Reviewing the State Department’s Annual Report on Terrorism

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U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation

Below is the transcript of a hearing held on 12 May 2005, concerning the U.S. Department of State’s Annual Report on Terrorism.Witnesses at the hearing included: Philip Zelikow, counselor of the Department of State; John Brennan, interim director of the National Counterterrorism Center; Raphael F. Perl, specialist in international terrorism policy, Congressional Research Service; Larry C. Johnson, managing director, BERG Associates.

Royce Statement on Annual Terrorism Report

Hearing Examines the State Department’s 2004 Report on Terrorism

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Today, the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation (ITNP) held a hearing to review the State Department’s annual report on terrorism. ITNP Chairman U.S. Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA-40) issued the following opening statement:

“The State Department’s last two editions of its yearly report on international terrorism have been mired in controversy. The 2003 edition had to be reissued after significant errors were detected—errors that underreported the number of terrorist attacks for 2003.This year, the State Department issued its 2004 report minus its traditional annex statistically reporting on the number of terrorist attacks worldwide.

“This change leaves us with two documents: a Country Reports on Terrorism, produced by the State Department, and A Chronology of Significant International Terrorism, produced by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).We used to have one report: Patterns of Global Terrorism.

“Patterns had been around since 1983. It was widely used throughout the world, because it was authoritative and comprehensive. In truncating this document, a good brand name was jettisoned. Post-9/11, when we are finding that much of what we have been doing for years in the terrorism field has been ineffective, it is an odd time to play with success.

“The new Country Reports on Terrorism is a bit like a onesided baseball card. We have the terrorist’s picture on the front.We see what team he is on.What is missing are the statistics on the back. In this case, it is the grisly statistics of attacks committed and deaths, injuries, and damage inflicted. Looking to next year, I would ask the Administration to revisit its decision to split this report in two. One report makes sense.

“I am not concerned, as are some, about the change in methodology that the NCTC is undertaking. There is room for improvement in classifying terrorist attacks, which is not an easy task. If the Administration needs a legislative fix to allow NCTC to input new statistics into a revived Patterns report, many of us would want to help. But, I should comment that after the problems with the 2003 report, in which Members of this Committee were very interested, I do not understand why the Committee was not consulted as the decision to alter Patterns was made.To some this may be just a report, but it is a congressionally mandated report dealing with the central security challenge facing our nation.

“Regarding some of the rhetoric surrounding this debate, the spike in terrorist attacks from 2003 to 2004 is not proof that we are losing the battle against terrorism.The Administration invited this charge though when it trumpeted its initial set of 2003 Patterns’ numbers to claim that we were winning the battle. Let’s get some perspective.

“The struggle against terrorism goes beyond the statistics of Patterns. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon. Key to fighting it is countering anti-Americanism, militant Islam, and various creeds that inspire terrorism and create a climate conducive to terrorist operations. Patterns’ statistics said nothing about this crucial effort.This is not to disparage Patterns, as some have who call its statistics bad or worthless.This report is, or at least was, a useful tool. But again, it is not the ultimate scorecard in the battle against terrorism. It is not that simple. My hope for this hearing is that we examine the issues and look ahead. A commitment from the Administration to work with Congress on producing the best possible report on international terrorism would be a good start.”

Testimony by Dr. Philip D. Zelikow

The Department of State has the lead responsibility for advancing our counterterrorism goals with other countries and welcomes the opportunity to submit a report to the Congress on those issues. After I say a few words on that subject, I will address the composition of the report and why we made the decision to revamp the Department’s report to reflect the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), allowing each agency to concentrate in the area of its expertise.

International terrorism continued to pose a significant threat to the United States and its partners in 2004. Despite ongoing improvements in U.S. homeland security, our campaigns against insurgents and terrorists, and the deepening counterterrorism cooperation among the nations of the world, the slaughter of hundreds of innocents at Beslan school and major attacks in Madrid, on a Philippines ferry, and in Sinai, demonstrated the danger that international terrorism poses to friendly countries. Although fortunately there were no attacks on the homeland during 2004, the loss of American citizens in Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Gaza this year reminds us that the U.S. homeland,U.S. citizens and interests, and U.S. friends and allies remain at risk.

In 2004, the United States broadened and deepened its international cooperation on counterterrorism issues. Increased diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, military and financial cooperation contributed directly to homeland security and the interdiction or disruption of terrorists around the globe. We have discussed these efforts extensively in Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 our annual report to Congress transmitted to you on April 27.

In that report, we offered a number of examples of this cooperation. For example:

■ Close cooperation with British, French and other authorities, coordinated through the State Department and U.S. Embassies in London, Paris and elsewhere, was pivotal to managing threats to airline security during the ‘03-’04 new year period.

■ Information sharing with the United Kingdom and Pakistan led to the disclosure and disruption of al-Qaida attack planning against U.S. financial institutions.

