports indicated that Iraqi intelligence agents may have been planning an attack against Radio Free Europe in Prague in October 1998. Other press reports citing “reliable diplomatic sources” in Amman claimed that Iraq had sent abroad for terrorist purposes intelligence agents who pretended to be refugees and businessmen. Iraqi oppositionists have claimed publicly that the regime intends to silence them and have accused Baghdad of planning to assassinate Iraqi exiles. There are various claims that the Iraqi intelligence service was responsible for the killings of some nine persons in Amman, but we cannot corroborate the charges.

In January 1998 an Iraqi diplomat was fired on in Amman, Jordan. Jordanian authorities arrested five persons who subsequently confessed responsibility. In a separate incident, eight persons—including an Iraqi diplomat—were murdered in the home of an Iraqi businessman. Jordanian authorities in April arrested several persons for this crime.

In southern Iraq, Ayatollah Morteza Borujerdi—a senior Shia cleric—was killed on 22 April. Oppositionists claimed the Iraqi Government assassinated Borujerdi because he refused to cease leading prayers. A second high-ranking Shia cleric, Ayatollah Ali Gharavi, was killed on 18 June. The oppositionist Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in

Iraq accused Baghdad of responsibility. Both men were respected Shia clerics of Iranian origin and their murders remain unsolved. Iraq continues to provide safehaven to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups, including the Abu Nidal organization, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), and the former head of the now-defunct 15 May Organization, Abu Ibrahim, who masterminded several bombings of US aircraft. In December press reports indicated that Abu Nidal had relocated to Iraq and may be receiving medical treatment. Abu Nidal’s move to Baghdad—if true—would increase the prospect that Saddam may call on the ANO to conduct anti-US attacks. Iraq also provides bases, weapons, and protection to the MEK, a terrorist group that opposes the current Iranian regime.

1999

Iraq continued to plan and sponsor international terrorism in 1999. Although Baghdad focused primarily on the antiregime opposition both at home and abroad, it continued to provide safehaven and support to various terrorist groups.

Press reports stated that, according to a defecting Iraqi intelligence agent, the Iraqi intelligence service had planned to bomb the offices of Radio Free Europe in Prague. Radio Free Europe offices include Radio Liberty, which began broadcasting news and information to Iraq in October 1998.The plot was foiled when it became public in early 1999.

The Iraqi opposition publicly stated its fears that the Baghdad regime was planning to assassinate those opposed to Saddam Hussein. A spokesman for the Iraqi National Accord in November said that the movement’s security organs had obtained information about a plan to assassinate its secretary general, Dr. Iyad ‘Allawi, and a member of the movement’s political bureau, as well as another Iraqi opposition leader.

Iraq continued to provide safehaven to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups, including the Abu Nidal organization, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), and the former head of the now-defunct 15 May Organization, Abu Ibrahim, who masterminded several bombings of U.S. aircraft.

Iraq provided bases, weapons, and protection to the MEK, an Iranian terrorist group that opposes the current Iranian regime. In 1999, MEK cadre based in Iraq assassinated or attempted to assassinate several high-ranking Iranian Government officials, including Brigadier General Ali Sayyad Shirazi, Deputy Chief of Iran’s Joint Staff, who was killed in Tehran on 10 April.

2000

Iraq planned and sponsored international terrorism in 2000. Although Baghdad focused on antidissident activity overseas, the regime continued to support various terrorist groups.The regime has not attempted an anti-Western terrorist attack since its failed plot to assassinate former President Bush in 1993 in Kuwait.

Czech police continued to provide protection to the Prague office of the US Government-funded Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), which produces Radio Free Iraq programs and employs expatriate journalists.The police presence was augmented in 1999, following reports that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) might retaliate against RFE/RL for broadcasts critical of the Iraqi regime.

To intimidate or silence Iraqi opponents of the regime living overseas, the IIS reportedly opened several new stations in foreign capitals during 2000. Various opposition groups joined in warning Iraqi dissidents abroad against newly established “expatriates’ associations,” which, they asserted, are IIS front organizations. Opposition leaders in London contended that the IIS had dispatched women agents to infiltrate their ranks and was targeting dissidents for assassination. In Germany, an Iraqi opposition figure denounced the IIS for murdering his son, who had recently left Iraq to join him abroad. Dr. Ayad ‘Allawi, Secretary General of the Iraqi National Accord, an opposition group, stated that relatives of dissidents living abroad are often arrested and jailed to intimidate activists overseas.

In northern Iraq, Iraqi agents reportedly killed a locally well-known religious personality who declined to echo the regime line.The regional security director in As Sulaymaniyah stated that Iraqi operatives were responsible for the carbomb explosion that injured a score of passersby. Officials of the Iraqi Communist Party asserted that an attack on a provincial party headquarters had been thwarted when party security officers shot and wounded a terrorist employed by the IIS.

Baghdad continued to denounce and delegitimize UN personnel working in Iraq, particularly UN de-mining teams, in the wake of the killing in 1999 of an expatriate UN demining worker in northern Iraq under circumstances suggesting regime involvement. An Iraqi who opened fire at the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) office in Baghdad, killing two persons and wounding six, was permitted to hold a heavily publicized press conference at which he contended that his action had been motivated by the harshness of UN sanctions, which the regime regularly excoriates.

The Iraqi regime rebuffed a request from Riyadh for the extradition of two Saudis who had hijacked a Saudi Arabian Airlines flight to Baghdad, but did return promptly the passengers and the aircraft. Disregarding its obligations under international law, the regime granted political asylum to the hijackers and gave them ample opportunity to ventilate in the Iraqi Government-controlled and international media their criticisms of alleged abuses by the Saudi Arabian Government, echoing an Iraqi propaganda theme.

While the origins of the FAO attack and the hijacking were unclear, the Iraqi regime readily exploited these terrorist acts to further its policy objectives.

Several expatriate terrorist groups continued to maintain offices in Baghdad, including the Arab Liberation Front, the inactive 15 May Organization, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the Abu Nidal organization (ANO). PLF leader Abu `Abbas appeared on state-controlled television in the fall to praise Iraq’s leadership in rallying Arab opposition to Israeli violence against Palestinians.The ANO threatened to attack Austrian interests unless several million dollars in a frozen ANO account in a Vienna bank were turned over to the group.

The Iraq-supported Iranian terrorist group, Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), regularly claimed responsibility for armed incursions into Iran that targeted police and military outposts, as well as for mortar and bomb attacks on security organization headquarters in various Iranian cities. MEK publicists reported that in March group members killed an Iranian colonel having intelligence responsibilities. A MEK claim to have wounded a general was denied by the Iranian Government. The Iraqi regime deployed MEK forces against its domestic opponents.

2001

Iraq was the only Arab-Muslim country that did not condemn the September 11 attacks against the United States. A commentary of the official Iraqi station on September 11 stated that America was “. . . reaping the fruits of [its] crimes against humanity.” Subsequent commentary in a newspaper run by one of Saddam’s sons expressed sympathy for Usama Bin Ladin following initial US retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan. In addition, the regime continued to provide training and political encouragement to numerous terrorist groups, although its main focus was on dissident Iraqi activity overseas.

Iraq provided bases to several terrorist groups including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the Abu Nidal organization (ANO). In 2001, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) raised its profile in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by carrying out successful terrorist attacks against Israeli targets. In recognition of the PFLP’s growing role, an Iraqi Vice President met with former PFLP Secretary General Habbash in Baghdad in January 2001 and expressed continued Iraqi support for the intifadah. Also, in mid-September, a senior delegation from the PFLP met with an Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister. Baghdad also continued to host other Palestinian rejectionist groups, including the Arab Liberation Front, and the 15 May Organization.

Meanwhile, Czech police continued to provide protection to the Prague office of the US Government-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), which produces Radio Free Iraq programs and employs expatriate journalists.The police presence was augmented in 1999 and 2000, following reports that the Iraqi Intelligence Service might retaliate against RFE/RL for broadcasts critical of the Iraqi regime. As concerns over the facility’s security mounted through 2000, the Czechs expelled an Iraqi intelligence officer in April 2001.

The Iraqi regime has not met a request from Riyadh for the extradition of two Saudis who had hijacked a Saudi Arabian Airlines flight to Baghdad in 2000. Disregarding its obligations under international law, the regime granted political asylum to the hijackers and gave them ample opportunity to voice their criticisms of alleged abuses by the Saudi Government in the Iraqi Government-controlled and international media.

2002

Iraq planned and sponsored international terrorism in 2002. Throughout the year, the Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS) laid the groundwork for possible attacks against civilian and military targets in the United States and other Western countries. The IIS reportedly instructed its agents in early 2001 that their main mission was to obtain information about US and Israeli targets.The IIS also threatened dissidents in the Near East and Europe and stole records and computer files detailing antiregime activity. In December 2002, the press claimed Iraqi intelligence killed Walid al-Mayahi, a Shi’a Iraqi refugee in Lebanon and member of the Iraqi National Congress.

Iraq was a safehaven, transit point, and operational base for groups and individuals who direct violence against the United States, Israel, and other countries. Baghdad overtly assisted two categories of Iraqi-based terrorist organizations—Iranian dissidents devoted to toppling the Iranian Government and a variety of Palestinian groups opposed to peace with Israel. The groups include the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq, the Abu Nidal organization (although Iraq reportedly killed its leader), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF). In the past year, the PLF increased its operational activity against Israel and sent its members to Iraq for training for future terrorist attacks.

Baghdad provided material assistance to other Palestinian terrorist groups that are in the forefront of the intifadah.The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, HAMAS, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad are the three most important groups to whom Baghdad has extended outreach and support efforts.

Saddam paid the families of Palestinian suicide bombers to encourage Palestinian terrorism, channeling $25,000 since March through the ALF alone to families of suicide bombers in Gaza and the West Bank. Public testimonials by Palestinian civilians and officials and cancelled checks captured by Israel in the West Bank verify the transfer of a considerable amount of Iraqi money.

The presence of several hundred al-Qaida operatives fighting with the small Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam in the northeastern corner of Iraqi Kurdistan—where the IIS operates—is well documented. Iraq has an agent in the most senior levels of Ansar al-Islam as well. In addition, small numbers of highly placed al-Qaida militants were present in Baghdad and areas of Iraq that Saddam controls. It is inconceivable these groups were in Iraq without the knowledge and acquiescence of Saddam’s regime. In the past year, al-Qaida operatives in northern Iraq concocted suspect chemicals under the direction of senior al-Qaida associate Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and tried to smuggle them into Russia,Western Europe, and the United States for terrorist operations.

Iraq is a party to five of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

2003

On 7 May 2003, President Bush suspended, with respect to Iraq, all sanctions applicable to state sponsors of terrorism, which had the practical effect of putting Iraq on a par with nonterrorist states. Although Iraq is still technically a designated state sponsor of terrorism, its name can be removed from the state sponsors list when the Secretary of State determines that it has fulfilled applicable statutory requirements, which include having a government in place that pledges not to support acts of terrorism in the future.

In 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom removed Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist regime from power and liberated Iraq. Since then, however, Iraq has become a central battleground in the global war on terrorism. Former regime elements, who have been conducting insurgent attacks against Coalition forces, have increasingly allied themselves tactically and operationally with foreign fighters and Islamic extremists, including some linked to Ansar al-Islam, al-Qaida, and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi.The line between insurgency and terrorism has become increasingly blurred as attacks on civilian targets have become more common. By end of the year, Coalition forces had detained more than 300 suspected foreign fighters.

Extremists associated with al-Qaida claimed credit for several suicide car bombings, including attacks in October against the headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross and three Baghdad police stations and an attack in November against an Italian military police base in Nasiriyah. Al-Qaida associate Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi—accused of working with Ansar al-Islam—emerged as a key suspect in the deadly bombing of Jordan’s Baghdad embassy in August.

After Coalition strikes destroyed Ansar al-Islam’s base in northern Iraq in late March, Ansar al-Islam members fled across the border and regrouped in Iran. Counterterrorist operations suggest many of those fighters have since reentered Iraq and are active in anti-Coalition activities. In September, suspected members of Ansar al-Islam were arrested in Kirkuk carrying 1,200 kilograms of TNT.

In November, Coalition forces killed two unidentified, high-ranking members of Ansar al-Islam during a raid on a terrorist hideout in Baghdad. Other terrorist groups maintained a presence in Iraq. Members of the foreign terrorist organization Mujahedin-e-Khalq—which had received military support from the regime of Saddam Hussein—were stripped of their weapons and placed under US military detention.The terrorist group KADEK—renamed the Kurdistan People’s Congress (KHK) in the fall—continued to proclaim its commitment to nonviolence, while launching several attacks against Turkish targets inside Turkey.The presence of several thousand KHK members in northern Iraq underscores the group’s ability to carry out terrorist operations.The KHK periodically threatens to heighten its attacks against Turkey.

Iraq has signed eight of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and is a party to five.

2004

The rescission of Iraq’s designation on October 20, 2004 was discussed by Department Spokesman Richard Boucher at a daily press briefing on October 20, 2004. The relevant section from the Department of State website (www.state.gov/r/ pa/prs/dpb/2004/37261.htm) is extracted below:

QUESTION: Yeah, today, for the second time in its history, Iraq has been taken off the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, and I’m just wondering what you have to say about that.Why the—obviously, since the President asked the Secretary to do it—

MR. BOUCHER: Why the two-stage? Yeah. Okay.

The first event that you’re referring to was in April 2003 in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The President sought and the Congress approved legislation that authorized the President to make nearly all the State Sponsor of Terrorism-related sanctions inapplicable to Iraq by a presidential determination, and the President exercised that authority in May of 2003.

Existing laws provide that State Sponsor status can only be formally rescinded when the country’s fundamentally changed government no longer supports international terrorism and has provided assurances that it will not support such acts in the future.That is done by a presidential certification to Congress that’s followed by a determination by the Secretary of State that these legal requirements have been satisfied.

So we had to wait until the new Iraqi Government was in place and then able to provide those assurances before we could take the formal step to end the sanctions; now we’ve done that. So once the new Interim Iraqi Government assumed authority in June, it was possible to obtain from that government the necessary assurances and to satisfy the other legal requirements necessary for a rescission; that’s been done. And effective with the President’s certification to Congress on September 24th and the Secretary’s determination of October 7th, the rescission of these restrictions is effective, and that’s what appeared in The Federal Register today.

Specifically, the President has certified and the Secretary then determined three basic things: First, there’s been a fundamental change in leadership and policies of the Government of Iraq; second, that Iraq’s Government is not supporting acts of international terrorism; and third, that Iraq’s Government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

QUESTION: Okay, I just—this, all that is very well and good and I know that he did sign it on October 7th, but once again, I mean, it didn’t take effect until its publication today in The Federal Register. So that—I just want to get that out of the way. But also, the—it is kind of unusual for a country to be—have been twice placed and twice removed from this list.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, I don’t think I’d say twice removed because the initial—this is, you might say, a progressive two-step process that we had to follow in the case of Iraq because of the circumstances this time. The first was to [su]spend the restrictions in May of 2003.

QUESTION: No, no, no, Richard—

MR. BOUCHER: And then the second is actually to remove—oh, you’re talking about taking them off in the ’80s?

QUESTION: I’m talking their being on the list and being a charter member of this group and suddenly not—

MR. BOUCHER: Being a charter member and being taken off—

QUESTION:—being taken off in ’82, and being put back on in 1990, and now being taken off again. MR. BOUCHER: Yeah, but let’s—whatever the wisdom of the step in the 1980s, I think everybody has to understand that there is a fundamentally changed situation. Iraq, unfortunately, for the Iraqi people and for the international community, Iraq had the same government throughout that period of the ’70s and the ’80s and the ’90s, and that was Saddam Hussein. And among the many things he did was never to calculate the interest of his nation and his people, but rather to continue to try to acquire the weapons and technology that he used many times to kill his people and to attack his neighbors.

That period is over. Iraq has a fundamentally changed government. It is going to have a different relationship with the Iraqi people, and it is going to have a different relationship with the international community. So the two circumstances can be contrasted but not compared, in my opinion.

QUESTION: Well, that’s fair enough, except for that my question really is that you said that these legal requirements to be made, that there has to be a fundamental change from the government and they have to renounce these kinds of—the terrorism and support for terrorism and promise not to do it in the future. And that didn’t happen in 1982. In fact, Iran—I mean, Iraq, as you have noted in subsequent Patterns of Global Terrorism reports, continued to support this.

So, you know, you said,“Whatever the wisdom of this step in the 1980s.” Well, you know, was that a mistake?

MR. BOUCHER: I’ll refer you back to the briefings of the time and I’ll let the historians judge whether it was a mistake or not. I’m not here to brief on a decision made in 1982.

QUESTION: It’s quite relevant to today, though.

MR. BOUCHER: No, I’m saying I just explained exactly why it’s not relevant at all to today because whatever, however these criteria applied in 1982, they quite clearly apply now.There is a different leader in Baghdad.There’s a different set of leaders.There is a different system of government. There is a different approach to governance. And there is a different relationship of Iraq with its neighbors. And those things are so obviously different that, as I said, I think the two situations can be contrasted but not compared.

QUESTION: But, of course, they can be contrasted, which begs the question though is why they were taken off in 1982.

MR. BOUCHER: And that’s a question I leave you to research and historians to judge.

QUESTION: All right.To go back in a time machine and ask the briefer in 1982?

MR. BOUCHER: No, you can just pull the transcripts off the web, I’m sure, and you’ll see what the briefer said at the time.

QUESTION: Well—

MR. BOUCHER: I’m sure the briefer stands by what he said.

QUESTION: Well, check that because I’m not sure you guys have ’82 on the web.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, we might not.

QUESTION: No.

MR. BOUCHER: We might not. But I—we’ve got it somewhere. Do I have it on CD? I can’t remember.

QUESTION: I don’t think—

MR. BOUCHER: I don’t know how far back it goes. Anyway, it’s out there somewhere. Try the National Security

Archive or somewhere like that, if we don’t have it. All right?

QUESTION: No.

Libya

Designation date December 29, 1979

1985

Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has long been the world leader most closely identified with sponsorship of terrorist groups and has made terrorism one of the primary instruments of his foreign policy. His revolutionary philosophy and anti-Western orientation lead him to aid virtually any group that opposes his perceived enemies.Tripoli has operated numerous training sites for foreign dissident groups that provide instruction in the use of explosive devices, hijacking, assassination, and various commando and guerilla techniques. It has also provided terrorist training outside Libya and has abused diplomatic privilege by storing arms and explosives at its diplomatic establishments.

In 1985 Libya was involved in fewer incidents then in the previous year—17 compared with 25—and more than half these attacks were assassination attempts against Libyan exiles during the first half of the year. In 1985 Libya sponsored five attacks against exiled Libyan dissidents in Greece,West Germany, Cyprus, Italy, and Austria.The former Libyan Ambassador to Austria survived a particularly vicious assassination attempt in February. Libya also plotted antiexile attacks in the United States. In May, for example, a Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was declared persona non grata, and other Libyans were accused when a plot to kill Libyan dissidents in several states was uncovered.The plan indicated an increased Libyan interest in embarrassing the US Government, even though the targets were not American.

Libyan support for radical Palestinian groups has continued to grow.Training for Palestinians and other radicals frequently has taken place at several locations in Libya. Qadhafi has provide safehaven, money, and arms to groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC), the Fatah dissidents led by Abu Musa, and the notorious Abu Nidal Group.The Abu Nidal members responsible for the attack on the El Al counter in Vienna in December 1985 used passports seized by Libya from expelled Tunisian nationals. Libya also may have been involved in the November 1985 hijacking of an Egyptian airliner. According to Libyan press reports, Sabri al-Banna (who calls himself Abu Nidal) met with Qadhafi in Libya at least twice in 1985, and, according to reliable press reports, some of the Abu Nidal Group’s leadership has moved to Libya.

Tripoli has continued to support insurgents and revolutionary groups around the world. In Latin America, Libya provided support to the Colombian 19th of April Movement (M-19), a guerilla organization that frequently carries out international terrorism. Libya also provided training, guidance, and funds to a Chilean leftist terrorist group, enabling it to expand armed action against the Government of Chile. Libya also has been implicated in subversive or terrorist activity in North Africa. During 1985 Cairo captured several teams of Libyan-supported Egyptian dissidents who reported that their plan was to destabilize the Mubarak government through sabotage and inciting civil unrest. Individuals arrested after the November attempted attack on Libyan exiles in Egypt stated that Qadhafi’s target list included Mubarak.

In 1985 the number of Libyan-inspired terrorist attacks in Sub-Saharan Africa declined markedly; none was directed against US personnel or facilities. Qadhafi probably calculated that his perceived political and diplomatic successes in the region reduced the need for Libyan terrorist activity there.The French withdrawal from Chad in late 1984 and the overthrow of longtime enemy President Nimeiri in Sudan eliminated two key targets of Libyan terrorism. Libya has assigned known terrorists to its facilities in Sudan, however, thereby creating a network available to resume terrorist activity at any time.Tripoli also has continued its subversive activity in Sub-Saharan Africa—providing financial, logistic, training, and material support to insurgent and terrorist groups in the region.

The level of Libyan activity in Sudan fluctuated during the course of 1985. After President Nimeiri’s ouster in April, Qadhafi quickly sent in his Libyan-based Sudanese Revolutionary Committees, which provide a network for promoting pro-Libyan subversive activity. On another front, however, Tripoli ended its support to the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which weakened the southern insurgency.The pace of SPLA terrorist activity slowed during 1985, with only occasional kidnappings and armed attacks on Sudanese civilians and foreigners.

In Central Africa, Libya continued its subversion aimed at destabilizing local governments, as in the following examples:

■ Libya continued to fund, train, and arm several hundred externally based Zairian dissidents.Tanzanian-based dissidents, possibly with Libyan support, attacked a small town in eastern Zaire in June 1985. In September Zairian officials claimed to have thwarted at least one Libyansponsored plot against President Mobutu. The Zairian President’s effective personal security and the ineptitude of the dissidents, however, reportedly stymied the assassination plot.

■ The Central African Republic was an active center for Libyan covert action. In July 1985, 15 Central Africans were arrested for conspiring with Libyan People’s Bureau members.

■ A large Libyan presence in Congo—including employees of the People’s Bureau, economic projects, and front organizations such as the Muslim Friendship League—and frequent official travelers from Tripoli, betrayed a high level of Libyan activity.

■ Libya has provided support to dissidents and students from Cameroon.

1986

Qadhafi’s anti-Western attacks in 1986 focused primarily on the United States and the United Kingdom. Information in late 1985 and early 1986 indicated a greater likelihood of anti-US targeting by Tripoli, including the suspicion of Libyan involvement in the Rome and Vienna airport attacks of December 1985.This led to a largely unsuccessful effort by the United States to persuade other countries to join in peaceful economic and political measures against Libya.

Against a backdrop of tension that increased after US naval maneuvers in the central Mediterranean in January and March, Qadhafi’s bellicose attitude climaxed in the Libyaninstigated attack against the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin. Libyan willingness to target US citizens directly was a dramatic new turn in Libyan terrorism. The discotheque was a nightclub popular with off-duty US servicemen. The powerful bomb that exploded there on the morning of 5 April killed three persons (including two American soldiers) and wounded more than 200 others (including more than 70 US citizens). Following the attack, the US Government announced that it had incontrovertible proof of Libyan complicity and on 15 April launched retaliatory airstrikes against Tripoli and Benghazi. Qadhafi responded with a series of terrorist attacks against the United States and also against the United Kingdom, where some of the US planes were based:

On 15 April, a US Embassy communications officer was shot in Khartoum; circumstantial evidence points to Libyan agents.

On 17 April, two British teachers and American hostage Peter Kilburn were discovered murdered in Beirut. British Foreign Secretary Howe publicly linked Libya to the murders. Another British hostage, journalist Alec Collett, was allegedly killed about the same time, but his body has not been found.

On 18 April, authorities in Ankara apprehended two Libyans with handgrenades as they approached a US officers club, where a wedding reception was being held. The pair later admitted they received the grenades from the Libyan People’s Bureau (LPB).

On 25 April, a US Embassy communications officer was wounded in Sansa, North Yemen. Libya is believed to have instigated the attack.

The level of Libyan-sponsored terrorist activity fell after late April. The reduction was probably the result of several factors. Qadhafi was apparently stunned by the US air raid and probably curtailed operations, in part, to avoid further military reprisals. Libya also experienced increased internal unrest after the raid and was forced to focus temporarily on domestic matters. Qadhafi’s ability to direct terrorism overseas via the LPBs was seriously damaged when more than 100 Libyan diplomats were expelled from Europe. Finally, heightened security measures taken by the United States and other Western nations undoubtedly also contributed to the lull.

Libya resumed terrorist activity in July. At least nine nationals from Togo and Benin were arrested in July for participation in a plot to attack the US Embassy and a market in Lome.They reportedly confessed to having received a pistol, grenades, and explosive devices from the LPB in Cotonou, Benin. The suspects alleged that official Libyan facilities in Burkina and Ghana were also involved in the plot.

On 3 August, gunmen attacked the UK base at Akrotiri, Cyprus, with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms fire. Although they did not penetrate the base’s perimeter, the attackers wounded two women before withdrawing. Available information strongly links Libya to the attack, which was undoubtedly undertaken in retaliation for UK support of the US April airstrikes. Qadhafi had publicly vowed to strike back against the United kingdom after the US air raid. He claimed the base at Akrotiri had been used by US aircraft involved in the raid. In claiming responsibility for the attack, the Unified Nasserite Organization invoked the Omar al-Mukhtar Group, named after a Libyan hero who opposed colonial occupation earlier in the century. A group using a similar name claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on the British Ambassador’s residence in Beirut two days after the US raid.

On September 5, four Abu Nidal organization (ANO) terrorists attempted to hijack Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan. Before the incident was resolved, the terrorists had killed 21 persons, including two Americans; an additional 120 persons were wounded. The four terrorists who seized the aircraft were captured at the scene. A fifth suspect arrested later in the case has ties to Libya and probably provided logistic support to the hijackers.

Qadhafi’s antidissident campaign remains one of the most consistent features of Libyan terrorism. Information suggests that all Libyan stations abroad are responsible for tracking and reporting on the exiles on Qadhafi’s “hit list”. During 1986, Qadhafi’s worldwide pursuit of individuals he regards as dangerous to his regime resulted in the following attacks:

On 17 February, the owner of an anti-Qadhafi radio station was wounded in Rome by two suspected Libyan agents.

Masked gunmen thought to be Libyan agents shot and killed a Libyan industrialist in his home in a Paris suburb on 30 June.

Qadhafi continued his interest in provoking violence in Latin America and the Caribbean in 1986 by providing encouragement to almost any anti-US group. Qadhafi focused his efforts on the French Caribbean, because leftist groups there have been more violent than English-speaking groups. Initially disappointed by the lack of support he received after the US airstrikes, by late summer Qadhafi had renewed his efforts to collect intelligence, undermine US influence in the region, and establish his bona fides as a worldwide revolutionary leader.

Qadhafi’s activities in the Western Hemisphere have not been totally successful. Tripoli provides money and some training to groups it supports, although Qadhafi frequently fails to deliver the aid he promises. Some local security forces were successful in countering terrorist plans. Local groups also resent Qadhafi’s insensitivity to their problems. Cuban opposition to Libya’s indiscriminate exhortations to violence has somewhat undercut Qadhafi’s ability to gain influence among local radical groups.

Libyan activity in Africa reached a peak after the US airstrikes in April. Qadhafi reacted to the raid by pressuring many of the groups he had supported to mount attacks against US personnel and facilities. Libya was behind many anti-US demonstrations and threats in the region immediately after the April operation. As elsewhere, Libyan activity in Africa slowed after April, resuming in July with the aforementioned incident in Benin.

Sudan remained a hotbed of Libyan terrorist activity. Several notorious Libyan terrorists visited Sudan during 1986. One purpose of the visits was to maintain contact with the pro-Libyan Sudanese Revolutionary Committees.These committees give Tripoli a network that can be used for either subversive activities or terrorism.

1987

Although detectable Libyan involvement in terrorist activity dropped significantly in 1986 and 1987 after the US air raids in April 1986, Qadhafi shows no signs of forsaking terrorism. His desire to establish himself as an Islamic and Third World revolutionary leader causes him to establish links to or provide aid to almost any group that opposes his enemies. Qadhafi’ s contacts with dissident groups around the world follow no geographic pattern but simply seek alliances of opportunity. The recipients of his assistance include several international terrorist groups as well as a range of insurgent and other dissident movements.

Libyan interest in attacking French targets increased significantly in 1987, probably because of France’s support for the Government of Chad in its fight against Libyan invaders.

Libya had already started to conduct surveillance against a range of potential French targets in 1986, and we suspect that Qadhafi may have been behind an attack against a government building in French Guyana in January 1987. Further attacks were staged against French Guyana in January 1987. Further attacks were staged against French interests following Qadhafi’s defeats in Chad in March:

A Libyan-supported radical Palestinian terrorist group, the Popular Struggle Front, was most likely responsible for the anti-Western bombing in Djibouti in March that killed 11 persons.

Qadhafi may have had a hand in the assassination of two French gendarmes in Beirut in October. The terrorist group ASALA, which may have been responsible, has a long history of ties to Qadhafi.

We have little doubt that the US air raids on Libya in 1986 contributed heavily to Qadhafi’s subsequent caution. At the same time, however, we are equally sure that he continued planning for anti-US attacks involving the use of surrogate groups to disguise Libyan responsibility.We believe that Libya also increased its surveillance of US facilities and personnel during the year, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.

On at least two occasions, there may have been a Libyan hand in terrorist incidents. First, the attempted murder of the three US Embassy employees in Egypt in May was carried out by the Egypt’s Revolution, a group alleged to have connections to Libya (the three sons of the late Egyptian President Nasser have close ties to Qadhafi) and, second, a bomb was set off in October at the offices of the private volunteer organization World Vision in Moundou in Chad.

Qadhafi also tried to retaliate for the United Kingdom’s role in the 1986 US airstrikes. In April, shortly after the first anniversary of the US air raids, two men wounded a British Army warrant officer and his companion traveling in a car near Limassol in Cyprus.Two Arabs later arrested for the attacks were identified as Libyan-supported terrorists who had previously participated in a 1986 attack on the British airbase at Akrotiri.

A spectacular French counterterrorist success in 1987 revealed Libya’s deep complicity in supporting PIRA in the United Kingdom. In October, French authorities intercepted a coastal freighter, the Eksund Ⅱ, off the coast of France and seized 150 tons of weapons and explosives, including surfaceto-air missiles. Several known PIRA members were on board the vessel, which had been loaded in Libya. The size of the shipment has led some observers to speculate that some of the weapons may have been intended for distribution to other terrorist groups. UK authorities suspect that the Eksund Ⅱ shipment may have been preceded by four others from Libya.

Libya continued to hunt down its dissidents overseas. Libyan agents murdered two exiles in 1987 and a third attempt failed:

In January, a Libyan businessman and known anti-Qadhafi activist was assassinated in a tavern in an Athens suburb.The gunmen escaped.

In May, an attacker tried but failed to kill a prominent anti-Qadhafi activist in Vienna. He dropped his Libyan passport at the scene while fleeing into the nearby Libyan People’s Bureau. The attempt was the second one the dissident’s life in just over two years.

In June, two assassins in Rome killed the Cairo office chief of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, who was a well-known opponent of Qadhafi. The two men were captured and identified themselves as agents of the Libyan Revolutionary Committees.

Qadhafi has consistently offered support for radical Palestinian groups involved in terrorism. Libya has had close operational ties to the Abu Nidal organization for at least three years, and we believe that Tripoli offered sanctuary and other facilities to many ANO leaders in 1987, after the group was expelled from its headquarters in Damascus.

Qadhafi also sought with little success to establish links to anti-Western or antiregime dissidents in the Caribbean and Pacific regions. Libya suffered a setback in the Caribbean when one of its officials—a key terrorism coordinator for the area—was excluded from Suriname,Trinidad, and Venezuela. Before his exclusion, documents had been found in his possession giving details of Libyan terrorism plans for the Caribbean. In the Pacific, plans were thwarted when Libya was refused permission to open a Libyan People’s Bureau in Vanuatu and its Bureau in Canberra was closed by Australian authorities.

1988

Despite a public posture of moderation in 1988, Qadhafi continued to support terrorism. Qadhafi attempted to mask his involvement in terrorism, working with and through client groups. He used his own personnel in only one known occasion in 1988. Libya has provided training, weapons, money, and other forms of support to about 30 insurgent and terrorist groups worldwide, including ASALA, the JRA, Palestinian groups such as the ANO and the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), and Latin American groups such as Colombia’s M-19 and Peru’s MRTA.

Circumstantial evidence links Libya to a number of attacks against US interests on the second anniversary of the US airstrikes. Qadhafi possibly offered financial incentives to client groups in return for such attacks. In 1988:

Italian police identified a JRA member as responsible for the car bombing outside a USO club in Naples on 14 April. A claim made for the attack said it was revenge for the US attack on Tripoli. A US servicewoman and four Italian citizens died in the explosion.

The M-19 group claimed the bombing of a USIS center in Colombia on 14 April.

Libyan-supported terrorists are strongly suspected in a bombing attack on 15 April against a US Air Force communications facility near Humosa, Spain.

The MRTA claimed credit for the bombing of two USIS centers in Peru on 16 April.

Libyan-supported Costa Rican terrorists are believed to be behind a bombing agent against a US-Costa Rican cultural center in San Jose on 19 April.

Libya also remained active in Sub-Saharan Africa. In February 1988, Senegalese authorities arrested two Libyans known to be terrorist operatives at Dakar Airport as they attempted to smuggle arms and explosives aboard a flight from Cotonou, Benin. The two were believed to have been planning to attack Western targets. Subsequent to the arrests, Benin expelled the head of the Libyan People’s Bureau. Despite publicly recognizing the Habre government in May, 1988, Qadhafi continues to support subversion in Chad.

For the first time since 1983, there were no Libyan antidissident attacks; Qadhafi invited all exiles to return home early in the year and seemed more willing—at least temporarily—to repair relations with opponents of his regime.

Tripoli remained the ANO’s primary state sponsor and was, through the provision of arms and documents, linked to an attack by the group in July in Greece.Tripoli has been the group’s principal host since it was expelled from Damascus in June 1987 and has provided it with weapons and other support since the late 1970s. ANO members train in Libya, and their leader, Sabri al-Banna, lives in Tripoli. A clear indication of the ANO-Libya link emerged during investigation of the attack on the Greek day-excursion ship in July. According to Greek authorities, the ANO team leader—Samir Muhammad Khadar—traveled on a Libyan passport. Furthermore, the attackers used weapons sold to Tripoli during the 1970s. Despite Libya’s extensive support of the ANO, however, we have no proof that Qadhafi ordered or participated directly in this or any of the ANO attacks in 1988. ANO-Libyan relations are still evolving. Although Qadhafi clearly sees the value of the ANO as a surrogate, he probably calculates that ANO operations are now more directly attributable to Tripoli. As a result he may take greater precautions in providing direct Libyan support to ANO operations.

1989

Libya continued to show public signs of moderation while maintaining in its network of support for international terrorist groups.There were no terrorist incidents in 1989 that were directly attributable to Libya. A Libyan-backed group, however, the MRTA, attempted to bomb the USIS Binational Center in Peru in April to mark the third anniversary of US airstrikes against Tripoli. MRTA bombed the same facility in 1988 on the second anniversary of the air raids.

Qadhafi may have put pressure on some Libyan-backed radical Palestinian groups—the PFLP-GC and the ANC—to stand down on terrorist operations not directed against Israel or the occupied territories. Nevertheless, the Libyan leader continues to shelter the ANO’s leader, Sabri Al-Banna (aka Abu Nidal), and his remaining followers.

Qadhafi continues to provide money, training, and other support to his terrorist clients, despite at least temporarily restricting their activities.The Libyans have sponsored over 30 international groups, including the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the JRA, M-19, PIRA, and MRTA, in addition to radical Palestinian groups.