■ U.S. diplomatic and military assistance in Africa facilitated cooperation among Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Libya and Chad that led to the capture and return of wanted GSPC faction leader El Para to Algeria to stand trial.

■ Law enforcement officers in Iraq, Colombia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, among others, applied U.S. specialized counterterrorism training to bring terrorists to justice.

Notably, 2004 was also marked by progress in decreasing the threat from state-sponsored terrorism. Iraq’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism was rescinded in October 2004. Although still designated as state sponsors of terrorism, Libya and Sudan took significant steps to cooperate in the global war on terrorism. Unfortunately, Cuba, North Korea, Syria, and in particular, Iran continued to embrace terrorism as an instrument of national policy. And, as we have noted before, we find it most worrisome that these countries all have the capabilities to manufacture weapons of mass destruction and other destabilizing technologies that could fall into the hands of terrorists.

Iran and Syria are of special concern to us for their direct, open, and prominent role in supporting Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups, for their unhelpful actions in Iraq and in Iran’s case, the unwillingness to bring to justice senior al-Qaida members detained in 2003, including senior al-Qaida members who were involved in the planning of the 9/11 attacks.

Now let me turn to the process issues. For years, as many of you know, statistical data on global terrorism has been published as part of an annual State Department report called Patterns of Global Terrorism, that was last provided to Congress in April 2004.

The law itself requires basically two things. It requires detailed assessments of specified countries, and information about specified terrorist groups.

The compilation of data about terrorist attacks is not a required part of the report. And, in fact, the Department of State itself has never compiled statistical data on international terrorist incidents. This function has always been performed by the intelligence community, although the State Department has traditionally released this data, going back to the years in which the State Department was the public voice of the U.S. Government on international terrorism generally.

Of course, that situation has been changing in recent years. In July 2004, the 9/11 Commission recommended creation of a National Counterterrorism Center to conduct allsource analysis of global terrorism.

The President implemented this recommendation by Executive Order in August and the center was created by statute in December 2004, in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.

But what’s important for our purposes here is what the law that Congress adopted said the NCTC should do.The law states that the NCTC is the primary organization for analysis and integration of “all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism or counterterrorism.” The law further states that the NCTC will be the United States Government’s “shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contact and support.”

Given that statutory mandate, the State Department has focused its own report to Congress on the issues in its mandate, renamed Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, assessing countries and providing information on terrorist groups, which we are still statutorily required to do. And we respect and defer to the National Counterterrorism Center to assume its new mandate as the “shared knowledge bank” for data on global terrorism.

We are gratified by the way some serious experts on terrorism analysis have responded to these innovations. Former terrorism prosecutor Andrew C. McCarthy in “The National Review Online” noted that under our new approach, State and NCTC “have labored to make terrorism information more reliable, more accessible, and more reflective of common sense.” Oxford Analytica noted that despite a new title and format “Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 continues to provide a detailed account of global antiterror cooperation.” Noted national security commentator Tony Cordesman at the Center for Strategic and International Studies wrote in a report called “Good Riddance to Meaningless Rubbish,” “The news that the State Department has dropped the statistical appendices from its annual report (on terrorism) should not come as a shock to anyone.The State Department report has been (and is) extremely useful for its characterization of terrorist groups. It never, however, produced useful numbers on the patterns of terrorism.” An analysis of the report by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy noted that the controversy over numbers “diverted attention from other, more significant aspects of the report. Country Reports 2004 provides a fairly balanced assessment of the evolving global jihadist threat, illustrating why and how jihadist groups pose a serious danger not only to the United States, but also to many other countries.”

On April 27, NCTC committed to developing a new approach to compiling statistics that needs to be and will be significantly revised and improved, including NCTC’s plans for providing a more comprehensive accounting of global terrorist incidents by June of this year. My colleague, John Brennan, is here with me today to discuss this with you.

The Department of State would support legislative changes that specifically task NCTC with the annual responsibility for statistical analysis of terrorism consistent with its basic mandate.The State Department would continue to prepare an annual report addressing state sponsors of terrorism, multilateral and bilateral cooperation on terrorism, terrorist groups and terrorist sanctuaries, as well as the new Section 7120 reporting requirements that lie within State’s area of expertise. The Department has begun consultations on this topic.We will be working with DNI and NCTC to shape a joint understanding on this topic.We will be back in touch with the Committee at a later date with a formal proposal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to testify before the Committee.

Statement for the Record of John O. Brennan

Good morning Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here to address the role that the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) have played over the past year in compiling a chronology of international terrorism incidents.