In recent speeches, Qadhafi has restated his opposition to US and Western influence in the Third World and reaffirmed Libyan willingness to support armed revolutionary struggles. Qadhafi continues to maintain Libyan contacts with subversive groups in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, possibly in hopes of cultivating surrogate agents. Qadhafi has also used front companies as conduits for financial and materiel support to international terrorist groups in order to obscure Libyan involvement.

1990

In 1990, Libya demonstrated its continued support for terrorism by supporting the Palestine Liberation Front’s failed 30 May seaborne attack on crowded Israeli beaches. Tripoli helped the PLF plan, train for, supply, and carry out the seaborne operation.

Since 1986, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has made public disclaimers about his support for terrorist groups. He continued to provide money, training, and other support to his terrorist clients. Qadhafi’s claims of having expelled certain terrorist groups—the PLF, ANO, and PFLP-GC—remained unsubstantiated as of the end of 1990. Libya also resumed funding to the PFLP-GC, and possibly other Palestinian terrorist groups in 1990.

Libya also continues its support for a variety of terrorist/ insurgent groups worldwide. In the Philippines, Libya has supported the NPA, which carried out terrorist attacks against Americans that killed five persons in 1990. Costa Rican officials believe that all 15 members of the Santamaria Patriotic Organization (OPS) arrested in Costa Rica in February for grenade attacks against US facilities had undergone terrorist training in Libya.The group that attacked the Trinidad and Tobago Parliament on 27 July in a coup attempt, which killed several persons, received training and financial support from Libya, among others.

In April, Ethiopia expelled two Libyan diplomats for alleged involvement in the 30 March bombing at the Hilton Hotel in Addis Ababa.

Throughout 1990, indications of Libya’s previous involvement in acts of terrorism emerged. According to German press reports, German officials uncovered evidence in the files of the now-defunct East German secret police, the Stasi, that demonstrated Libyan responsibility for the 1986 bombing of the La Belle disco in West Berlin.

In addition, according to press reports, the investigation into the September 1989 bombing of the French UTA Flight 772—which killed 170 persons, including 7 Americans—indicates that the bomb was brought into Congo in the Libyan diplomatic pouch and delivered to three Libyantrained Congolese terrorists by an official of the Libyan Embassy in Brazzaville. African and French press reports state that both the Congolese and Zairians are holding suspects who have implicated Libya in the bombing.

Press reports in late 1990 also laid much of the responsibility on the Libyans for the bombing in December 1988 of Pan Am Flight 103. According to American, British, and French press, investigators discovered that the detonator used in the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing was identical to one carried by two Libyan agents arrested in Dakar, Senegal, in February 1988. The official investigation into both of these cases was continuing through the end of 1990.

1991

The culmination of two important investigations in 1991 demonstrated Libya’s continued responsibility for acts of international terrorism. In October, a French magistrate issued international arrest warrants charging four Libyan Government officials—including two senior officials—with the 1989 bombing of UTA 772 in which 171 persons, including seven American, died. One of those indicted is Abdullah Sanussi, Qadhafi’s brother-in-law. On 14 November, simultaneous indictments were issued by US and British courts accusing two Libyan intelligence officers, Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, of planting the bomb on Pan Am Flight 103 that killed 270 persons, including 189 Americans, in December 1988.

Those two cases starkly revealed Libya’s direct participation in two major acts of terror.We believe that these two incidents, resulting in the murder of 441 people, were executed with the knowledge and approval of officials at the highest level of the Libyan Government.

The international reaction to the evidence indicating Libyan involvement in these two bombings has been overwhelmingly positive. Even many of those states with close political, economic, ethnic, or religious ties to Libya have recognized that the evidence clearly supports Libya’s responsibility. At year’s end, the United States, France, and Great Britain were building support for a United Nations Security Council resolution to require that Libya submit the accused to the appropriate legal forum and provide proof that it has ceased its support for international terrorism. (This resolution was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 21 January 1992.)

Despite some meaningless gestures in response to international pressure following the Pan Am and UTA indictments, Libya continued its support for a variety of terrorist or insurgent groups worldwide during 1991. Radical Palestinian groups such as the PLF, the ANO, and the PFLP-GC have maintained headquarters or training facilities inside the Government of Libya. In the Philippines, Libya has supported the NPA, which has killed a number of Americans and held one American hostage at the end of 1991. Libya has also supported the MRTA in Peru, the PIRA in Ireland, the PKK in Turkey, and many other radical groups.

1992

On 21 January, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 731, which endorses US, British, and French demands that Libya comply with a series of steps, including turning over for trial two Libyan intelligence agents indicted by the United States and the United Kingdom for their role in bombing Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988.The resolution also required that Libya accept responsibility for the bombing and disclose all evidence related to it, pay appropriate compensation, satisfy French demands regarding Libya’s role in bombing UTS Flight 772 in 1989, and cease all forms of terrorism. On 30 March the UNSC adopted Resolution 748, imposing mandatory sanctions against Libya for its failure to meet UNSC Resolution 731 demands.Those sanctions went into effect on 15 April.The sanctions included an arms and civil aviation embargo on Libya, a demand that Libyan Arab Airlines offices be closed, and a requirement that all states reduce Libya’s diplomatic presence abroad. As of the end of 1992, Tripoli has failed to comply with the Security Council resolution.

Although the Libyan regime has made some cosmetic changes to its terrorism apparatus, it retains its capability to commit terrorist acts. In addition, the regime continues to support terrorist and insurgent groups worldwide despite Tripoli’s repeated offer to open to UN inspection terrorist camps—previously identified publicly by the US Government—as proof of its renunciation of terrorism. Many of these suspect camps, although they have been changed superficially, can be easily reactivated as terrorist training facilities. Members of some terrorist groups remain at other government facilities or are dispersed in Libyan cities.

Tripoli appears to have put its own terrorist operations on hold during 1992 in an effort to evade and then lift UN sanctions. However, the regime orchestrated the April mob attacks on the Venezuelan and Russian Embassies in Tripoli in retaliation for their support for UN sanctions against Libya. The attacks were staged to appear as though angry Libyan citizens had spontaneously rioted against the embassies, throwing gasoline bombs and stones.

On 4 December, German prosecutors identified two Libyan Embassy workers as having helped a Palestinian carry out the 1986 La Belle disco bombing that killed two US soldiers and a Turkish woman and wounded more than 200.The Libyans implicated in the case were working at the time at Libya’s Embassy in East Germany and supplied the Palestinian with weapons and other cover support. In addition, the two Libyans had worked with the Palestinian in plotting an attack against a location where US soldiers congregated. This latest confirmation of Libyan involvement in the La Belle bombing serves as a reminder of Tripoli’s traditional practice of using its diplomatic missions abroad to carry out terrorist acts.

1993

The Libyan Government took no serious measures during the year to comply fully with UN Security Council Resolution 731. The resolution demanded that Libya take steps to end its state-sponsored terrorism, including extraditing two Libyan intelligence agents indicted by the United States and the United Kingdom for their role in bombing Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988. The resolution also required that Libya accept responsibility for the bombing, disclose all evidence related to it, pay appropriate compensation, satisfy French demands regarding Libya’s alleged role in bombing UTA Flight 772 in 1989, and cease all forms of terrorism.The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 748 in March 1992; it imposed an arms and civil aviation embargo on Libya, demanded that Libyan Arab Airlines offices be closed, and required that all states reduce Libya’s diplomatic presence abroad. Libya’s continued defiance of the resolutions led the Security Council to adopt Resolution 883 in November 1993, which imposed a limited assets freeze and oil technology embargo on Libya and significantly tightened up existing sanctions.

Although the Libyan regime made some cosmetic changes to its terrorism apparatus immediately following the adoption of Resolutions 731 and 748, it made no further attempts during the year to dismantle its broad-based terrorism network. Instead, Tripoli concentrated its efforts on extricating itself from UN sanctions by floating a number of proposals that fell short of UN demands, including offering the two suspects for trial in a “neutral” country and leaving their “surrender” up to the suspects.The Libyan regime has largely avoided association with acts of terrorism and terrorist groups while under the United Nations’ watchful eye; however, its multifaceted terrorism apparatus remains intact. Qadhafi reiterated his anti-Western themes throughout the year and publicly offered support to radical Palestinian groups opposed to the PLO’s Gaza-Jericho accord with Israel. In addition, Qadhafi publicly threatened to support extremist Islamic groups in neighboring Algeria and Tunisia as punishment for not having adequately supported Libya against the UN sanctions effort. Qadhafi’s speeches in the fall of 1993, particularly after the mid-October uprising and subsequent crackdown, became increasingly belligerent, and he vowed to strike back against Libyan oppositionists, those who enforced sanctions against Libya, and individuals who cooperated with the United States. Qadhafi also invited notorious terrorist organizations—including the ANO and PIRA—to Libya in December. Oppositionists in exile have blamed Tripoli for the December disappearance from Cairo of prominent dissident and former Libyan Foreign Minister, Mansur Kikhia.

1994

The Libyan regime continued to defy the demands of UN Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 adopted in response to Tripoli’s involvement in the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772. UNSCR 731 was adopted following the November 1991 indictments by British and US authorities of two Libyan intelligence agents for their role in the 1988 Pan Am bombing.The resolution incorporated US and British demands that Tripoli turn over the two suspects for trial in either a US or UK court, pay compensation to the victims, cooperate in the ongoing investigation, and cease all support for terrorism. UNSCR 731 also demanded that Tripoli cooperate with French authorities in their separate investigation of the UTA 772 bombing in 1989.

In April 1992, UNSCR 748 imposed sanctions against the Libyan regime for its refusal to comply with the demands of UNSCR 731. Those sanctions involved embargoing Libyan civil aviation and military procurement efforts, as well as requiring all states to reduce Libya’s diplomatic presence. In November 1993, UNSCR 883 imposed additional sanctions to increase the pressure on Libya to comply with previous demands. The 883 sanctions added a limited assets freeze and oil technology ban and strengthened existing sanctions. By the end of 1994, Libya had taken no serious steps toward compliance with any of the UNSC demands. Instead, the Libyan regime continued to propose half measures and “compromise” solutions to the trial venue for the two suspects. Tripoli’s proposals appeared disingenuous from the start, as none satisfy the demands of UNSC resolutions or meet the requirements of American or British judicial systems.

Even while Libya continued its efforts to convince international public opinion that it had abandoned terrorism, Qadhafi and his senior advisers vehemently attacked the Libyan opposition, calling them “stray dogs” and publicly threatening them. Indeed, available evidence strongly suggests Libya was behind the disappearance of prominent Libyan dissident and human rights activist, Mansour Kikhia, from his hotel room in Egypt in December 1993.Throughout 1994,Tripoli demonstrated its willingness to support groups that oppose Western interests with terrorism. Qadhafi repeatedly urged radical rejectionists of the Middle East peace process to use “whatever means” possible to oppose it. Libya opened its arms to leaders of well-known militant groups opposed to the Gaza-Jericho accord and hosted several meetings of the rejectionist groups in 1994. In addition, Libya hailed the 19 October bus-bombing attack in Tel Aviv by HAMAS as a “courageous operation.” In addition, the leaders of HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad publicly announced that Qadhafi had pledged to provide them with aid for the “liberation of Palestine.”

1995

The end of 1995 marked the fourth year of the Libyan regime’s refusal to comply with the demands of UN Security Council Resolution 731. This measure was adopted following the indictments in November 1991 of two Libyan intelligence agents for the bombing in 1988 of Pan Am Flight 103. UNSCR 731 endorsed US, British, and French demands that Libya turn over the two Libyan bombing suspects for trial in the United States or the United Kingdom, pay compensation to the victims, cooperate with US, UK, and French authorities in the investigations into the Pan Am 103 and UTA flight 772 bombings, and cease all support for terrorism.

UN Security Council Resolution 748 was adopted in April 1992 as a result of Libya’s refusal to comply with UNSCR 731. UNSCR 748 imposed sanctions that embargoed Libya’s civil aviation and military procurement efforts and required all states to reduce Libya’s diplomatic presence. UNSCR 883 adopted in November 1993, imposed additional sanctions against Libya for its continued refusal to comply with UNSC demands. UNSCR 883 included a limited assets freeze and oil technology ban, and it also strengthened existing sanctions.

By the end of 1995, the Libyan regime had yet to comply in full with the UNSC demands. Although British authorities were satisfied that Libya had provided sufficient information on its past sponsorship of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Tripoli had failed to meet any of the other UNSC demands. Most significantly, it still refused to turn over for trial in the United States or the United Kingdom the two Libyan agents indicted for the Pan Am 103 bombing.

Throughout 1995, the Libyan regime continued to support groups violently opposed to the Middle East peace process, some of which engage in acts of international terrorism. After the murder of Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leader Fathi Shaqaqi in Malta in October 1995, it was revealed that Libya had frequently facilitated his travel. Libya also continued to sponsor meetings of the Palestinian rejectionist groups in Tripoli.

Despite the ongoing sanctions against Libya for its sponsorship of terrorism, Tripoli continued to harass and intimidate the Libyan expatriate dissident community in 1995. Libya is widely believed to be responsible for the abduction in 1993 and continued detention of prominent Libyan dissident and human rights activist Mansur Kikhia. In November 1995 a Libyan dissident resident in London was brutally murdered; the Libyan expatriate community accused Tripoli of involvement in his death. British authorities continued to investigate the case as the year ended.They also expelled the Libyan charge in London for engaging in “activities incompatible with his diplomatic status.” The charge was accused of being involved in intimidation and surveillance of Libyan dissidents in the United Kingdom.

1996

The end of 1996 marked the fifth year of the Libyan regime’s refusal to comply with the demands of UN Security Council Resolution 731.This measure was adopted following the indictments in November 1991 of two Libyan intelligence agents for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988. UNSCR 731 ordered Libya to turn over the two Libyan bombing suspects for trial in the United States or the United Kingdom, pay compensation to the victims, cooperate in the ongoing investigations into the Pan Am 103 and UTA Flight 772 bombings, and cease all support for terrorism.

UN Security Council Resolution 748 was adopted in April 1992 as a result of Libya’s refusal to comply with the demands of UNSCR 731. UNSCR 748 imposed sanctions that embargoed Libya’s civil aviation and military procurement efforts and required all states to reduce Libya’s diplomatic presence. In November 1993 UNSCR 883 was adopted, imposing additional sanctions against Libya for its continued refusal to comply with UNSC demands. UNSCR 883 included a limited assets freeze and a ban on sales of some oil technology to Libya and strengthened existing sanctions in other ways.

By the end of 1996 Qadhafi had yet to comply in full with the UNSC demands. He did, however, allow a French magistrate to visit Libya in July to further his investigation of the 1989 bombing of UTA 772. As a result of that investigation, France has issued a total of six arrest warrants—two in 1996—for Libyan intelligence officers, who are still at large.

Tripoli continues to deny any involvement in Pan Am 103 and has made no attempt to comply with the UN resolutions. Most significantly, it still refused to turn over for trial in the United States or the United Kingdom the two Libyan agents indicted for the Pan Am bombing. In response to continued Libyan and Iranian support for terrorism, the US Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.This Act imposes new sanctions on companies that invest in the development of either country’s petroleum resources. The law is intended to help deny revenues that could be used to finance international terrorism.

In addition to the Pan Am and UTA airliner bombings, Libya continues to be held responsible for other terrorist acts of the past that retain current interest. In October 1996 warrants were issued by German authorities for four Libyans who are suspected of initiating the 1986 Berlin discotheque bombing that killed two US citizens.The four are believed to be in Libya. Also, Libya is widely believed to be responsible for the 1993 abduction of prominent Libyan dissident and human rights activist Mansur Kikhia. The current whereabouts of Kikhia, a US green card holder, remains unknown.

Libya also continued in 1996 to provide support to a variety of Palestinian terrorist groups, including the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Ahmed Jabril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).The ANO maintains its headquarters in Libya, where the group’s leader, Sabri al-Banna (a.k.a. Abu Nidal) resides.

1997

The end of 1997 marked the sixth year of the Libyan regime’s refusal to comply in full with the demands of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 731, 748, and 883 adopted in response toTripoli’s involvement in the bombings of PanAm Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772.The bombings claimed a total of 441 lives. UNSCR 731 was adopted following the indictments in November 1991 of two Libyan intelligence agents for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988. The resolution ordered Libya to turn over the two Libyan bombing suspects for trial in the United States or the United Kingdom, pay compensation, cooperate in the ongoing investigations into the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings, and cease all support for terrorism.

UNSCR 748 was adopted in April 1992 as a result of Libya’s refusal to comply with UNSCR 731. UNSCR 748 imposed sanctions that embargoed Libya’s civil aviation and military procurement efforts and required all states to reduce Libya’s diplomatic presence. UNSCR 883, adopted in November 1993, imposed further sanctions against Libya for its continued refusal to comply with UN Security Council demands. UNSCR 883 included a limited assets freeze and an oil technology ban, and it also strengthened existing sanctions.

By the end of 1997, Qadhafi had yet to comply in full with the UN Security Council sanctions. Most significant, he continued to refuse to turn over for trial in the United States or the United Kingdom the two Libyan agents indicted for the Pan Am 103 bombing. (French officials on 29 January 1998 officially completed their investigation into the 1989 bombing of UTA 772. The officials concluded that the Libyan intelligence service was responsible, naming Qadhafi’ s brother-in-law, Muhammad al-Sanusi, as the mastermind of the attack. A French criminal court in 1998 or 1999 is expected to begin a trial in absentia of the six Libyan suspects, all of whom are intelligence officers and remain at large.)

Despite the ongoing sanctions against Libya for its sponsorship of terrorism, Tripoli continued to harass and intimidate Libyan expatriate dissidents in 1997. Libya is now believed to have abducted prominent Libyan dissident and human rights activist Mansur Kikhia in 1993 and to have executed him in early 1994. Kikhia, a US green cardholder, is survived by his wife and children, who are US citizens.

Libya continues to be held responsible for other past terrorist acts that retain current interest. Germany in November 1997 began the trial of five defendants in the 1986 La Belle discotheque bombing in Berlin, which killed three persons, including two US servicemen, and wounded more than 200, many of them seriously. In opening remarks, the German prosecutor said the bombing was “definitely an act of assassination commissioned by the Libyan state.” German authorities have issued warrants for four other Libyan officials for their role in the case who are believed to be in Libya.

Libya also continued in 1997 to provide support to a variety of Palestinian terrorist groups, including the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the PIJ, and the PFLP-GC. The ANO maintains its headquarters in Libya, where the group’s leader, Sabri al-Banna (a.k.a. Abu Nidal), resides.

1998

Despite a joint US-UK offer to prosecute the two Libyans charged with the bombing in 1988 of Pan Am Flight 103 before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands, Libya remained unwilling to meet the demands of UN Security Council resolutions 731, 748, 883, and 1192. These measures call upon Libyan leader Qadhafi to cease all support to terrorism, turn over the two indicted Pan Am 103 suspects for trial, and cooperate in the investigation. (On 5 April 1999, Libya turned over the two suspects, ‘Abd al Basit al-Megrahi and Lamin Kalifah Fhima, for prosecution in the Netherlands under Scottish law.)

French officials in January completed their investigation into the bombing in 1989 of UTA Flight 772.The French officials believe that the Libyan intelligence service was responsible and named Qadhafi’s brother-in-law, Muhammad Sanusi, as the attack’s mastermind. (Six Libyan suspects, all intelligence officers, were tried in absentia by a French court in March 1999. The suspects were convicted on 8 March 1999.)

Libya remains the primary suspect in several other past terrorist operations, including the La Belle discotheque bombing in Berlin in 1986, which killed two US servicemen, one Turkish civilian, and wounded more than 200. The trial in Germany of five defendants in the case, who are accused of “an act of assassination commissioned by the Libyan state,” began in November 1997 and continued through 1998.

Despite ongoing sanctions against Libya for its sponsorship of terrorism,Tripoli in 1998 continued to harass and intimidate expatriate dissidents. Moreover, Qadhafi continued publicly and privately to support Palestinian terrorist groups, including the PIJ and the PFLP-GC. Libya has not been implicated in any international terrorist act for several years, however.

1999

In April 1999, Libya took an important step by surrendering for trial the two Libyans accused of bombing Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.The move responded directly to the US-UK initiative; concerted efforts by the Saudi, Egyptian, and South African Governments; and the active engagement of the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary General. At yearend, however, Libya still had not complied with the remaining UN Security Council requirements: payment of appropriate compensation; acceptance of responsibility for the actions of its officials; renunciation of, and an end to, support for terrorism; and cooperation with the prosecution and trial. Libyan leader Qadhafi repeatedly stated publicly during the year that his government had adopted an antiterrorism stance, but it remained unclear whether his claims of distancing Libya from its terrorist past signified a true change in policy.

Libya also remained the primary suspect in several other past terrorist operations, including the La Belle discotheque bombing in Berlin in 1986 that killed two US servicemen and one Turkish civilian and wounded more than 200 persons. The trial in Germany of five suspects in the bombing, which began in November 1997, continued in 1999.

In 1999, Libya expelled the Abu Nidal organization and distanced itself from the Palestinian rejectionists, announcing that the Palestinian Authority was the only legitimate address for Palestinian concerns. Libya still may have retained ties to some Palestinian groups that use violence to oppose the Middle East peace process, however, including the PIJ and the PFLP-GC.

2000

In 2000, Libya continued efforts to mend its international image in the wake of its surrender in 1999 of two Libyans accused of the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. Trial proceedings for the two defendants began in the Netherlands in May and were ongoing at year’s end. (The court issued its verdict on 31 January 2001. It found Abdel Basset al-Megrahi guilty of murder, concluding that he caused an explosive device to detonate on board the airplane resulting in the murder of the flight’s 259 passengers and crew as well as 11 residents of Lockerbie, Scotland.The judges found that he acted “in furtherance of the purposes of . . . Libyan Intelligence Services.” Concerning the other defendant, Al-Amin Kalifa Fahima, the court concluded that the Crown failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy the high standard of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” that is necessary in criminal cases.)

In 1999, Libya paid compensation for the death of a British policewoman,⁽²⁾ a move that preceded the reopening of the British Embassy. Libya also paid damages to the families of victims in the bombing of UTA flight 772. Six Libyans were convicted in absentia in that case, and the French judicial system is considering further indictments against other Libyan officials, including Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi.

Libya played a high-profile role in negotiating the release of a group of foreign hostages seized in the Philippines by the Abu Sayyaf Group, reportedly in exchange for a ransom payment. The hostages included citizens of France, Germany, Malaysia, South Africa, Finland, the Philippines, and Lebanon. The payment of ransom to kidnappers only encourages additional hostage taking, and the Abu Sayyaf Group, emboldened by its success, did seize additional hostages—including a US citizen—later in the year. Libya’s behavior and that of other parties involved in the alleged ransom arrangement served only to encourage further terrorism and to make that region far more dangerous for residents and travelers.

At year’s end, Libya had yet to comply fully with the remaining UN Security Council requirements related to Pan Am 103: accepting responsibility, paying appropriate compensation, disclosing all it knows, and renouncing terrorism. The United States remains dedicated to maintaining pressure on the Libyan Government until it does so. Qadhafi stated publicly that his government had adopted an antiterrorism stance, but it remains unclear whether his claims of distancing Libya from its terrorist past signify a true change in policy.

Libya also remained the primary suspect in several other past terrorist operations, including the La Belle discotheque bombing in Berlin in 1986 that killed two US servicemen and one Turkish civilian and wounded more than 200 persons. The trial in Germany of five suspects in the bombing, which began in November 1997, continued in 2000. Although Libya expelled the Abu Nidal organization and distanced itself from the Palestinian rejectionists in 1999, it continued to have contact with groups that use violence to oppose the Middle East peace process, including the Palestine Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.

2001

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi issued a statement condemning the attacks as horrific and gruesome and urging Libyans to donate blood for the US victims. On 16 September he declared that the United States had justification to retaliate for the attacks. Since September 11, Qadhafi has repeatedly denounced terrorism.

Libya appears to have curtailed its support for international terrorism, although it may maintain residual contacts with a few groups. Tripoli has, in recent years, sought to recast itself as a peacemaker, offering to mediate a number of conflicts such as the military standoff between India and Pakistan that began in December 2001. In October, Libya ransomed a hostage held by the Abu Sayyaf Group, although it claimed that the money was not a ransom and would be used for “humanitarian assistance.”

Libya’s past record of terrorist activity continued to hinder Qadhafi’s efforts to shed Libya’s pariah status. In January, a Scottish court found Libyan intelligence agent Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi guilty of murder, concluding that in 1988 he planted an explosive device on Pan Am Flight 103 whose detonation resulted in the murder of all 259 passengers and crew on board as well as 11 persons on the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland. The judges found that Megrahi had acted “in furtherance of the purposes of . . . Libyan Intelligence Services.” His codefendant, Libyan Arab Airlines employee Al-Amin Khalifa Fhima, was acquitted on the grounds that the prosecution failed to prove his role in the bombing “beyond a reasonable doubt.” At year’s end, Libya had yet to comply fully with the remaining UN Security Council requirements related to Pan Am 103, including accepting responsibility for the actions of its officials, fully disclosing all that it knows about the bombing, and paying appropriate compensation to the victims’ families. Libya’s hesitation to do so may have reflected a hope that Meghahi’s appeal would overturn his conviction. (On 14 March 2002, a Scottish appellate court upheld Megrahi’s conviction.)

In November, a German court convicted four defendants in the bombing in 1986 of La Belle discotheque in West Berlin. In rendering his decision, the judge stated that Libyan Government officials had clearly orchestrated the attack. In response to the court’s findings, the German Government called on Libya to accept responsibility for the attack and provide compensation to the victims. Two US servicemen and one Turkish civilian died in the bombing, and more than 200 persons were wounded.

2002

In 2002, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi continued the efforts he undertook following the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks to identify Libya with the war on terrorism and the struggle against Islamic extremism. In August, Qadhafi told visiting British officials that he regards Usama Bin Ladin and his Libyan followers a threat to Libya. In his 1 September speech, he declared that Libya would combat members of al-Qaida and “heretics”—a likely reference to Libyan extremists allied with al-Qaida and opposed to his regime—as doggedly as the United States did. He further claimed that all political prisoners would be released and that the Libyan Government would henceforth only hold members of al-Qaida. Libya appears to have curtailed its support for international terrorism, although it may maintain residual contacts with some of its former terrorist clients.

Libya’s past record of terrorism continued to hinder Qadhafi’ s efforts to shed Libya’s pariah status in 2002. In March, a Scottish appellate court upheld the conviction—originally returned in January 2001—of Libyan intelligence agent Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi for murder in connection with planting an explosive device on Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988. The explosion killed all 259 passengers and crew on board and 11 persons on the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland. There have been reports of a proposed out-of-court settlement of a suit brought by Pan Am 103 family members against Libya, but by year’s end it had not been concluded.

Despite progress toward the payment of appropriate compensation, at year’s end Libya had yet to comply with the remaining UN Security Council requirements related to Pan Am Flight 103, necessary for the permanent lifting of UN sanctions, including accepting responsibility for the actions of its officials.

In October, lawyers representing the seven US citizens who died in the bombing of UTA Flight 772 in 1989—for which a French court convicted six Libyans in absentia in 1999—filed a suit against Libya and Qadhafi, reportedly seeking $3 billion in compensation.The same month, Libya reportedly pledged to French authorities to increase payments already made to victims of the UTA bombing following the French court ruling in 1999.

In 2002, Libya became a party to the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. It is a party to all the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

2003

In 2003, Libya held to its practice in recent years of curtailing support for international terrorism, although Tripoli continues to maintain contact with some past terrorist clients. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi and other Libyan officials continued their efforts to identify Tripoli with the international community in the war on terrorism. During an interview in January, Qadhafi stated that Libyan intelligence had been sharing information on al-Qaida and other Islamic extremists with Western intelligence services and characterized such cooperation as “irrevocable.” In a speech marking the 34th anniversary of his revolution, he declared that Libya and the United States had a common interest in fighting al-Qaida and Islamic extremism.

Regarding its own terrorist past, Libya took long-awaited steps in 2003 to address the UN requirements arising out of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 but remained embroiled in efforts to settle international political and legal disputes stemming from other terrorist attacks Tripoli conducted during the 1980s.

In August, as required by the UN Security Council, the Libyan Government officially notified the UN Security Council that it accepted responsibility for the actions of its officials in connection with Pan Am Flight 103 (Abdel Basset Ali al-Meghrahi, a Libyan intelligence agent, was convicted by a Scottish court in 2001 for his role in the bombing). Libya further confirmed that it had made arrangements for the payment of appropriate compensation to the families of the victims: a total of up to $2.7 billion or $10 million for each victim. Further, Libya renounced terrorism and affirmed its adherence to a number of UN declarations and international conventions and protocols that the Libyan Government had signed in the past. Libya also pledged to cooperate in good faith with any further requests for information in connection with the Pan Am Flight 103 investigation. In response, the Security Council voted on 12 September to permanently lift sanctions that it had imposed against Libya in 1992 and suspended in 1999.

In August, the Qadhafi Foundation pledged to compensate victims wounded in the bombing in 1986 of La Belle Discotheque, a Berlin nightclub, after a German court issued its written opinion finding that the Libyan intelligence service had orchestrated the attack. The original trial had concluded in 2001 with the conviction of four individuals for carrying out the attack, in which two US servicemen and a Turkish woman were killed and 229 persons wounded. Leaders of the Qadhafi Foundation indicated, however, that their compensation was a humanitarian gesture that did not constitute Libyan acceptance of responsibility. In September, the German Government indicated that it was engaged in talks with Libyan representatives, but at the end of the year, no announcement had yet been made regarding a final compensation deal.

On 19 December, Colonel Qadhafi announced that Libya would eliminate its weapons of mass destruction programs and MTCR-class missiles and took immediate steps to implement this public commitment with the assistance of the United States, United Kingdom, and relevant international organizations.The Libyan decision to reveal its programs to the international community shed important light on the international network of proliferators intent on subverting nonproliferation regimes.

Libya is a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

2004

Following Libya’s December 19, 2003, announcement that it would eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and non-Missile Technology Control Regime class missiles, the United States, the United Kingdom, and relevant international agencies worked with Libya to eliminate these weapons in a transparent and verifiable manner. In recognition of Libya’s actions, the United States and Libya began the process of improving diplomatic relations. On February 26, the United States lifted its restriction on the use of US passports for travel to Libya and eased some economic sanctions. On April 23, the United States eased more sanctions and terminated the applicability of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act provisions to Libya. On June 28, the United States reestablished direct diplomatic relations with Libya by upgrading its Interests Section to a US Liaison Office. On September 20, the President terminated the state of emergency declared in 1986 and revoked the related executive orders.This rescinded the remaining economic sanctions against Libya under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

Libya remains designated as a state sponsor of terrorism and is still subject to the related sanctions. In 2004, Libya held to its practice in recent years of curtailing support for international terrorism, although there are outstanding questions over its residual contacts with some past terrorist clients. Libya has provided cooperation in the global war on terrorism, and Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi continued his efforts to identify Libya with the international community in the war on terrorism. Prior to the January 30, 2005, elections in Iraq, senior Libyan officials made statements that defended insurgent attacks on US and Coalition forces; following strong US protests, Libya encouraged Iraqi participation in the elections, indicating its intent to recognize the upcoming Transitional Iraqi Government, and support reciprocal diplomatic missions with Iraq.

Following Libya’s steps to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and the September 20 revocation of US economic sanctions related to the national emergency, Libya authorized a second payment of $4 million per family to the families of the 270 victims of the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland. This payment was part of a deal concluded in 2003 between Libya and the families in which Libya agreed to pay $10 million per family, or $2.7 billion, contingent upon the lifting of UN and US sanctions and removal of Libya from the state sponsors of terrorism list. By year’s end, UN and US sanctions were lifted and the families had received a total of $8 million each, even though Libya remained designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. A remaining $2 million per family remained in a thirdcountry escrow account, pending Libya’s removal from the terrorism list.

Libya resolved two other outstanding international disputes stemming from terrorist attacks that Libya conducted during the 1980s. In January, the Qadhafi Foundation agreed to pay $170 million to the non-US families of victims of the 1989 bombing of a French UTA passenger aircraft. Separate cases for compensation filed by US victims’ families are still pending in the US courts. In 2001, a German court issued a written opinion finding that the Libyan intelligence service had orchestrated the 1986 bombing of the La Belle nightclub in Berlin, in which two US servicemen and a Turkish woman were killed and 229 people were injured.The Court convicted four individuals for carrying out the attack. In August, the Qadhafi Foundation agreed to pay $35 million to compensate non-US victims of the La Belle attack. In reaching the agreement to pay compensation, Libya stressed that it was not acknowledging responsibility for the attack, but was making a humanitarian gesture. The families of the US victims are pursuing separate legal cases, and Libyan officials publicly called for compensation for their own victims of the 1986 US air strikes in Libya.

In October, Libya was instrumental in the handover of Amari Saifi, also known as Abderrazak al-Para, the number two figure in the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), to Algeria. Al-Para, responsible for the kidnapping of 32 Western tourists in Algeria in 2003, had been held by a Chadian rebel group, the Movement for Democracy and Justice, for several months. In August, Abdulrahman Alamoudi pled guilty to one count of unlicensed travel and commerce with Libya. Alamoudi stated that he had been part of a 2003 plot to assassinate Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah at the behest of Libyan officials.The United States expressed its serious concerns about these allegations and continues to evaluate Libya’s December 2003 assurances to halt all use of violence for political purposes.

In December 2004, the US designated the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Nicaragua

1985

Managua has continued to provide training and support to Latin American guerilla groups, and there has been limited evidence of direct Nicaraguan involvement in specific terrorist incidents. The Sandanistas also have maintained contact with Latin American andWest European groups that engage in terrorism. According to a former Italian terrorist who turned state’s evidence, at least five Red Brigades leaders have become instructors in the Nicaraguan Army. Despite the publicity aroused by Western accusations, international disapproval has not discouraged the Sandinistas form pursuing terrorist ties. Several of the weapons used by Colombian M-19 terrorists during the siege of the Palace of Justice in Bogota in November 1985 were traced to Nicaragua. The PRTC, a Salvadoran insurgent group with close ties to Nicaragua, claimed responsibility for the killing of six Americans and seven other persons in downtown San Salvador on 19 June.

1986

Managua provides training and support to terrorist groups in Colombia, to Ecuador’s Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC), and to a variety of Latin American guerilla groups. It also provides weapons to many groups in the region and facilitates contacts among Latin American leftists, including hosting meetings between Central and South American subversives. Members of European terrorist groups, including Italy’s Red Brigades and Prima Linea and Spain’s Basque Fatherland and Liberty, enjoy safe haven in Managua, but there is no evidence that they stage terrorist attacks from Nicaragua or that Nicaragua supports attacks by those groups in Western Europe.

1987

Like Cuba, in 1987 Nicaragua continued to supply materiel and training to a number of terrorist and other dissident groups in Central and South America and the Caribbean.The regime maintains close ties to the M-19 insurgency in Colombia, the Alfredo Vive Carajo group in Ecuador, and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement in Peru. Nicaragua continues to provide support for the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador despite its commitment under the terms of the August 1987 Guatemala Agreement to end such assistance. In years past, Nicaragua has also provided safehaven to terrorists from Western Europe, including Italy’s Red Brigades and the Basque ETA group, but we have not detected any evidence that Nicaragua has directly sponsored specific terrorist attacks by these groups.

1988

Like Cuba, Nicaragua provides training and safehaven to Latin American terrorist and guerilla groups, including the Ecuadorian Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC) group, Colombia’s M-19, and the MRTA of Peru.The Sandinistas also continue to support the FMLN in El Salvador despite their commitment to end such assistance. In addition to dealing with individual groups, Nicaragua occasionally acts as a coordinator for Latin American insurgents, including hosting meetings between Central and South American subversives. Nicaragua appears to have better concealed, or possibly reduced, its links to West European terrorist groups such as the Italian BR and the Basque ETA. The Nicaraguan Government also maintains diplomatic relations with all six nations currently on the US Secretary of State’s terrorism list (North Korea, South Yemen, Syria, Libya, Iran, and Cuba).