By way of background, the Intelligence Community (IC) has traditionally provided input to the State Department publication of Patterns of Global Terrorism. This has included, among other things, Appendix A, that laid out in some detail those incidents of “international terrorism” that were considered “significant.” Because Patterns was produced in response to statutory directive, Intelligence Community input was consistent with the statutory criteria that, for instance, defined “international terrorism” as “terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.” In many cases, the key statutory criteria, such as the definition of “noncombatant,” whether an attack in a specific region should be considered “international” and what constituted “significant” were open to interpretation. In such cases the IC looked to the State Department to provide counting rules; these counting rules, coupled with past practices and our own judgment were then used to evaluate specific incidents.

With the standup of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center in May 2003, responsibility to support Patterns shifted from the CIA to TTIC. However, during the hectic early days of TTIC, the database to support Patterns received insufficient attention and resources. Adequate quality control was lacking, incidents were missed, and the document was published with numerous errors. As you are aware, these shortcomings were noted by academics and the press, and Appendix A was ultimately reissued.To avoid a repeat of such problems TTIC/NCTC took a number of actions last year:

■ Increased personnel assigned to the database from three part-time to ten full-time individuals;

■ Reengineered the database itself to improve data integrity;

■ Established an Incident Adjudication Board, drawn from Intelligence Community officers assigned to the TTIC/ NCTC to ensure quality control;

■ And took on board, as appropriate, recommendations of the Department of State Inspector General’s Report which had reviewed the 2003 production process.

In the process of compiling the statistics for 2004, a number of issues became apparent. Because of the significant increase in the resources devoted to maintaining the database, far more source material was reviewed and a substantially higher number of incidents meeting the statutory criteria were compiled; significant international incidents rose from under 200 in 2003 to approximately 650 last year—a copy of the entire chronology of significant international attacks is provided for the written record. While some of the global increase was attributable to incidents in Iraq, the overall growth in total incidents represented a statistical discontinuity—a function of increased resources dedicated to research and not necessarily any change in the nature of global terrorism.The impact of such additional research is seen most clearly in Kashmir, where a dramatic growth is noted over previous years’ data; there is little doubt that a more accurate accounting of the incidents in Kashmir would have reflected far higher totals than was the case in 2003 Patterns. In other words: the numbers compiled for 2004 cannot be compared to those of previous years in any meaningful way.

A rigorous application of the statutory criteria and counting rules clearly gave rise to a significant increase in the number of international terrorist incidents. However, in compiling the results,TTIC/NCTC became increasingly concerned with both the statutory criteria themselves as well as the definitions that we were being asked to use: Of primary concern was the statutory definition of “international terrorism.” This definitional approach may be valid for a state sponsored threat, but is far less useful with the kind of transnational threat that we confront now. For instance, the requirement that international terrorism involve the citizens or territory of more than one country necessarily implied that if a suicide bomber from Country A blows up a café in Country A and kills only citizens of Country A, it doesn’t count. But . . . if a suicide bomber from Country A blows up a café in Country A and there happens to be a tourist from Country B in the café who is killed or seriously wounded, it counts. In other words, the end results were arbitrary and often a function of serendipity; analysts were left trying to determine citizenship of those people present at an attack or the makeup of an aircraft manifest. Representative problems from 2004 included:

■ On 2 November the Dutch filmmaker, Theo Van Gogh, was killed by Mohammed Bouyari, a Dutch Moroccan and Islamic extremist. The murder was clearly a terrorist attack, but because they were both Dutch citizens this attack did not meet the statutory definition of “international terrorism.”

■ On 24 August two Russian airliners were destroyed in mid air by Chechen female suicide bombers. One aircraft apparently had all Russian passengers and crew and therefore, did not meet the criteria for international terrorism. The other aircraft had a single dual Israeli citizen onboard and therefore, is reflected in the international terrorism statistics.

■ On 26 February a member of the Abu Sayyaf Group sank a Superferry, killing 118 people and leaving many more missing. Because the reported victims and perpetrator were all from the Philippines, the attack did not constitute international terrorism.

These are not unique instances.We have also identified over 100 other attacks conducted by Foreign Terrorist Organizations that do not meet the criteria for international terrorism.

In our compilation of 2004 data, we found problems not only with the statutory definition of “international terrorism,” but also with incidents occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan. Determining “noncombatant” status in such an environment is hard enough. But in such “war-like” circumstances, it was often impossible to distinguish between terrorism and insurgency; for instance, in some cases Iraqis were part of the Zarqawi network (a terrorist network) and in other cases they were Former Regime Elements (insurgency). Under the statutory definition, as noted above, attacks by Iraqis on Iraqis wouldn’t meet the definition of international terrorism. But in the context of attacks against the U.S. military, we had little practical or intellectually defendable way of distinguishing between terrorism and insurgency; as such, with State’s concurrence, we focused on attacks against international civilians.

Finally, we were advised by Department of State to continue to use the Community definition of “significant” as attacks that involve death, serious injury, or property damage over $10,000; that amount presents a very low bar, but it is the standard that has been used for many years.

These are just a few of the difficulties associated with counting international terrorist incidents.The Department of State and many others shared our concerns regarding the often arbitrary nature of the designations, and a consensus began to emerge on the need for a methodological change that more accurately captured the nature of the terrorist threat. I must emphasize that at no point did the Department of State attempt to pressure NCTC to lower its numbers, or indicate to us that the numbers would not be included in Patterns because they were “too high.”

Looking Ahead

Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, NCTC has been given unique responsibilities to “serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contacts and support.” As such, I believe that this is an opportune time to reexamine how terrorist incidents are reported; we do not pretend to have all the answers and, thus, will be reaching out to subject matter experts both inside and outside the government.

Given the concerns highlighted above, we have serious misgivings about the utility of the data that was released on the 27th of April. As such, we will make available, by the end of June of this year, a more comprehensive accounting of worldwide terrorism incidents.The precise nature of this accounting is still being worked, but we will undoubtedly extend reporting beyond those incidents that only involve citizens or territory of two or more countries. Depending on what precisely is counted, this could raise the global totals to several thousand incidents. Several points are worthy of note:

■ First, as is hopefully self evident, this will totally invalidate any comparisons with past Patterns reports. Beyond the differing levels of effort used this past years in comparison to previous years, methodologically, we will be counting very different things.

■ Second, this must be seen as a work in progress.The definition of terrorism, relative to all other forms of political violence, has never been clear-cut.We envision reaching out to experts across the Government and academia to further develop and refine a more meaningful approach.

■ Third, as we have done with the data released on 27 April, we will make both the methodology and the results as transparent as possible, ideally providing an interactive search capability on the INTERNET; we are currently reviewing precisely what can be accomplished by June. And in this vein, I also want to express my deep appreciation for the efforts of the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City (MIPT). MIPT is partnering with us to make the data as accessible as possible to the American public.The data to be released in June, like that released the end of last month, will be available at www.tkb.org.

■ Finally, I would caution against the natural inclination to want to use terrorist incidents as a simple metric to judge progress in the Global War on Terrorism.While we anticipate this new approach will provide data that can be used to more accurately depict the nature of terrorism around the world, it won’t necessarily translate into a simple basis for judging whether we are prevailing in the struggle against terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss NCTC’s role in this important issue and look forward to taking your questions.

The Department of State’s Annual Report on Terrorism: Testimony of Raphael F. Perl

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, my name is Raphael Perl. I am a senior foreign policy specialist with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. I thank you for the opportunity to be here today and to address issues relating to the Department of State’s annual report to Congress on global terrorism, which is entitled this year, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004. In previous years this report was entitled Patterns of Global Terrorism, and prior to that, Patterns of International Terrorism. In my testimony I refer to this new report version as “Country Reports.”

Focus of Testimony

My testimony will focus on two areas of potential concern to Congress:

1. The importance of numbers and data to sustain credibility of the report; and,

2. Options for consideration by Congress to strengthen the Department of State’s reporting role in this area so vital to the security of our nation.

In discussing options, I remind the Committee that the Congressional Research Service (CRS) does not recommend any particular policy option or approach. Although I confine my discussion to selected options, CRS is prepared to address the merits and downsides of a full range of additional issues and options at the Subcommittee’s behest.

This year’s annual report to Congress has both a new title and a modified format. Country Reports continues to provide information on anti-terror cooperation by nations worldwide. It continues to list state sponsors of terrorism, which are subject to sanctions. However, this year statistical data on terrorist incidents are not included as an integral part of the report. They are provided and released concomitantly with the publication of Country Reports by the newly created National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC).The NCTC will likely release more detailed statistical data later this year—perhaps as early as June 17th, the date that a new, congressionallymandated report on terrorist sanctuaries is due.

It should be noted that this separation of the NCTC data from the Country Reports may not be very user-friendly for readers of the reports. One option would be to include the NCTC data as an appendix.

The Importance of Data

As a researcher who has served both at the Congressional Research Service and at the National Academy of Engineering, I must stress the core importance of data. Data provide the context of, and basis for, subsequent analysis. Analysis without underlying data often lacks credibility. In the academic and scientific community, analysis without reference to data—even if logical and persuasive—is viewed with skepticism.

For the purpose of maintaining credibility, an annual report to Congress on global terrorism would benefit from the availability of a significant compilation of relevant data. Although in most cases data are integrated either in the text or in an appendix of a report, at the very least data should be in some manner readily available elsewhere, in print or on the Internet, as appropriate.

Strengthening the Report

Overview

Looking at things afresh, what areas might an annual global report on terrorism address? What trends might it home in on? How might it be structured? How rigid or how loose might congressional reporting requirements be?

It has been some fifteen years since Congress mandated the first annual report on global terrorism. When the report was originally conceived as a reference document, the primary threat from terrorism was state-sponsored. But, since then, the threat has evolved, with Al Qaeda-affiliated groups and non-state sponsors of terrorism increasingly posing a major and more decentralized threat.