North Korea

Designation date January 20, 1988

1985

Pyongyang almost certainly has continued to provide training, funds, and weapons to various foreign extremist groups, but it apparently has not been involved in any terrorist incidents since the October 1983 Rangoon bombing. North Korea has continued to obtain weapons on the gray arms market, but these probably are intended for use by North Korean agents, saboteurs, and infiltrators in operations against South Korea. Pyongyang has exported weapons to Third World governments willing to pay for them, including Iran—a country supporting international terrorism. Thus far, none of these weapons has been found at the scene of terrorist attacks or in the possession or captured terrorists.

1986

North Korea is not known to have conducted a terrorist attack since the 1983 bombing against South Korean officials in Rangoon, Burma. South Korea blames North Korea for the bombing of Seoul’s Kimpo Airport on the eve of the Asian Games in September 1986, but no evidence has been found that clearly links the attack to Pyongyang.

1987

The single most lethal international terrorist attack in 1987 occurred in Asia and heralded the return of North Korea as an active agent of state terrorism for the first time since it bombed the Martyr’s Memorial in Rangoon four years earlier. On 29 November, Korean Air Flight 858 disappeared en route from Abu Dhabi to Bangkok, probably over the Andaman Sea. All 115 aboard were killed. A couple who boarded the flight in Baghdad and left it in Abu Dhabi were arrested in Bahrain on 1 December for traveling on false Japanese passports as father and daughter. As they were being interrogated, they bit into cyanide capsules concealed in cigarettes. The man died, but the woman survived and was later deported to Seoul. She has since publicly confirmed that the pair were North Korean intelligence agents who had placed the bomb on the aircraft in their carry-on luggage.

According to the surviving terrorist, the KAL 858 bombing was the start of a campaign to disrupt the Olympic Games in 1988.We believe it possible that the bombing was the first in a planned series of terrorist events intended to portray South Korea as unsafe. North Korea will probably not host any Olympic events in P’yongyang or participate in the Games—a situation that might encourage it to stage further disruptive acts. On the other hand, with only a few exceptions, most Communist and Third World countries will take part in the Olympics; this participation, coupled with widespread international belief in North Korean complicity in the bombing of the airliner, might act to deter P’yongyang.

1988

North Korea continued to fund and train South Korean extremist groups and to move weapons through the gray arms market but is not known to have sponsored any international terrorist attacks in 1988. Continuing revelations throughout 1988 about North Korean complicity in the bombing of a South Korean airliner in November 1987—which may have been the opening shot in an abortive terror campaign against the South and the Olympics—possibly served to embarrass the North and dissuade it from further attempts to disrupt the Olympics through terrorist tactics.

North Korea supported at least some members of the JRA. A faction of the group, presently consisting of six members, is based in Pyongyang. Japanese police believe that Yasuhiro Shibata, a JRA member arrested in Tokyo in May, was “run” by North Korean intelligence agents. Shibata was using the identity of a former North Korean resident of Japan who had immigrated to North Korea in 1972. Japanese police have been tracking attempts by North Korean spy rings to acquire Japanese passports, some of which have been passed to the JRA in the past.

1989

North Korea was not responsible for any terrorist incidents in 1989. It has continued to provide haven to a small group of Japanese Red Army members who hijacked a JAL airliner to North Korea in 1973. North Korea also continued supplying training and possibly materiel to communist guerillas in the Philippines in 1989. North Korea remains on the list of state sponsors of terrorism because of its responsibility for the November 1987 destruction of a South Korean airliner and the 1983 terrorist attack against the Republic of Korea officials in Rangoon, Burma.

1990

North Korea is not known to have sponsored a terrorist attack since members of its intelligence service planted a bomb on a South Korean airliner in 1987. However, it continues to provide safehaven to a small group of Japanese Red Army (JRA) members who hijacked a JA airliner to North Korea in 1970. North Korea has provided some support to the New People’s Army in the Philippines. It has not renounced the use of terrorism.

1991

North Korea is not known to have sponsored any international terrorist attacks since 1987.While the North Korean Government has not publicly renounced terrorism, it did agree to abandon violence against the South in the December 1991 reconciliation agreement with South Korea. North Korea has also assured the Philippines that it has broke its ties to the Communist New People’s Army (NPA). Pyongyang continues to provide political asylum to a small group of Japanese Communist-League Red Army Faction members who hijacked a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970.

1992

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987, when a KAL airliner was bombed in flight.While not explicitly renouncing terrorism, the DPRK Foreign Ministry made an ambiguous condemnation of international terrorism on 26 March 1992 following the passage of a UN Security Council resolution on the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. North Korea appears to be honoring its pledge to abandon violence against South Korea, as set out in the 1991 reconciliation agreement. North Korea also appears to be respecting a promise to the Philippine Government to suspend its support for the Communist New People’s army (NPA). Normalization talks with Japan broke off in the fall of 1992, when North Korea refused to respond to questions concerning the status of a Korean resident of Japan allegedly kidnapped by North Koreans to teach Japanese to DPRK terrorists involved in the 1987 KAL bombing. Pyongyang continues to provide political sanctuary to members of the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction who participated in the hijacking of a Japanese airlines flight to North Korea in 1970.

1993

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987, when a KAL airliner was bombed in flight. A North Korean spokesman condemned all forms of terrorism including state terrorism after the April assassination of South African Communist Party chief Chris Hani. Pyongyang has supported the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/ NPA) in the past but does not appear to be doing so at present. North Korea is believed, however, to maintain contacts with other groups that practice terrorism. Pyongyang continues to provide political sanctuary to members of the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction who participated in the hijacking of a Japanese airlines flight to North Korea in 1970.

1994

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is not known to have sponsored any international terrorist attacks since 1987, when it conducted the midflight bombing of a KAL airliner. A North Korean spokesman in April 1993 condemned all forms of terrorism, including state terrorism, and said his country resolutely opposed the encouragement and support of terrorism. Nevertheless, North Korea maintains contact with groups that practice terrorism and continues to provide political sanctuary to members of the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction who hijacked a Japan Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970.

1995

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is not known to have sponsored any international terrorist attacks since 1987, when it conducted the midflight bombing of a KAL airliner, killing all 115 persons aboard.A North Korean spokesman in November stated that the DPRK opposed “all kinds of terrorism” and “any assistance to it.” North Korea, however, continued to provide political sanctuary to members of the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction who hijacked a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970.

1996

North Korea has not been conclusively linked to any international terrorist attacks since 1987. North Korea is best known for its involvement in the 1987 midair bombing of KAL Flight 858 and the 1983 Rangoon bombing aimed at South Korean Government officials. A North Korean spokesman in November 1995 stated that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) opposed “all kinds of terrorism” and “any assistance to it.”

There is no conclusive evidence the DPRK conducted any act of terrorism since 1987.The Republic of Korea, however, suspects that North Korean agents were involved in the murder of a South Korean official in Vladivostok on 1 October 1996, which shortly followed a North Korean warning that it would retaliate if Seoul did not return the bodies of several North Korean infiltrators killed in South Korea.

The DPRK provides asylum to a small group of Japanese Red Army members—the “Yodo-go” group—who hijacked a JAL airliner to North Korea in 1970. The senior surviving Yodo-go member,Yoshimi Tanaka, in late March was arrested in Cambodia on counterfeiting charges.Tanaka was captured while carrying a North Korean diplomatic passport and in the company of several North Korean diplomats. Pyongyang admitted publicly that Tanaka was a Yodo-go member, did not dispute the counterfeiting charges, and refused to take up his defense.

1997

North Korea has not been linked conclusively to any international terrorist attacks since 1987. Pyongyang may have been responsible for the February 1997 murder of a North Korean defector in South Korea and the murder of a South Korean official in Vladivostok in October 1996.

The best known case of past North Korean involvement in terrorism was the 1987 midair bombing of Korean Airlines Flight 858, which killed all 115 persons aboard. Pyongyang continues to provide sanctuary to five of the nine “Yodo-go” hijackers of a Japan Airlines jet to North Korea in 1970. Of the original nine, two have died of illness, one was arrested in Japan in the mid-1980s, and another was arrested in 1996 by Thai authorities on charges of passing counterfeit US currency.

1998

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has not been linked solidly to the planning or execution of an international terrorist attack since 1987, when a KAL airliner was bombed in flight. North Korea continues to provide safehaven to members of the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction who participated in the hijacking of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970. In March, Pyongyang allowed members of the Japanese Diet to visit some of the hijackers.

1999

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) continued to provide safehaven to the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction members who participated in the hijacking of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970. Pyongyang allowed members of the Japanese Diet to visit some of the hijackers during the year. In 1999 the DPRK also attempted to kidnap in Thailand a North Korean diplomat who had defected the day before. The attempt led the North Korean Embassy to hold the former diplomat’s son hostage for two weeks. Some evidence also suggests the DPRK in 1999 may have sold weapons directly or indirectly to terrorist groups.

2000

In 2000 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) engaged in three rounds of terrorism talks that culminated in a joint DPRK-US statement wherein the DPRK reiterated its opposition to terrorism and agreed to support international actions against such activity.The DPRK, however, continued to provide safehaven to the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction members who participated in the hijacking of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970. Some evidence also suggests the DPRK may have sold weapons directly or indirectly to terrorist groups during the year; Philippine officials publicly declared that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front had purchased weapons from North Korea with funds provided by Middle East sources.

2001

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) response to international efforts to combat terrorism has been disappointing. In a statement released after the September 11 attacks, the DPRK reiterated its public policy of opposing terrorism and any support for terrorism. It also signed the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, acceded to the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, and indicated its willingness to sign five others. Despite the urging of the international community, however, North Korea did not take substantial steps to cooperate in efforts to combat terrorism, including responding to requests for information on how it is implementing the UN Security Council resolutions, and it did not respond to US proposals for discussions on terrorism. It did not report any efforts to search for and block financial assets as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Similarly, the DPRK did not respond positively to the Republic of Korea’s call to resume dialogue, where counterterrorism is an agenda item, nor to the United States in its call to undertake dialogue on improved implementation of the agreed framework. In light of President Bush’s call to recognize the dangerous nexus between Weapons of Mass Destruction and terrorism, this latter failure, with its implications for nuclear development and proliferation, was especially troublesome.

In addition, Pyongyang’s provision of safehaven to four remaining Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction members who participated in the hijacking of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970 remained problematic in terms of support for terrorists. Moreover, some evidence suggested the DPRK may have sold limited quantities of small arms to terrorist groups during the year.

2002

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) response to international efforts to combat terrorism was disappointing throughout 2002, although in a statement released after the September 11 attacks, the DPRK had reiterated its public policy of opposing terrorism and any support for terrorism. In 2001, following the September 11 attacks, it also signed the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and became a party to the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.

Despite the urging of the international community, however, North Korea did not take substantial steps to cooperate in efforts to combat terrorism. Its initial and supplementary reports to the UN Counterterrorism Committee on actions it had undertaken to comply with its obligations under UNSCR 1373 were largely uninformative and nonresponsive. It did not respond to previous US proposals for discussions on terrorism and did not report any efforts to freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts that UNSCR 1373, among other things, requires all states to do.

North Korea is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987. It has sold weapons to several terrorist groups, however, even as it reiterated its opposition to all forms of international terrorism. Pyongyang also has provided safehaven to several Japanese Red Army members who participated in the hijacking of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970.

Pyongyang continued to sell ballistic missile technology to countries designated by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism, including Syria and Libya.

North Korea is a party to six of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

2003

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.

Following the attacks of September 11, Pyongyang began laying the groundwork for a new position on terrorism by framing the issue as one of “protecting the people” and replaying language from the Joint US-DPRK Statement on International Terrorism of October 2000. It also announced to a visiting EU delegation that it planned to sign the international conventions against terrorist financing and the taking of hostages and would consider acceding to other antiterrorism agreements.

At a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in Pyongyang in September 2002, National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il acknowledged the involvement of DPRK “special institutions” in the kidnapping of Japanese citizens and said that those responsible had already been punished. Pyongyang has allowed the return to Tokyo of five surviving abductees and is negotiating with Tokyo over the repatriation of their family members remaining in North Korea.The DPRK also has been trying to resolve the issue of harboring Japanese Red Army members involved in a jet hijacking in 1970—allowing the repatriation of several family members of the hijackers to Japan.

Although it is a party to six international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, Pyongyang has not taken substantial steps to cooperate in efforts to combat international terrorism.

2004

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.

At a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in Pyongyang in September 2002, National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il acknowledged the involvement of DPRK “special institutions” in the kidnapping of Japanese citizens and said that those responsible had already been punished. Pyongyang in 2003 allowed the return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and in 2004 of eight family members, mostly children, of those abductees. Questions about the fate of other abductees remain the subject of ongoing negotiations between Japan and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned to Japan what it identified as the remains of two Japanese abductees whom the North had reported as having died in North Korea. Subsequent DNA testing in Japan indicated that the remains were not those of Megumi Yokota or Kaoru Matsuki, as Pyongyang had claimed, and the issue remained contentious at year’s end. Four Japanese Red Army members remain in the DPRK following their involvement in a jet hijacking in 1970; five of their family members returned to Japan in 2004.

Although it is a party to six international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, Pyongyang has not taken substantial steps to cooperate in efforts to combat international terrorism.

South Yemen

1985

Then South Yemeni President Hasani continued his more moderate foreign policy by curtailing Aden’s direct involvement with, and support for, insurgent groups from Oman and North Yemen. South Yemen also reduced support for the Palestinians. However, Aden has continued to provide safehaven and other low-level support to groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command.

1986

The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) continued to display a low profile in its support for groups that engage in terrorism. Aden experienced considerable domestic instability in the wake of a coup and change in government early in the year and may have curtailed its support to insurgent groups in Oman and North Yemen in an effort to improve its standing in the region.The PDRY maintains ties to some terrorist groups, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command (PFLP-SC) is headquartered in Aden.

1987

We have detected little evidence of direct South Yemen involvement in sponsoring international terrorism since the early 1980s and believe that the new regime, which came into power following a bloody internecine conflict in January 1986, may have decided to continue its predecessor’s policy of reducing close ties to terrorist groups.The regime appears preoccupied with serious domestic political and economic problems and may have been responsible for a car bomb and letter bomb explosions in Sanaa (North Yemen) in 1987, directed against supporters of the previous regime.

In 1987, SouthYemen persisted in its longstanding policy of allowing Palestinian groups, including elements of the Abu Nidal organization, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Struggle Front, to maintain offices in Aden. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command has its headquarters there. As long as these facilities continue to be offered, South Yemen risks being linked to overseas attacks staged by any of these groups.

1988

South Yemen has considerably reduced its support for international terrorism since the early 1980s, and we do not believe it sponsored any terrorist attacks in 1988. Aden probably was trying to project an image of moderation to encourage neighboring Arab states—and other possible aid contributors—to provide additional economic and technical assistance. The regime also appeared preoccupied with serious domestic political and economic problems.

South Yemen continued, however, to play host to a number of Palestinian groups—including the ANO, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the PSF, and the PFLP-SC—but no longer directly supports them with material or financial assistance. South Yemen appeared to have reconsidered—or perhaps reversed—its longstanding policy of issuing South Yemeni passports to Palestinians, although Armenian terrorist leader Hagop Hagopian was carrying a South Yemeni passport, complete with a diplomatic stamp, at the time of his death in April 1988.

1989

South Yemen has considerably reduced its support for international terrorism since the early 1980s, and we do not believe it sponsored any terrorist attacks in 1989. Aden continues to project an image of moderation in its effort to repair relations with the West and neighboring Arab states. The regime’s economic problems and need for economic and technological assistance have encouraged greater pragmatism. South Yemen may have reversed its longstanding policy of issuing South Yemeni passports to Palestinians. However, it has continued to allow some radical Palestinian groups, including the ANO, to maintain a presence in South Yemen.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

1985

In contract to Libya, Syria, and Iran, the Soviets do not appear to directly plan or orchestrate terrorist acts by Middle Eastern,West European, or Latin American groups. Moscow has continued to support various “national liberation movements”—such as the PLO and the African National Congress (ANC)—with the knowledge that some of those they train later commit terrorist acts. The Soviets and East Europeans have provided most weapons support indirectly through the international gray arms market. Moscow’s Third World clients (with Libya a leading buyer) then have resold or given the weapons to terrorists. Moscow apparently has not restricted the end use of these weapons.The Soviet Union and its East European allies also have provided arms to a variety of Palestinian groups. Some of these may ultimately be used in terrorist attacks because Palestinian terrorists routinely use light infantry weapons, such as the AK-47, that originate in the Soviet Bloc.

The Soviet’s influence over their East European allies has given Moscow the leverage to elicit their support for radical and revolutionary groups.There has been extensive evidence of indirect support and scattered information about direct involvement by East European states with terrorists. At a minimum, these states have maintained surveillance on suspected terrorists and allowed them transit privileges and safehaven. A number of East European states also have trained members of African, Latin American, and Palestinian groups that use terrorist tactics.

Bulgaria has been the East European state most actively involved in terrorism. Sofia has provided weapons and political support to various Palestinian groups and has hosted terrorist-related training facilities where Palestinians, in particular, have received instruction in a variety of weapons. Materiel from Czechoslovakia has also appeared frequently in terrorist hands. A Czechoslovak-manufactured explosive material, Semtex, has been used in numerous letter bombs, as well as several recent bombings.Yugoslavia was the first state to offer initial safehaven to Muhammad Abu Abbas, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) leader who planned the Achille Laruo hijacking and provided the aircraft on which Abbas was flown to safety from Rome.

1986

The Soviets and various East European states provide arms and training to a broad spectrum of anti-Western groups and “national liberation movements,” many of whose members commit terrorist acts. Although the Soviet Union and its allies have sold arms directly to some groups, mostly Palestinians, most Soviet weapons sold or given to terrorist groups are provided by Third World Soviet clients, such as Libya.

Various East European states provide training, equipment and/or political support to radical groups, particularly Palestinian, that commit terrorism. Polish and Bulgarian weapons have been found in possession of Abu Nidal organization terrorists and the scenes of their attacks. Many Middle Eastern groups use a Czechoslovak-manufactured explosive, Semtex-H, in their bombs. Many terrorists transit or find safehaven in East European countries, including Yugoslavia, whose geographic location, visa-free regime, and large Arab student population continue to make it an attractive area for the transit of agents and for operational uses, such as recruiting members and maintaining safehouses.