The terrorist threat we face today has greatly increased in complexity and danger. It has evolved to have a major economic aspect.Technology and the Internet are both major facilitators and mitigators of this threat, aiding both terrorists and those who seek to interdict them. It appears that, in today’s globally interconnected world, the distinction between domestic and international is becoming increasingly blurred. And it appears that some terrorist groups may look to an expanding range of criminal activity to provide financial and logistical support for their causes.

Clearly the threat is becoming ever more global. The terrorist of the past wanted to change his country.The terrorist of today often wants to change the world. And as the gap between the haves and the have nots widens globally, increasingly the use of terror may become the “ballot box” for the dispossessed.

Many analysts suggest that terrorism today is rapidly assuming the characteristics of a global insurgency, with strong ideological and often religious motivations. More and more, the conflict is seen as a struggle for hearts and minds of the vulnerable, with the media at the center of the battlefield.

Given these important changes since the report was originally conceived, how might they best be reflected in future reports?

Structural Issues and Options

The current report begins with several short chapters: legislative requirements, an overview, a brief analysis of global jihad and a description of international antiterrorism efforts. This is followed by country reports broken down by region, and finally, by a chapter on terrorist groups.

Much of the current report corresponds to the Department of State’s structure of regional bureaus, which include Africa, Europe, East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Eurasia, the Near East and North Africa, South Asia and the Western Hemisphere. However, as international terrorism and, more particularly, Islamist militancy become more decentralized, regional or country-specific presentations alone may not reflect the wider picture, and an expanded transregional focus may add value.

A report which also includes a number of supplemental categories of information about terrorism could prove useful for congressional purposes, especially if it presents facts and data, along with understandable tables and graphics.

An integral question is who should prepare and publish such data and what should they measure? The NCTC might well be tasked by Congress or its own administrators to develop meaningful data compilations on terrorism, including and going beyond those eliminated from the State Department report this year. Ideally, some flexibility should be granted in the development and publication of this data. A series of seminars and workshops to explore these possibilities, with congressional participation, might prove useful in this regard.

Analysis, including impacts—not merely reformulating the numbers—is another important element; Congress could specify subject areas of particular interest, such as terrorist involvement with weapons of mass destruction or narcotics trafficking.

Also useful would be a set of meaningful predictions, where possible based on trends, projections, survey data and intelligence inputs where available. Finally, clearly enunciated policy statements might be set forth, including goals and objectives, as well as criteria to measure progress.

The Government Accountability Office uses goals, objectives and measurement criteria in order to report on operational efficiency.These are also needed to facilitate decisions on funding and resource allocation.The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) has similar requirements. And the Department of State already includes such criteria in its Mission and Bureau performance plans, and might be able to develop some variation appropriate to its report.

The more specific Congress can be about requirements and structure of the report, the more pertinent and responsive the product is likely to become.To the degree that many perceive the presentation by region and country as providing a useful and informative guide to international cooperation, this format could be retained. State might then also present analysis and predictions in a manner tailored to its own functional organization, which includes Political, Economic, Consular, Administrative, Public Diplomacy and Commercial components, plus Diplomatic Security and other lateral offices, with each component providing relevant but different outlooks on the challenges and impacts of terrorism.

In addition to required information and structure, the Department of State might be encouraged to provide supplementary facts, analysis, predictions, and other relevant information in separate chapters or annexes without prejudice for future years. This flexibility could maximize the use of the Department’s expertise by including such topics as the linkage of terrorism to weapons of mass destruction, terrorist narcotics activities, and other areas of interest without the possibility of creating requirements that may outlive their usefulness. Some of this has already been legislated by Congress in Public Laws 108-458 and 108-487.

The public diplomacy elements of the report are of great relevance to terrorism policies, given the amalgamation several years ago of the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency. Since the decommissioning of the Strategic Information Initiative, State appears to have the sole departmental charter for winning hearts and minds abroad, a critical strategic component of any long-term, reality-based, and forward-looking antiterrorism strategy.

Arguably, the report is an appropriate vehicle for describing, among other results, the trends in public opinion polls abroad concerning aspects of terrorism or Islamist militancy, when available or significant. The report might discuss current public diplomacy initiatives which attempt to mitigate support for terrorism and how successful they have been.

The report’s usefulness to Congress would likely be enhanced by inclusion of classified appendices to inform Congress about sensitive issues and analysis. Often countries do not want it made public that they go out of their way to assist the United States in certain sensitive anti-terrorist operations. And often it may not be productive to strongly criticize countries in a public document if the feeling is that they can be won over.Yet, clearly this is information of interest and importance to Congress.

After the structure of the report is generally determined, the baseline content could also be defined. Further options concerning content and subject matter are discussed below.

Report Content

Regardless of whether information is presented in country reports or in separate chapters (or both), the report might include, at a minimum, information of potential interest to Congress such as the following, some of which is already present:

■ Levels of state cooperation (or lack thereof) in antiterrorism efforts.Which states support or incite terror? Which states countenance or allow terror? Which states stand firmly opposed to it? Which countries are cooperative, but vulnerable? Which are exemplary?

■ Responsiveness of international organizations to antiterrorism programs, going beyond the United Nations to encompass regional organizations and others, such as Interpol and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

■ Profiles and data on major terrorist groups, as well as on emerging groups, including activities, capabilities and attributed significant incidents.

■ Trends, including all reported incidents of major significance, categorized by location, target and method of attack, with emphasis on incidents affecting U.S. interests. Data on fund-raising and recruiting trends would likely be of interest to Congress as well.

■ Attitudes/factors contributing to terrorism and its support.

■ Economic consequences of terrorism.

■ Special Topics: some options might include:

—Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

—Links to narcotics and organized crime.

—Fund-raising and money laundering.

—Economic impact of specific major attacks.

—Impact of technology, including the internet, on terror and counter-terror.

■ Proposed action agenda; goals and objectives for the year ahead.

Conclusion

In combating terrorism, we are engaged in an ongoing campaign, not a war in the traditional sense. Both Congress and the Administration are heavily committed to this open-ended effort. Communicating the best information available as clearly as possible to the Congress will benefit the United States in this campaign.

As in the past, a major component of any meaningful annual report to Congress on international terrorism will likely focus on the successes and failures of diplomacy and the levels of cooperation provided by states in the global campaign against terror. A well-structured, comprehensive report could include supporting information, profiles on major and emerging terrorist groups, discussion of major developments or trends in terrorist activity—especially those directed against U.S. personnel or interests—and evaluation of the impact of terrorism on individual nations and the global economy.

The report would likely continue to include a potentially changing array of special topics, supplemented by presentation of a policy-driven action agenda with both short-term and long-term goals and objectives, in which the “war of ideas” plays a significant role. Such a report could serve congressional needs by providing an important reference tool and policy instrument in support of the nation’s global campaign against terror. Providing the Department of State with flexibility while mandating a periodic review of both structure and content could help ensure its ongoing effectiveness.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my formal testimony. I would be honored to answer any questions the Subcommittee might have.

Thank you.

Terrorism: Why the Numbers Matter—Testimony of Larry C. Johnson

In the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001, fighting terrorism has become a growth business in the United States. We are spending money like wild fire to harden airports, equip first responders, deploy explosive detection equipment, and beef up border patrols. I understand how in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks there was enormous political pressure to do something. As a result Federal and State governments are spending a lot of money to deter and prevent this threat.

While we assume that the threat of terrorism is very grave, little attention has been paid to trying to assess the actual threat. If we are going to spend a lot of money to detect and deter a particular threat it stands to reason we should have some method of identifying and monitoring the persons and groups who threaten us. I believe we have an obligation to the taxpayers to somehow measure the effectiveness of our nation’s efforts to combat the threat of terrorism. Yet some have argued that we cannot use statistics to help gauge the actual threat. If we accept that argument then what standards or methods should we use to determine if a threat exists? Feelings? Mind reading? I am not trying to be flippant. But surely we should be able to have an objective, empirical discussion about terrorism because ultimately it is an activity carried out by flesh and blood human beings.

Although a terrorist act can have a psychological effect on a population, it is more than a state of mind—it is a tangible, organized physical activity. It is a pre-meditated act. And when I say “pre-meditated” I am referring to a host of activities ranging from the recruitment of personnel, training, intelligence collection, acquisition of explosives, and the provision of such mundane things as food and a place to sleep. People who want to engage in terrorist operations need a place to train. It does not require a large base with elaborate barracks and shooting houses. It can be done on the cheap. But it does require one or more physical locations where prospective murderers can plan and prepare.

I take the threat of terrorism seriously. I believe that Americans, regardless of political affiliation, take the threat seriously. We recognize that there are people in the world who, if given the opportunity,would like to kill large number of Americans. Fortunately for us, desire does not equal capability.

If we are going to confront this threat intelligently we must be serious about measuring and monitoring the activity. We must also be willing to take an honest, objective look at the facts and put terrorism in its proper perspective.We ought to acknowledge that terrorism, thankfully, is a relatively infrequent activity and that the number of lives lost at the hands of terrorists over the past 30 years are relatively few compared to the thousands who die from drug abuse, or cancer or automobile accidents in any given year. Nonetheless, terrorism has the potential to cause great harm and should not be ignored or trivialized.