1987

As in years past, some Soviet Bloc countries continued in 1987 to provide some direct and indirect assistance to terrorist groups. Such support usually was given under the pretext of aiding “national liberation movements” and ranged from permitting transit for known terrorists to providing arms, explosives, training, funding, and political encouragement. Soviet Bloc countries also provided state sponsors of terrorism, such as Libya and Syria, with large amounts of arms and explosives, some of which were then distributed to terrorist groups. A prime example of this indirect support came to light in the French interception of the PIRA-bound Libyan arms shipment, almost all of which, we believe, was supplied by the Soviet Bloc.

Finally, according to press reports, Poland and East Germany had permitted Abu Nidal organization to operate trading offices from their territory for several years until, in the face of international concern they closed them down in 1987. Commercial agents form the Abu Nidal organization in the offices acted as brokers in several arms sales involving Poland and East Germany. Some of the weapons sold in the transactions were made in the Soviet Bloc and may have ended up with Middle East terrorist groups. The Abu Nidal organization used the profits from these ventures to finance its own activities.

The United States regularly raised its concerns regarding terrorism with the Soviets and the East Europeans, and in doing so may have persuaded Eastern Bloc countries to distance themselves somewhat from terrorism.

1988

In the past year, the Soviet Union has taken a more constructive approach to condemning terrorism than in previous years, but there is still room for improvement. The Soviets continued to provide arms, training, and materiel and diplomatic support to a range of states and groups linked to terrorism. Several countries that support terrorism—such as Libya, Syria, and North Korea—are Soviet allies.The Soviets have been reluctant thus far in taking concrete measures to discourage terrorist acts by groups or terrorism-supporting states with which Moscow has influence. For example, in the ICAO and the UN, the Soviets publicly defended North Korea against claims that it was responsible for the destruction of KAL Flight 8958, despite considerable evidence to the contrary. A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman in June also defended Libya against a US statement about Libyan links to terrorism.

The Soviets have, however, indicated that they maybe prepared in the future to work with others against terrorism. In public statements, the Soviets have increasingly condemned specific acts of terrorism. For example, the Soviet media denounced the holding of hostages in Beirut and the April 1988 hijacking of Kuwait Airways Flight 422. This more positive approach has also been demonstrated in practical terms. There are reports that, in the period leading up to the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul, the Soviets pressed P’yongyang to avoid acts that could disrupt the Games. General Secretary Gorbachev has publicly indicated Soviet interest in discussing counterterrorism issues with other interested countries.

The Soviets have also been supportive of multilateral efforts to increase airport and maritime security and have indicated their support for new legal instruments in these areas. In the UN, the Soviets have proposed a “comprehensive system of international security,” which includes establishing a tribunal to investigate acts of international terrorism. This proposal, however, omits any mechanism for taking action specifically aimed at combating terrorism.

The Soviets have dealt with domestic hijacking incidents in different ways. In contrast with the handling of a domestic hijacking in March in which a Soviet assault team stormed the plane and nine civilians died, the Soviets in December allowed an Aeroflot aircraft hijacked by criminals to depart from the country without incident and then worked with the Israeli Government to secure the safe return of the plane, passengers, and the hijackers.

As for Eastern Europe, countries in this region are quick to affirm their opposition to terrorism; however, several have condoned terrorism by directly or indirectly supporting North Korea against charges of responsibility for the destruction of KAL Flight 858 in November 1987. Czechoslovakia refused to recognize North Korean responsibility, and the controlled press in Bulgaria sought to defend it against the charges.The German Democratic Republic confined its coverage in the controlled media to reporting solely North Korea’s statements, and the media reporting in Romania was similarly biased. PIRA continues to use Czech-made Semtex-H explosives supplied by Libya, with deadly results in Northern Ireland. As with the Soviet Union, these East European countries maintain close relations with virtually all countries on the US Government’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Consistent with its publicly stated policy against terrorism, in April, Bulgaria sponsored an international conference on terrorism in Druzba and supported work on counterterrorism by the Balkan foreign ministers at their conference in February. It remains to be seen what practical counterterrorism measures participants in this latter conference will adopt. The conference condemned the hijacking last April of Kuwait Airways Flight 422.

As for the matter of the Abu Nidal commercial network in Eastern Europe, which was terminated in 1987 after a US diplomatic campaign against it, there are no indications that any such relationships have resumed, although the United States continues to monitor the situation closely.

Sudan

Designation date August 12, 1993

1993

In August, the Secretary of State placed Sudan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Despite several warnings to cease supporting radical extremists, the Sudanese Government continued to harbor international terrorist groups in Sudan. Through the National Islamic Front (NIF), which dominates the Sudanese Government, Sudan maintained a disturbing relationship with a wide range of Islamic extremists. The list includes the ANO, the Palestinian HAMAS, the PIJ, the Lebanese Hizballah, and Egypt’s al Gama’at al-Islamiyya.

The Sudanese Government also opposed the presence of the United Nations coalition in Somalia and probably provided some aid to the Somali Islamic Union and the Somali National Alliance. Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria have complained that Sudan supports antiregime insurgents in North Africa with safehaven, weapons, passports, funds, and training. Algeria withdrew its Ambassador from Khartoum in March.

Sudan’s ties to Iran, the leading state sponsor of terrorism, continued to cause concern during the past year. Sudan served as a convenient transit point, meeting site, and safehaven for Iranian-backed extremist groups. Iranian Ambassador in Khartoum Majid Kamal was involved in the 1979 takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran and guided Iranian efforts in developing the Lebanese Hizballah group while he served as Iran’s top diplomat in Lebanon during the early 1980s. His presence illustrated the importance Iran places on Sudan.

Although there is no conclusive evidence linking the Government of Sudan to any specific terrorist incident during the year, five of 15 suspects arrested this summer following the New York City bomb plot are Sudanese citizens. Khartoum’s anti-US rhetoric also escalated during 1993. In September, at a prominent Khartoum mosque, a radical journalist called for the murder of the US Ambassador. President Bashir dismissed the call as that of an unstable individual, but no NIF officials publicly disavowed it.

1994

The Government of Sudan provided safehaven and support for members of several international terrorist groups operating in Sudan.The regime also permitted Tehran to use Sudan as a secure transit point and meeting site for Iranian-backed extremist groups. There is no evidence that Sudan, which is dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF), conducted or sponsored a specific act of terrorism in 1994.

The list of groups that maintain a presence or operate in Sudan is disturbing and includes some of the world’s most violent organizations: the ANO, the Lebanese Hizballah, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Egypt’s Islamic Group. The NIF also supports Islamic opposition groups from Algeria, Tunisia, Kenya, and Eritrea. Some of Sudan’s neighbors have complained that insurgents in North Africa have received assistance from Sudan in the form of training, funds, weapons, travel documents, and indoctrination. In December, Eritrea severed diplomatic relations with Sudan for its support for subversive activities and hostile acts.

In a positive development, Sudan turned over the international terrorist “Carlos” (Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez) to France in August. Carlos—who bragged about his ties to senior government officials, carried a weapon, and flaunted Sudan’s laws—had been living in Sudan since late 1993 with full knowledge and protection of senior levels of the NIF and Sudanese Government.

While the reasons for the expulsion of Carlos are not entirely clear, the regime emphasized that the affair did not signal a shift in Sudanese policy and that the fate of Carlos would not affect other terrorist elements currently harbored in Sudan. President Bashir stated publicly it was Sudan’s duty to protect “mujahedin” who sought refuge. In a press interview on the suicide bus bombing in Tel Aviv by a HAMAS militant in October, which left 22 persons dead, NIF leader Hassan Turabi praised the attack, calling it “an honorable act.”

The Sudanese regime regularly denied there are terrorists in Sudan, and it refused to investigate information the US Ambassador supplied in September about the training of terrorists at the Merkhiyat Popular Defense camp located northwest of Khartoum. The Foreign Minister categorically dismissed the information without even offering to look into it.

1995

Sudan continued to serve as a refuge, nexus, and training hub in 1995 for a number of international terrorist organizations, primarily of Middle Eastern origin. The Sudanese Government, which is dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF), also condoned many of the activities of Iran and the Khartoum-based Usama Bin Ladin, a private financier of terrorism. Khartoum permitted the funneling of assistance to terrorist and radical Islamist groups operating in and transiting Sudan.

Since Sudan was placed on the US Government’s official list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in August 1993, the Sudanese Government has continued to harbor members of some of the world’s most violent organizations: the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), Lebanese Hizballah, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Egypt’s al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group or IG), and the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS). The NIF also supports Islamic and non-Islamic opposition groups in Uganda,Tunisia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

Uganda severed diplomatic relations with Sudan in April, citing the inappropriate activities of representatives of the Sudanese Embassy in Kampala. The Government of Uganda said it found these activities threatening to its security.

Both Ethiopia and Egypt accused Sudan’s security services of providing direct assistance to the IG for the attempt on the life of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa on 26 June.Three surviving assailants captured by Ethiopian police provided incriminating information about Sudan’s role. Sudanese help to the IG included supplying travel documents and weapons and harboring key planners of the operation.

Despite a private plea by the Ethiopian Government, the Sudanese regime did not act on Ethiopia’s request for the extradition of three Egyptian suspects involved in the Mubarak assassination attempt, claiming it was unable to locate them. Those being sought included the operation’s mastermind—resident in Khartoum—his assistant, and a surviving member of the assassination team. (After the attack misfired, this last individual fled from Addis Ababa to Sudan on Sudan Airlines using a Sudanese passport.) In rare actions against a member state, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 11 September and again on 19 December called on Sudan to extradite the three IG suspects believed to have been involved in the assassination attempt and to stop aiding terrorism.

In an apparent attempt at damage control not long after the assassination attempt, President Bashir removed the head of Sudan’s security services and proclaimed a new visa policy requiring Arab foreigners to obtain visas to enter Sudan. The policy did not apply to citizens from three state sponsors of terrorism—Iraq, Libya, and Syria—however, because of bilateral agreements.

Khartoum also permitted Usama Bin Ladin, a denaturalized Saudi citizen with mujahedin contacts, to use Sudan as a shelter for his radical Muslim followers and to finance and train militant groups. Bin Ladin, who lives in Khartoum and owns numerous business enterprises in Sudan, has been linked to numerous terrorist organizations. He directs funding and other logistic support through his companies to a number of extremist causes.

A Sudanese national, who pleaded guilty in February 1995 to various charges of complicity in the New York City bomb plots foiled by the Federal Bureau Investigation, alleged that a member of the Sudanese UN Emission had offered to facilitate access to the UN building in pursuance of the bombing plot. The Sudanese official also is said to have had full knowledge of other bombing targets.

Sudan’s support to terrorist organizations has included paramilitary training, indoctrination, money, travel documentation, safe passage, and refugee in Sudan. Most of the organizations present in Sudan maintain offices or other types of representation. They use Sudan as a base to organize some of their operations and to support compatriots elsewhere. Sudan also serves as a secure transit point and meeting place for several Iranian-backed terrorist groups.

1996

Sudan in 1996 continued to serve as a refuge, nexus, and training hub for a number of international terrorist organizations, primarily of Middle East origin.The Sudanese Government also condoned many of the objectionable activities of Iran, such as funneling assistance to terrorist and radical Islamic groups operating in and transiting through Sudan.

Following the passage of three critical UN Security Council resolutions, Sudan ordered the departure of terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin from Sudan in May. Sudan failed, however, to comply with the Security Council’s demand that it cease support to terrorists and turn over the three Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya (IG) fugitives linked to the 1995 assassination attempt of President Mubarak. Khartoum continued to deny any foreknowledge of the planning behind the Mubarak attempt and claimed not to know the whereabouts of the assailants.

Since Sudan was placed on the list of state sponsors of terrorism in August 1993, the Sudanese Government has continued to harbor members of several international terrorist and radical Islamic groups, including the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), Lebanese Hizballah, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) of Algeria.The National Islamic Front, which is the dominant influence within the Sudanese Government, also supports opposition and insurgent groups in Uganda,Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

In April 1996 the Department of State expelled a Sudanese diplomat at the Sudanese UN Mission who had ties to the conspirators planning to bomb the UN building and other targets in New York in 1993. A Sudanese national, who pleaded guilty in February 1995 to various charges of complicity in the New York City bomb plots foiled by the FBI, indicated two members of the Sudanese UN Mission had offered to facilitate access to the UN building in support of the bombing plot.

1997

Sudan in 1997 continued to serve as a haven, meeting place, and training hub for a number of international terrorist organizations, primarily of Middle East origin. The Sudanese Government also condoned many of the objectionable activities of Iran, such as funneling assistance to terrorist and radical Islamic groups operating in and transiting through Sudan. The Department of State in November 1997 announced new comprehensive economic sanctions against Sudan. The sanctions convey the gravity of US concerns about Sudan’s continued support for international terrorism and regional opposition groups as well as its abysmal human rights record.

Sudan has not complied with UN Security Council Resolutions 1044, 1054, and 1070 passed in 1996, despite efforts that year by the regime to distance itself somewhat from terrorism, including ordering the departure of terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin. The Security Council’s demands include that Sudan cease its support to terrorists and turn over the three Egyptian al-Gama’at fugitives linked to the 1995 attempted assassination of Egyptian President Mubarak in Ethiopia. President Bashir, consistent with Khartoum’s repeated denials that its officials had any foreknowledge of the planning of the event, in October 1997 scoffed at the idea Sudan could be seen to have had anything to do with the attack.

Since Sudan was placed on the list of state sponsors of terrorism in August 1993, the Sudanese Government has continued to harbor members of several of the most violent international terrorist and radical Islamic groups. These groups include Lebanese Hizballah, the PIJ, the ANO, and HAMAS. The Sudanese Government also supports regional Islamic and non-Islamic opposition and insurgent groups in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Tunisia.

Sudan’s support to terrorist organizations has included paramilitary training, indoctrination, money, travel documentation, safe passage, and refuge in Sudan. Most of the organizations present in Sudan maintain offices or other types of representation.They use Sudan as a base to organize some of their operations and to support compatriots elsewhere. Sudan also serves as a transit point and meeting place for several Iranian-backed terrorist groups.

1998

Sudan continued to serve as a meeting place, safehaven, and training hub for a number of international terrorist groups, particularly Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida organization. The Sudanese Government also condoned many of Iran’s objectionable activities, such as funding terrorist and radical Islamic groups operating and transiting Sudan.

Sudan still has not complied fully with UN Security Council Resolutions 1044, 1054, and 1070, passed in 1996, despite the regime’s efforts to distance itself publicly from terrorism. The UNSC demands that Sudan end all support to terrorists. It also requires Khartoum to hand over three Egyptian al-Gama’at fugitives linked to the assassination attempt in 1995 against Egyptian President Mubarak in Ethiopia. Sudanese officials continue to deny that they are harboring the three suspects and that they had a role in the attack.

Khartoum continues to provide safehaven to members of several of the world’s most violent terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hizballah, the PIJ, the ANO, and HAMAS. Khartoum also supports regional Islamic and non-Islamic opposition and insurgent groups in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Tunisia.

Sudanese support to terrorists includes provision of paramilitary training, money, religious indoctrination, travel documents, safe passage, and refuge. Most of the organizations in Sudan maintain offices or other types of representation.

In August the United States accused Sudan of involvement in chemical weapons development. On 20 August the United States conducted military strikes against the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, which was associated with Usama Bin Ladin’s terrorist network and believed to be involved in the manufacture of chemical weapons, to prevent an anti-US attack. Sudan has denied that the plant was involved in chemical weapons production and vigorously has protested the US bombing.

1999

Sudan in 1999 continued to serve as a central hub for several international terrorist groups, including Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida organization. The Sudanese Government also condoned Iran’s assistance to terrorist and radical Islamist groups operating in and transiting through Sudan.

Khartoum served as a meeting place, safehaven, and training hub for members of the Lebanese Hizballah, Egyptian Gama’at al-Islamiyya, al-Jihad, the Palistinian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and Abu Nidal organization. Sudan’s support to these groups included the provision of travel documentation, safe passage, and refuge. Most of the groups maintained offices and other forms of representation in the capital, using Sudan primarily as a secure base for organizing terrorist operations and assisting compatriots elsewhere.

Sudan still had not complied with UN Security Council Resolutions 1044, 1054, and 1070 passed in 1996—which demand that Sudan end all support to terrorists—despite the regime’s efforts to distance itself publicly from terrorism. They also require Khartoum to hand over three Egyptian al-Gama’at fugitives linked to the assassination attempt in 1995 against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia. Sudanese officials continued to deny that they are harboring the three suspects and that they had a role in the attack.

Sudan also continued to assist several Islamist and non-Islamist rebel groups based in East Africa. Nonetheless, Sudan’s relations with its neighbors appeared to improve in 1999. Ethiopia renewed previously terminated air links, while Eritrea considered reestablishing diplomatic ties. Moreover, in early December, Sudan signed a peace accord with Uganda under which both nations agreed to halt all support for any rebel groups operating on each other’s soil.

2000

The United States and Sudan in mid-2000 entered into a dialogue to discuss US counterterrorism concerns. The talks, which were ongoing at the end of the year, were constructive and obtained some positive results. By the end of the year Sudan had signed all 12 international conventions for combating terrorism and had taken several other positive counterterrorism steps, including closing down the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference, which served as a forum for terrorists.

Sudan, however, continued to be used as a safehaven by members of various groups, including associates of Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida organization, Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and HAMAS. Most groups used Sudan primarily as a secure base for assisting compatriots elsewhere.

Khartoum also still had not complied fully with UN Security Council Resolutions 1044, 1054, and 1070, passed in 1996—which demand that Sudan end all support to terrorists. They also require Khartoum to hand over three Egyptian al-Gama’at fugitives linked to the assassination attempt in 1995 against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia. Sudanese officials continued to deny that they had a role in the attack.

2001

The counterterrorism dialogue begun in mid-2000 between the US and Sudan continued and intensified during 2001. Sudan condemned the September 11 attacks and pledged its commitment to combating terrorism and fully cooperating with the United States in the campaign against terrorism.The Sudanese Government has stepped up its counterterrorism cooperation with various US agencies, and Sudanese authorities have investigated and apprehended extremists suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. In late September, the United Nations recognized Sudan’s positive steps against terrorism by removing UN sanctions.