We are here today in part because the State Department, in a break with previous policy, has claimed that the numbers on terrorism do not matter.When I learned in mid-April that the Department was planning to quietly submit the legally required report to Congress without including the 2004 terrorism statistics I was shocked. (I decided to publish this development on the Counter Terrorism Blog—counterterror. typepad.com.) I was told by friends in the intelligence community that the Seventh Floor at State (this is a State Department euphemism for the Secretary of State and her staff) was alarmed by the data, which showed a dramatic increase in significant terrorist attacks and fatalities. Rather than explain the meaning of these numbers to the Congress and the American people, the Seventh Floor wanted to shift the burden of explanation to the National Counter Terrorism Center. It was only after a minor media and Congressional firestorm that the State Department decided to release the report in tandem with the statistical data from the National Counter Terrorism Center.

I was amazed by the audacity of Phil Zelikow and John Brennan at the State Department press conference on April 28th, who insisted that the numbers did not matter and could tell us little about the progress of our national policy in dealing with terrorism. At a minimum this is intellectually dishonest. If we are to be successful in finding and defeating those groups and individuals who want to employ terrorism against us we must have the courage to call a spade a spade. I hope we have not entered a world created by Lewis Carroll, where up is down and bigger is smaller. If we refuse to accept objective facts about terrorist activity then I do not know how we can keep track of what is happening around the world.

Last year’s facts on terrorism are disturbing because they point to a trend of increased lethality by Islamic extremist groups.The 651 attacks marks the highest number of significant incidents of terrorism the intelligence community has recorded since 1968. (An incident is counted as significant if an attack results in death, injury or kidnapping of one or more persons, or property damage is in excess of $10,000). This surpasses the previous high of 273 significant attacks in 1985. It also was the second highest death toll from terrorist attacks.The 1,907 people who died in international terrorist attacks last year marks the second highest death toll in 36 years, with 2001 still holding that horrific record.

Why are the numbers important? For starters the raw data on terrorist incidents tells us who is getting killed, where they are being killed, and who are the likely culprits. That information should help our policymakers set priorities for employing our diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, and military resources in going after groups who have killed or are planning to kill Americans.

Beyond helping establishing priorities, the numbers also flag trouble spots that require intense focus.Take last year, for example.The numbers show that most of the attacks and fatalities occurred in Iraq, India, and Russia. If we are going to confront the threat of terrorism effectively our efforts ought to concentrate on these areas. The terrorist attacks in these three countries share a common tie—the attacks were carried out by groups with links to international Islamic jihadists.

Let us take a closer look at the threat in India’s Kashmir region. Some of the groups carrying out those terrorist attacks—the Lashkar Tayiba and Harakat ul-Ansar—have received direct support, including financing and training, from senior Pakistani intelligence officers. It is worth recalling that the cruise missiles fired by President Clinton in August of 1998 in retaliation for the Al Qaeda bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania struck a camp in Afghanistan and killed members of Harakat as well as two Pakistani intelligence officers. In the war against Islamic extremists Kashm matters.

Pakistan poses a delicate policy dilemma.On the one hand it has been an important ally in the war against Al Qaeda. Pakistan has helped apprehend and turn over to US authorities terrorists such as Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Ramsi Yousef, and Mir Aimal Kansi. On the other hand there are Pakistani officials who are financing and training groups responsible for international terrorist attacks.The statistics on terrorist activity in Kashmir tell us a very uncomfortable story—our ally in the war on terrorism is also a sponsor of terrorism.

The terrorism statistics can create some uncomfortable policy dilemmas. I am not suggesting that they should take precedence over all other considerations. During my time at State Department, for example, there was a behind the scenes debate about whether or not to put Greece as well as Pakistan on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. If we had relied solely on the terrorism data then both countries should have been put on the list. But State Department also looked at other issues.This is the grey area where intelligence data and policy considerations collide. In retrospect I do not think previous versions of Patterns of Global Terrorism went far enough in putting both Greece and Pakistan on notice that their support for terrorism was unacceptable behavior. Frankly if the data concerning their role in supporting groups responsible for terrorist attacks had been more fully disclosed it might have generated enough pressure to persuade them to back off of that support.

What Should We Do about the Numbers?

I have no beef with NCTC taking over the job from CTC of compiling the statistics on terrorism. I also welcome the news that 10 analysts are now focused on this task. If that leads to better, more comprehensive data on terrorist activities it will provide an important resource to finding and rooting out those groups who threaten us. However, we still do not have a good explanation of why the CIA’s CTC was able to do a credible job of tracking terrorist activity but TTIC could not. Why did TTIC only assign three part time workers to the task of monitoring and counting terrorist incidents? What is NCTC, the TTIC successor, doing differently?