Sudan, however, remained a designated state sponsor of terrorism. A number of international terrorist groups including al-Qaida, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and HAMAS continued to use Sudan as a safehaven, primarily for conducting logistics and other support activities. Press speculation about the extent of Sudan’s cooperation with the United States probably has led some terrorist elements to depart the country. Unilateral US sanctions remained in force.

2002

Sudan was cooperating with US counterterrorism efforts before 11 September 2001, which included a close relationship with various US Government agencies to investigate and apprehend extremists suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. Sudan is a party to 11 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Sudan also has participated in regional efforts to end the civil war that has been ongoing since 1983—a US policy priority that parallels the US objective of having Sudan deny safehaven to terrorists.

While concerns remain regarding Sudanese Government support for certain terrorist groups, such as HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, the United States is pleased with Sudan’s cooperation and the progress being made in their antiterrorist activities.

2003

Sudan in 2003 deepened its cooperation with the US Government to investigate and apprehend extremists suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. Overall, Sudan’s cooperation and information sharing has improved markedly, producing significant progress in combating terrorist activity, but areas of concern remain.

Domestically, Khartoum stepped up efforts to disrupt extremist activities and deter terrorists from operating in Sudan. In May, Sudanese authorities raided a probable terrorist training camp in Kurdufan State, arresting more than a dozen extremists and seizing illegal weapons. The majority of the trainees captured were Saudi citizens and were extradited to Saudi Arabia to face charges in accordance with a bilateral agreement. In June, the Sudanese Government detained several individuals linked to the publication of an alleged “hit list” attributed to the terrorist group al-Takfir wa al-Hijra.The list called for the killing of 11 prominent Sudanese Christian and leftist politicians, jurists, journalists, and others. In September, a Sudanese court convicted a Syrian engineer and two Sudanese nationals of training a group of Saudis, Palestinians, and others to carry out attacks in Iraq, Eritrea, Sudan, and Israel. A court statement said the Syrian was training others to carry out attacks against US forces in Iraq.

There were no international terrorist attacks in Sudan during 2003. Khartoum throughout the year placed a high priority on the protection of US citizens and facilities in Sudan. In November, the authorities stepped up their efforts to protect the US Embassy, which temporarily suspended operations in response to a terrorist threat that was deemed credible. Earlier in the year, Sudanese authorities closed a major Khartoum thoroughfare to enhance the Embassy’s security and further upgraded security measures during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The Sudanese Government also took steps in 2003 to strengthen its legislative and bureaucratic instruments for fighting terrorism by ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Sudan also ratified the African Union’s Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating Terrorism. In June, Sudanese Minister of Justice Ali Mohamed Osman Yassin issued a decree establishing an office for combating terrorism. In 2003, Sudan signed a counterterrorism cooperation agreement with the Algerian Government, which during the 1990s accused Sudan of harboring wanted Algerian terrorists. Sudan also signed a counterterrorism agreement with Yemen and Ethiopia.

In response to ongoing US concern over the presence in Sudan of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail in June said the Sudanese Government would limit HAMAS to conducting political activities.Visiting Sudanese peace talks in Kenya in October, Secretary Powell said Sudan had yet to shut down the Khartoum offices of HAMAS and the PIJ.

President Umar al-Bashir in an interview with Al-Arabiyah television maintained that the Sudanese Government could not expel HAMAS because it has a political relationship with the group and stated there was no PIJ office in Sudan. Responding to press reports that its Sudan office had closed, HAMAS officials in Khartoum and Gaza in November said that the office remained open but that the main representative had been replaced.

Sudan also has participated in regional efforts to end its long-running civil war—a US policy priority that complements the US goal of denying terrorists safehaven in Sudan.

Sudan is a party to all 12 of the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

2004

In 2004, despite serious strains in US-Sudanese relations regarding the ongoing violence in Darfur, US-Sudanese counterterrorism cooperation continued to improve. While Sudan’s overall cooperation and information sharing improved markedly and produced significant progress in combating terrorist activity, areas of concern remain. In May, the US Government certified to Congress a list of countries not fully cooperating in US antiterrorism efforts. For the first time in many years, this list did not include Sudan.

Sudan increased cooperation with Ugandan authorities to diminish the capabilities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan group which has terrorized civilians in northern Uganda and has claimed that it wants to overthrow the current Ugandan Government. The Ugandan military, with Sudanese Government cooperation, inflicted a series of defeats on the LRA at its hideouts in southern Sudan, forcing its leaders to flee into Uganda and engage in peace talks with the Ugandan Government.

Domestically, the Government of Sudan stepped up efforts to disrupt extremist activities and deter terrorists from operating in Sudan. In March 2004, a new HAMAS representative arrived in Khartoum. According to some press reports, he was received by Sudanese officials in an official capacity. In response to ongoing US concern, the Sudanese Government closed a HAMAS office in Khartoum in September. In August, Sudanese authorities arrested, prosecuted, and convicted Eritreans who had hijacked a Libyan aircraft and forced it to land in Khartoum. In October, the United States designated the Khartoum-based NGO Islamic African Relief Agency as a supporter of terrorism under EO 13224 for its support of Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaida.

The Sudanese Government also took steps in 2004 to strengthen its legislative and bureaucratic instruments for fighting terrorism. In January, Sudan co-hosted a three-day workshop on international cooperation on counterterrorism and the fight against transnational organized crime with the United Nations Office of Drug Control. Neighboring countries from the Horn of Africa and member states of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) attended the workshop, which culminated in the “Khartoum Declaration on Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime,” in which IGAD member states reaffirmed their commitment to the fight against terrorism. The Khartoum Declaration also focused on the technical assistance needs of the IGAD member states with regard to implementing the 12 international conventions and protocols against terrorism.

Syria

Designation date December 29, 1979

1985

In 1985, Syria continued to use terrorist surrogates to further its Middle Eastern policy. Syrian-sponsored groups—responsible for attacks in 15 countries in the last two years—were involved in 30 terrorist attacks in 1985 against moderate Arab, US, British, Palestinian, Jordanian, and Israeli targets. Support for international terrorist groups has cost Syria little but has raised the cost to participants of any peace initiative that might exclude Damascus; it also has served to keep President Hafez Assad’s regional rivals off balance.

The greater use of surrogates by Damascus in 1985 probably reflected Assad’s desire to mask Syria’s role in terrorist attacks. Damascus has permitted terrorist groups to use Syrian or Syrian-controlled territory for base camps, training facilities, and political headquarters, and it has provided these groups with arms, travel assistance, intelligence, and money. Palestinians who have been largely funded, trained, and armed by Syria include the PFLP-GC. Abu Musa’s Fatah rebels, and Saiqa. Damascus also has supported some non-Palestinian terrorists.

The number of incidents carried out by groups operating with Syrian support increased in 1985, compared with 1984; but Syrian personnel were not directly implicated in any specific attacks.The Abu Nidal Group—despite its increased ties to Libya—remained Syria’s major terrorist surrogate and was responsible for some two-thirds of the Syrian-sponsored attacks in 1985.

A key Syrian policy goal during 1985—as well as a principal Abu Nidal objective—was to disrupt tentative moves in the peace process exemplified by the February accord between King Hussein of Jordan and PLO leader Arafat.To this end, Abu Nidal conducted a series of attacks on Jordanian interests. On a single day in March, for instance, grenades were thrown at Jordanian airline offices in Rome, Athens, and Nicosia.

1986

Syria continued its role as a major sponsor of international terrorism in 1986, and, for the first time since 1982, Syrian personnel were implicated directly in terrorist operations. Damascus used terrorism as a foreign policy tool and to intimidate political opposition to the regime. In 1986, Syriansponsored terrorism was generally directed against pro-Arafat Palestinians, anti-Syrian Lebanese leaders, Syrian opponents of the Assad regime, and Jordanian,Turkish, Iraqi, and Israeli targets. Damascus provided several groups engaged in terrorism with base camps in Syria or in Syrian-controlled portions of Lebanon, training facilities, arms, travel assistance, intelligence, and funds.The best known groups linked to Syria are the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Abu Musa’s Fatah rebels, the Kurdish Workers’ party (PKK), and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA).

Three major incidents in Western Europe in 1986 showed evidence of direct involvement by Syrian personnel:

On 30 March two Syrian-backed Palestinians bombed the German-Arab Friendship Union in West Berlin, injuring seven persons; the Syrian Embassy in East Berlin provided the explosive device. Evidence introduced during the trial of the two suspects also implicated Syrian Air Force Intelligence deputy Haitham Said.

On 17 April, Jordanian Nizar Hindawi had his unwitting, pregnant girlfriend carry a bomb aboard an El Al flight at Heathrow Airport. Security personnel discovered and defused the device. Among the 340 passengers were more than 220 American citizens.The investigation and trial in London implicated top Syrian officials, the Syrian airline, and Syrian Embassy personnel, including the Ambassador.

On 26 June a member of the Palestinian group known as the Fatah rebels and headed by Abu Musa attempted to have a Spaniard unwittingly carry a bomb aboard an El Al flight at Madrid airport. That device partially detonated in a baggage check area, injuring 11 persons.The suspect had a Syrian passport when he was arrested and other documents supplied by Damascus. Abu Musa’s Fatah rebels are among Syria’s closest Palestinian allies and are headquartered in Damascus.

Publicity about the evidence linking Syria to the March bombing of the German-Arab Friendship Union building in West Berlin and the April attempt on the El Al airliner in London during the trials of the suspects in October and November created political pressure for international action against Damascus. The United Kingdom broke relations with Syria on 24 October, and the United States and West Germany subsequently recalled their ambassadors. The EC agreed to various political and economic sanctions. In response to these moves, Syria curtailed its support to terrorist groups and attempted to curb operations by its surrogates.The Syrian support infrastructure remains largely in place, however, and may be used again.

Syria continued to provide weapons, operational bases, safehaven, and terrorist training facilities to a variety of groups, including Abu Nidal, Abu Musa, Saiqa, the PFLP, the PLFP-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), ASALA, the PKK, and the Jordanian People’s Revolutionary Party. Syrian involvement in operations by these groups during the past three years has ranged from complete control, in the case of Saiqa, to permitting the PFLP-GC to operate out of Syrian-occupied territory in Lebanon.

1987

In a radical change from Syria’s previous close involvement in supporting international terrorism, we detected only one terrorist operation in 1987—a KurdishWorker’s Party (PKK) cross-border attack—in which, according to several sources, Syria was implicated, compared with six in 1986 and 34 in 1985. As part of an attempt to end Syria’s diplomatic and economic isolation, President Assad, in a highly publicized move in June 1987, ousted the Abu Nidal organization from Damascus. Syria also put pressure on Iran and Hizhballah to release US journalist Charles Glass in August and claims to have tried to secure the release of other foreign hostages held in Lebanon. Nevertheless, the Abu Nidal organization and other terrorists maintain camps in Syriancontrolled areas of Lebanon, and, despite Syria’s attempts to improve security, known terrorists continue to pass easily through the Syrian-controlled Beirut airport. Furthermore, Palestinians who have promoted terrorist in the past are still present in Damascus.

We believe that Syria was involved in supporting attempts by Palestinian groups to cross the border and carry out armed attacks against Israeli targets in 1987. Most of these attempts failed. Syria maintains that this support is part of its assistance for the Palestinian national liberation movement, but, unlike previous years, Syria limited such support to groups attacking only Israeli targets in the Middle East.

Syria may also bear at least partial responsibility for several cross-border terrorist attacks by the PKK, including one on a Turkish village in March during which eight persons were killed. According to press reports, Syria provides refuge and training to the PKK in its violent anti-Turkish irredentist campaign.The press also reported that Syrian support for the PKK was on the agenda during the Turkish Prime Minister’s visit to Damascus in July.

Other Middle Eastern terrorist groups that, we believe, continue to receive some Syrian support include Abu Musa, the Popular Struggle Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, the Jordanian People’s Revolutionary Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Saiqa, and the Japanese Red Army.

We expect that Syria will continue its sponsorship of terrorism, but that it will act circumspectly because of its keen interest in preventing the imposition of further Western political and economic sanctions, or the reimposition of those already lifted.We believe, therefore, that its involvement will be confined to the Middle East against targets not identified with West European or US interests.

1988

We did not detect direct Syrian involvement in any international terrorist incidents. Indeed, the diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed on Syria by the US and European Community in November 1986 seemed to have had a salutory effect on Syria.

Nevertheless, both Syria and the Syrian-occupied Bekaa Valley in Lebanon remain major sanctuaries for a wide variety of international groups that have engaged in terrorism. These include the ANO, Abu Musa, Hizballah, the PFLP-GC, ASALA, the PKK, the JRA, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. These groups continue to pose severe security threats in the region and elsewhere. For example,West German authorities in October arrested a number of members of a Damascus-based group, the PFLP-GC, which has been suspected of carrying out the bombings of US troop trains in West Germany in 1987-88. Although Syria expelled the ANO from Damascus in June 1987, the group maintains a presence in Syrian-occupied areas of the Bekaa Valley.

Syria also continues to support subversion against Turkey—despite signs of improved relations—by providing the PKK with safehaven and training. Syrian military intelligence provides the group with training facilities and probably financial support. Despite a border security agreement Assad reached with Turkish Prime Minister Ozal in July 1987, Syria still seems to be a safehaven for PKK militants operating in southeastern Turkey. Damascus probably believes the PKK gives Syria bargaining leverage on bilateral issues with Ankara.

Syria has made some efforts to improve its record as a state sponsor of terrorism.The Syrian Government has indicated its willingness to work closely with the Western governments to facilitate the release of the remaining hostages in Lebanon. Its ability to influence events at this point is seen as limited to facilitating the movement of the released hostages to Damascus and their respective embassies after they have been released. In April the Syrians denied hijacked Kuwait Airways Flight 422 permission to land in Damascus and were instrumental in a similar refusal by airport authorities at Beirut’s airport.The Syrian Government has pointed to these actions as evidence of its tough stand against terrorism.

Despite Syrian statements abhorring terrorism, Syria considers Palestinian terrorist incidents directed against nocombatant targets in Israel and the occupied territories to be part of the legitimate Palestinian struggle for independence. Such terrorist incidents as the attack on a civilian bus in the Negev Desert are reported by the Syrian media in that light. Syria’s ruling Ba’the party in February issued a statement in support of North Korea when the United States charged that that government was responsible for the November 1987 destruction of KAL Flight 858.

1989

There is no evidence that Syrian officials were involved in planning or executing terrorist attacks outside Lebanon since 1987, although they continue to provide support and safehaven to a number of groups that engaged in international terrorism.

Both Syria and Syrian-occupied areas of Lebanon (particularly the BekaaValley) remain sanctuaries for a wide variety of international groups that have engaged in terrorism, including the PFLP-GC, Hizballah, Saiqa, Abu Musa, ASALA, the PKK, the JRA, and the Syrian Social National Party. In July, JRA leader Fusako Shingenobu gave a press interview from her group’s base in the BekaaValley. Many of these groups remain active within the region and elsewhere. Syrian support has enabled some of these groups to carry out acts of international terrorism. For example, the senior PFLP-GC official arrested in 1988 inWest Germany and charged in 1989 with attempted murder in the bombing of US troop trains in 1987-88 was travelling on an official Syrian passport.

The United States has repeatedly expressed concern—both publicly and privately—about terrorist groups supported by Syria.To date, the US Government is not satisfied with the Syrian Government’s responses, and we think the Syrian Government can do more.

We have discussed with the Syrians, on a number of occasions in diplomatic channels, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and public accusations of PFLP-GC’s involvement in that attack. We have urged Syria’s full cooperation in finding those responsible. Despite Syrian statements abhorring terrorism,

Syria considers Palestinian terrorist incidents directed against targets in Israel and the occupied territories to be part of the legitimate Palestinian struggle for independence. Syria continues to support subversion against some of its neighbors. It assists the PKK insurgency against Turkey by providing the group with safehaven and safe passage in border regions, as well as sanctuary for its camps in the Bekaa Valley. The PKK insurgency escalated this year, and Turkey has publicly charged Syria with supporting armed violence in violation of the 1987 border security agreement. During 1989, Syria also allowed Iran to send arms via Damascus airport to Hizballah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon.

Syria has made some effort to improve its record as a state sponsor of terrorism. The Syrian Government continued to indicate its willingness to work closely with Western governments to facilitate the release of the remaining hostages in Lebanon. Syrian President Assad has also stated publicly that Syria will punish any individual or group proved to have been involved in acts of terrorism. In early August, the Syrian Government worked closely with the Untied States following the revelation of Colonel Higgins’ murder, and contributed to preventing death threats against US hostage Joseph Cicippio from being carried out. Senior Syrian officials have publicly reiterated Syria’s call for the release of all hostages. In January 1989, Syria was successful in including a clause in the agreement between warring Amal and Hizballah groups in Lebanon prohibiting the taking of UN personnel hostage.

1990

There is no direct evidence of Syrian Government involvement in terrorist attacks outside Lebanon since 1987, although Syria continues to provide support and safehaven to groups that engage in international terrorism.

Syria has made some progress in moving away from support for some terrorist groups. Syria has also cooperated with Iran and others to obtain the release of Western hostages held by terrorist groups in Lebanon, including the successful release of American hostages Polhill and Reed in the spring of 1990. The government-controlled media has described the Abu Nidal organization as a terrorist organization, but the Syrian Government has failed to take concrete measures against the ANO in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.

At the same time, Syria publicly supports the Palestinian right to armed struggle for their independence. President Assad has publicly defended and supported Palestinian attacks in Israel and the occupied territories. Syria continues to provide political and material support for Palestinian groups who maintain their headquarters in Damascus and who have committed terrorist acts in the past, most notably the PFLP-GC whose propaganda radio station, al Quds, broadcasts from Syrian soil. It also hosts the Abu Musa group, the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). The leader of the PFLP had publicly stated that he would carry out attacks against US targets and others opposed to Iraq in the event of a military clash in the Gulf. At year’s end, no such attacks had occurred.

The United States continued to express its serious concern to the Syrian Government—both publicly and privately—about terrorist groups supported by Syria. The Syrian Government has taken some positive steps, particularly since the beginning of the Gulf crisis in August 1990, to rein in terrorist groups based in Syria. They did not, however, take steps to close down these groups or expel them from Syria.