I think it is a big mistake to separate the statistics from the policy analysis in the Annual Report. I believe that State Department should continue to be responsible for issuing an annual report on terrorism that includes the statistical data.This is not a fight over turf, nor am I trying to protect a status quo. The State Department role in producing the Patterns of Global Terrorism, at least until this year, was pretty straightforward. S/CT was never in charge of collecting or compiling the statistics. That task was carried out by CTC (and later TTIC) with the help of INR. In the future I would hope that NCTC and INR analysts would again meet on a regular basis to make the decision about what should be classified as an incident of international terrorism.The analysts in NCTC and INR should continue to draft the narrative of the report. For its part S/CT should continue to do the policy overview and the policy summaries at the start of each regional section.The Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism should retain the job of editing and producing the final report. The key to this process is a joint, closely coordinated effort with the NCTC and INR.

There is a need for better information in the report. Summary statistics, such as total attacks or total fatalities, are of little use in helping further our understanding of what is going on in the world of international terrorism. NCTC needs to provide more “micro” data. By “micro” I mean specifically identifying which groups are responsible (or believed to be responsible) for terrorist attacks that produce fatalities. If you consult the previous editions of Patterns of GlobalTerrorism, for example, you would be hard pressed to answer the question: How many attacks has Hezbollah carried out? How many fatalities did Hezbollah attacks cause?

One piece of analysis sorely lacking in previous editions of Patterns concerns identifying emerging trends in terrorist attacks. Last year, for example, I created charts using the data I summarized from incidents listed in Appendix A of previous editions of Patterns of Global Terrorism that showed a dramatic, steady rise in the number of significant attacks, even though the total number of attacks was declining.When I looked more closely at the data I realized that in 2003, for example, over 95% of the casualties were caused by attacks by Islamic extremists in just 10 countries. The annual report to Congress needs more precise data and more thoughtful analysis.

The definition of “international terrorism” needs to be reconsidered. From an analytical standpoint I think it would be useful for NCTC to keep track of all violence, not just terrorism, as a means of establishing a benchmark. I do not think we have sufficient data today to indicate whether or not there is a direct correlation between violence and terrorism. From an analytical standpoint it is important to differentiate between groups like Colombia’s FARC, who rarely targets US and European citizens, from a group like Islamic Jihad that takes pride in encouraging such attacks.

NCTC’s methodology should been expanded to include under the umbrella of international terrorism those groups that receive assistance of any kind from outside their national territory.This would allow us to capture the terrorist attacks carried out over the last several years by the Chechens.While it is true that most Chechen attacks have killed Russians in Russia there is overwhelming evidence that they are closely aligned with Al Qaeda. In March 2002, for instance, Chechen fighters killed US soldiers in the mountains of Afghanistan.

The State Department and NCTC should also follow up on the recommendation by the State Department’s Inspector General that some statistics be made available on a quarterly basis. I fail to see how having more information about terrorist events is harmful or counterproductive.

I believe that part of the reason the statistics became an issue again this year is because of the failure to keep the position of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism filled with a competent Presidential appointee.That slot has been vacant now for almost six months.While the conventional wisdom is that State Department’s role in combating terrorism consists of sending stern diplomatic notes to terrorists, it is an unfair and inaccurate perception. State Department’s role as the lead for coordinating international terrorism emerged in the mid-1980s in the wake of devastating attacks in Lebanon. A National Security Decision Directive signed by President Reagan in early 1986 gave State the responsibility of coordinating international terrorism policy.This was in response to an interagency fight that broke out during an effort to apprehend the terrorists responsible for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship.While flying over Italy in late 1985 in pursuit of Abu Abbas, a State Department official and a CIA officer argued heatedly over who was in charge of the mission. Recognizing the need for a clear chain of command the Department of State was put in charge of coordinating the efforts of CIA, DOD, and FBI efforts to track and deal with terrorism.The first man put in charge of this effort was L. Paul (Jerry) Bremer.

The Coordinator for Counter Terrorism at State Department (S/CT) plays a variety of roles, including facilitating the travel of military special operations personnel into countries where terrorists are operating or are receiving safehaven. S/CT also has played a direct role in helping FBI and other law enforcement personnel move into countries to apprehend terrorists or provide assistance to local forces,who in turn root out and capture terrorist suspects. And, within Foggy Bottom, S/ CT pokes a finger in the eye of the regional bureaus.While the incentive of the desk officer for a country like Pakistan, for example, is to be accommodating of Pakistani concerns, a bureau like S/CT is there to bring up the uncomfortable facts about Pakistan’s support for terrorist activities. Not having a Coordinator for CounterTerrorism is inexcusable and unfortunately says a lot about the true importance assigned to that function.

At the end of the day we need more and better coordination between the intel community and the policy community, not less. While there have been problems with Patterns of Global Terrorism in the past, the basic process of the coordination of the two elements was sound. I am struck by the irony that the staff director of the 9-11 Commission that correctly criticized the stove piping of information and the lack of coordination, was a key decision maker in taking collaborative process and splitting it into separate components that will make cooperation and coordination more difficult. I encourage this Committee to take the appropriate steps to require these two important agencies—State and NCTC—to work closely together on one report on terrorism.