Syria has taken no steps to disband or eliminate the presence of other terrorist organizations, such as the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), and the Japanese Red Army. A number of these groups have camps in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, which is under the control of Syrian forces. Syria also tolerates the presence of a faction of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad that took responsibility for the massacre in February of nine Israeli civilians on a tour bus in Egypt.The PIJ statement was broadcast on the PFLP-GC-controlled radio station in southern Syria.

In 1990, and particularly since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Syria has attempted to minimize its public association with terrorist activities and groups in the international arena, apparently in an attempt to improve its standing with the West. Syrian officials have said that Syria is committed to bring to justice and punish those individuals within Syria’s evidence of their crimes.They have also repeated that any organization that is involved in terrorist crimes will have to bear the consequences. Following the September visit by Secretary of State James Baker, Syrian Foreign Minister Shara’ stated publicly that Syria condemned all forms of terrorism, including hijacking and hostage taking. However, Syria continues to draw a distinction between “legitimate struggle against the occupation troops” and acts of terrorism—a fundamental difference between US and Syrian views.

1991

Syria continued in 1991 to provide support and safehaven to a number of groups that engage in international terrorism. However, it is not known to have sponsored any international terrorist attacks outside Lebanon since 1987. Several radical groups, including the notorious Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), maintain training camps or headquarters inside Syrian territory. In addition, areas of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley controlled by Syria provide sanctuary for a wide variety of groups engaged in terrorism, including factions of Hizballah, the PIJ, the ANO, the PKK, the JRA, and Dev Sol.

During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Syrian Government seemed to have restrained groups over which it has influence. Nevertheless, there were a number of terrorist incidents in 1991 attributed to groups based in Syria and in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon, particularly against Israel. Damascus tolerated the presence of active PKK and Dev Sol training camps in the Bekaa Valley and permitted the PKK to maintain its headquarters in Damascus. Dev Sol killed three Westerners, including two Americans, in terrorist attacks in 1991.The PKK was responsible for dozens of terrorist incidents in Turkey, including for the first time the kidnapping of Americans and other Westerners.

Various press sources reported that noted terrorist Ilich Ramirez (Carlos “the Jackal”) lived in Damascus during most of 1991.There are unconfirmed reports that he was expelled from Syria in November, but he may have returned in December.

Syria facilitated the release of nine long-held Western hostages who were held in Lebanon.

1992

There is no evidence that Syrian officials have been directly involved in planning or executing terrorist attacks outside Lebanon since 1986, but Syria continues to provide support and safehaven to a number of groups that engage in international terrorism. Syria has at times restrained the activities of these groups.

Several radical groups maintain training camps or other facilities on Syrian territory. Ahmad Jabril’s PFLP-GC, for example, has its headquarters near Damascus. In addition, areas of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley under Syria’s control provide sanctuary for a wide variety of groups engaged in terrorism, including the PFLP-GC, Hizballah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), and the Japanese Red Army (JRA).The notorious international terrorist Carlos continues to enjoy Syrian sanctuary.

Two organizations that have engaged in terrorism in Turkey maintained training camps in the Bekaa Valley throughout much of 1992. Dev Sol killed three Westerners in Turkey, including two Americans, in terrorist attacks in 1991 and was responsible for two rocket attacks against the US Consulate in Istanbul in 1992.The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is responsible for dozens of terrorist incidents in Turkey, including bombings in public places and the kidnapping of foreigners. PKK leader Ahmed Ocalan also uses Syria as his residence and base of operations, with Syrian Government knowledge and support. PKK operations are the subject of ongoing talks between Syria and Turkey, and the Turks report some progress. Press reports indicate that the Lebanese Army closed down—apparently with Syrian approval—the Dev Sol and PKK facilities in September, although ti is not clear whether the terrorist groups have left the Bekaa Valley altogether.

1993

There is no evidence that Syrian officials have been directly involved in planning or executing terrorist attacks since 1986, but Syria continues to provide support to and safehaven for several groups that engage in international terrorism. Syria has taken steps to restrain the international activities of some of these groups. In July, Damascus played an important part in cooling hostilities in southern Lebanon by inducing Hizballah to halt its rocket attacks on northern Israel. Since the signing of the Gaza-Jericho accord in September, Syria has counseled Palestinian rejectionists to refrain from violence outside the region, although it has not acted to stop rejectionist violence in southern Lebanon, or halted Iranian resupply of Hizballah via Syria.

Several radical terrorist groups maintain training camps or other facilities on Syrian territory. Ahmad Jibril’s PFLP-GC, for example, has its headquarters near Damascus. In addition, Damascus grants a wide variety of groups engaged in terrorism—including the PFLP-GC, the ANO, the PIJ, and the JRA—basing privileges or refuge in areas of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley under Syrian control.The notorious international terrorist Carlos appears to continue to enjoy Syrian sanctuary.

The Turkish PKK continues to train in the Bekaa Valley, despite earlier reports that camps had been closed.The PKK is responsible for hundreds of terrorist incidents in Turkey and across Europe, including bombings and kidnappings of foreigners. One American was held hostage by the group. PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who is believed to reside in Syria, made threats against Turkey and foreign tourists and residents of Turkey in press conferences in the Bekaa Valley during the year. Syrian safehaven for PKK operations was vigorously protested by Turkey and is the subject of ongoing talks between Syria and Turkey.

1994

There is no evidence that Syrian officials have been directly involved in planning or executing terrorist attacks since 1986. Damascus is publicly committed to the Middle East peace process and has taken some steps to restrain the international activities of these groups. Syria also uses its influence with Hizballah to limit outbreaks of violence on the border between Lebanon and Israel, but permits Iran to resupply Hizballah via Damascus. However, Syria continues to provide safehaven and support for several groups that engage in international terrorism; spokesmen for some of these groups have publicly claimed responsibility for attacks in Israel and the occupied territories. Several radical terrorist groups maintain training camps or other facilities on Syrian territory. Ahmad Jibril’s PFLP-GC has its headquarters near Damascus. In addition, Damascus grants a wide variety of groups engaged in terrorism basing privileges or refuge in areas of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley under Syrian control: these include HAMAS, the PFLP-GC, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Japanese Red Army (JRA).

The terrorist group PKK continues to train in the Bekaa Valley, and its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, resides at least parttime in Syria. The PKK in 1994 conducted a violent campaign against Turkish tourist spots frequented by foreigners, as well as other terrorist violence across Europe. Syrian safehaven for PKK operations was vigorously protested by Turkey and is the subject of discussions between Syria and Turkey.

1995

There is no evidence that Syrian officials have been directly involved in planning or executing terrorist attacks since 1986. Damascus continues to negotiate seriously to achieve a peace accord with Israel and has taken some steps to restrain the international activities of these groups. Syria continues to use its influence to moderate Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups when tension and violence in southern Lebanon escalate. It has, however, allowed Iran to resupply Hizballah via Damascus.

At the same time, Syria provides safehaven and support for several groups that engage in international terrorism. Spokesmen for some of these groups, particularly Palestinian rejectionists, continue to claim responsibility for attacks in Israel and the occupied territories/Palestinian autonomous areas. Several radical terrorist groups maintain training camps or other facilities on Syrian territory and in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon, such as Ahmad Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), which has its headquarters near Damascus. Syria grants basing privileges or refuge to a wide variety of groups engaged in terrorism.These include HAMAS, the PFLP-GC, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Japanese Red Army (JRA).

The terrorist group Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) continues to train in the Al Biqa’ (Bekaa Valley), and its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, resides at least part-time in Syria. The PKK in 1995 conducted—with limited success—a violent campaign against Turkish tourist spots frequented by foreigners, as well as other terrorist violence in Europe. Syrian safehaven for PKK operations was vigorously protested by Turkey and is the subject of discussions between Syria and Turkey.

1996

There is no evidence that Syrian officials have been directly involved in planning or executing international terrorist attacks since 1986. Nevertheless, Syria continues to provide safehaven and support for several groups that engage in such attacks.Though Damascus has stated its commitment to the peace process, it has not acted to stop anti-Israeli attacks by Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups in southern Lebanon. Syria also permits the resupply of arms for rejectionist groups operating in Lebanon via Damascus. On the positive side, Syria took action to prevent specific terrorist acts, continued to restrain the international activities of some terrorist groups in Syria, and has been a member of the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group—established by the 12 April 1996 Understanding—helping to enforce its provisions. After King Hussein of Jordan raised the issue of individuals infiltrating into Jordan from Syria with plans to attack Jordanian and Israeli targets, Damascus conducted an arrest campaign against the infiltrators’ backers.

Several radical terrorist groups maintain training camps or other facilities on Syrian territory. Ahmed Jibril’s PFLP-GC and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), for example, have their headquarters near Damascus. In addition, Damascus grants basing privileges or refuge to a wide variety of groups engaged in terrorism in areas of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley under Syrian control.These include HAMAS, the PFLP-GC, the PIJ, and the Japanese Red Army (JRA). The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) continues to train in Syria-controlled areas of Lebanon, and its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, resides at least part-time in Syria. In 1996 the PKK executed numerous terrorist attacks across Europe and continued—with limited success—its violent campaign against Turkish tourist spots. Syria also suffered from several terrorist attacks in 1996, including a string of unresolved bombings in major Syrian cities.

1997

There is no evidence that Syrian officials have been directly involved in planning or executing international terrorist attacks since 1986. Syria, however, continues to provide safehaven and support for several groups that engage in such attacks. Several radical terrorist groups maintain training camps or other facilities on Syrian territory. Ahmad Jibril’s PFLP-GC and the PIJ, for example, have their headquarters in Damascus. In addition, Syria grants a wide variety of terrorist groups basing privileges or refuge in areas of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley under Syrian control: these include HAMAS, the PFLP-GC, and the PIJ. The PKK also continues to train in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon, and its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, resides at least part-time in Syria.

Although Damascus has stated its commitment to the peace process, it has not acted to stop anti-Israeli attacks by Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups in southern Lebanon. Syria also assists the resupply of Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups operating in Lebanon via Damascus. Nevertheless, the Syrian Government continues to restrain the activities of some of these groups and to participate in a multi-national monitoring group to prevent attacks against civilian targets in southern Lebanon and northern Israel.

1998

There is no evidence that Syrian officials have engaged directly in planning or executing international terrorist attacks since 1986. Syria, nonetheless, continues to provide safehaven and support to several terrorist groups, allowing some to maintain training camps or other facilities on Syrian territory. Ahmad Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, for example, have their headquarters in Damascus. In addition, Syria grants a wide variety of terrorist groups—including HAMAS, the PFLP-GC, and the PIJ—basing privileges or refuge in areas of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley under Syrian control.

In response to Turkish pressure, Damascus took several important steps against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in October. PKK leader Abdallah Ocalan departed Syria, and Damascus forced many PKK members to relocate to northern Iraq. It is unclear whether Damascus has made a longterm commitment to sever its ties to the PKK.

Although Damascus claims to be committed to the Middle East peace process, it has not acted to stop anti-Israeli attacks by Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups in southern Lebanon. Syria allowed—but did not participate in—a meeting of Palestinian rejectionist groups in Damascus in December to reaffirm their public opposition to the peace process. Syria also assists the resupply of rejectionist groups operating in Lebanon via Damascus. Nonetheless, the Syrian Government continues to restrain the international activities of some groups and to participate in a multinational monitoring group to prevent attacks against civilian targets in southern Lebanon and northern Israel.

1999

Syria continued to provide safehaven and support to several terrorist groups, some of which maintained training camps or other facilities on Syrian territory. Ahmad Jibril’s Popular Front Liberation of Palestinian-General Command (PFLPGC) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), for example, were headquartered in Damascus. In addition, Syria granted a wide variety of terrorist groups—including HAMAS, the PFLP-GC, and the PIJ—basing privileges or refuge in areas of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley under Syrian control. Damascus generally upheld its agreement with Ankara not to support the Kurdish PKK, however.

Syria permitted the resupply of rejectionist groups operating in Lebanon via Damascus. The Syrian Government, nonetheless, continued to restrain their international activities, instructing leaders of terrorist organizations in Damascus in August to refrain from military activities and limit their actions solely to the political realm. Syria also participated in a multinational monitoring group to prevent attacks against civilian targets in southern Lebanon and northern Israel.

2000

Syria continued to provide safehaven and support to several terrorist groups, some of which maintained training camps or other facilities on Syrian territory. Ahmad Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Abu Musa’s Fatah-the-Intifada, and George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) maintained their headquarters in Damascus.The Syrian Government allowed HAMAS to open a new main office in Damascus in March, although the arrangement may be temporary while HAMAS continues to seek permission to reestablish its headquarters in Jordan. In addition, Syria granted a variety of terrorist groups—including HAMAS, the PFLP-GC, and the PIJ—basing privileges or refuge in areas of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley under Syrian control. Damascus generally upheld its agreement with Ankara not to support the Kurdish PKK, however.

Although Syria claimed to be committed to the peace process, it did not act to stop Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups from carrying out anti-Israeli attacks. Damascus also served as the primary transit point for terrorist operatives traveling to Lebanon and for the resupply of weapons to Hizballah. Damascus appeared to maintain its longstanding ban on attacks launched from Syrian territory or against Western targets.

2001

Syria’s president, Bashar al-Asad, as well as senior Syrian officials, publicly condemned the September 11 attacks. The Syrian Government also cooperated with the United States and with other foreign governments in investigating al-Qaida and some other terrorist groups and individuals.

The Government of Syria has not been implicated directly in an act of terrorism since 1986, but it continued in 2001 to provide safehaven and logistics support to a number of terrorist groups. Ahmad Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Abu Musa’s Fatah-the-Intifadah, George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and HAMAS continued to maintain offices in Damascus. Syria provided Hizballah, HAMAS, PFLP-GC, the PIJ, and other terrorist organizations refuge and basing privileges in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, under Syrian control. Damascus, however, generally upheld its September 2000 antiterrorism agreement with Ankara, honoring its 1998 pledge not to support the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Damascus served as the primary transit point for the transfer of Iranian-supplied weapons to Hizballah. Syria continued to adhere to its longstanding policy of preventing any attacks against Israel or Western targets from Syrian territory or attacks against Western interests in Syria.

2002

The Syrian Government has continued to provide political and limited material support to a number of Palestinian groups, including allowing them to maintain headquarters or offices in Damascus. Some of these groups have committed terrorist acts, but the Syrian Government insists that their Damascus offices undertake only political and informational activities.The most notable Palestinian rejectionist groups in Syria are the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS). Syria also continued to permit Iranian resupply, via Damascus, of Hizballah in Lebanon. Nonetheless, the Syrian Government has not been implicated directly in an act of terrorism since 1986.

At the UN Security Council and in other multilateral fora, Syria has taken a leading role in espousing the view that Palestinian and Lebanese terrorist groups fighting Israel are not terrorists; it also has used its voice in the UN Security Council to encourage international support for Palestinian national aspirations and denounce Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories as “state terrorism.”

The Syrian Government has repeatedly assured the United States that it will take every possible measure to protect US citizens and facilities from terrorists in Syria. In times of increased threat, it has increased police protection around the US Embassy. During the past five years, there have been no acts of terrorism against US citizens in Syria. The Government of Syria has cooperated significantly with the United States and other foreign governments against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations and individuals. It also has discouraged any signs of public support for al-Qaida, including in the media and at mosques.

In 2002, Syria became a party to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, making it party to five of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

2003

The Syrian Government in 2003 continued to provide political and material support to Palestinian rejectionist groups. HAMAS, the PIJ, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine operate from Syria, although they have lowered their public profiles since May, when Damascus announced that the groups had voluntarily closed their offices. Many of these groups claimed responsibility for anti-Israeli terrorist acts in 2003; the Syrian Government insists that their Damascus offices undertake only political and informational activities. Syria also continued to permit Iran to use Damascus as a transshipment point for resupplying Hizballah in Lebanon.

Syrian officials have publicly condemned international terrorism but continue to make a distinction between terrorism and what they consider to be the legitimate armed resistance of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and of Lebanese Hizballah. The Syrian Government has not been implicated directly in an act of terrorism since 1986.

During the past five years, there have been no acts of terrorism against US citizens in Syria. Despite tensions between the United States and Syria about the war in Iraq and Syrian support for terrorism, Damascus has repeatedly assured the United States that it will take every possible measure to protect US citizens and facilities. Damascus has cooperated with the United States and other foreign governments against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations and individuals; it also has discouraged signs of public support for al-Qaida, including in the media and at mosques.

In 2003, Syria was instrumental in returning a soughtafter terrorist planner to US custody. Since the end of the war in Iraq, Syria has made efforts to tighten its borders with Iraq to limit the movement of anti-Coalition foreign fighters into Iraq, a move that has not been completely successful.

Syria is a party to seven of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

2004

The Syrian Government in 2004 continued to provide political and material support to both Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups. HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), among others, continue to operate from Syria, although they have lowered their public profiles since May 2003, when Damascus announced that the groups had voluntarily closed their offices. Many of these Palestinian groups, in statements originating from both inside and outside of Syria, claimed responsibility for anti-Israeli terrorist attacks in 2004. The Syrian Government insists that these Damascus-based offices undertake only political and informational activities. Syria also continued to permit Iran to use Damascus as a transshipment point for resupplying Lebanese Hizballah in Lebanon.

Syrian officials have publicly condemned international terrorism, but make a distinction between terrorism and what they consider to be the legitimate armed resistance of Palestinians in the occupied territories and of Lebanese Hizballah. The Syrian Government has not been implicated directly in an act of terrorism since 1986, although Israeli officials accused Syria of being indirectly involved in the August 31, 2004, Beersheva bus bombings that left 16 dead.

Damascus has cooperated with the United States and other foreign governments against al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations and individuals; it also has discouraged signs of public support for al-Qaida, including in the media and at mosques.

In September 2004, Syria hosted border security discussions with the Iraqis and took a number of measures to improve the physical security of the border and establish security cooperation mechanisms. Although these and other efforts by the Syrian Government have been partly successful, more must be done in order to prevent the use of Syrian territory by those individuals and groups supporting the insurgency in Iraq.